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Finishing this dissertation and my PhD program would not have been possible without the love 
and support of family, friends, and colleagues, perseverance, compromise, and sacrifice. I'm 
the first person in my extended family to earn a PhD. 
Thank you to Rodney and Shirley, my parents, who provided my siblings and me 
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showing signs of what became an Alzheimer's disease diagnosis. My mom took on full-time 
caregiving. Mom, you are amazing. The disease is devastating, a kudzu-like funeral that creeps 
over everything until the sun is gone. It has been strange trying to join a professional world 
that claims to revolve around ideas and the mind as I watch my dad lose both. We academics 
take ourselves and our ideas so seriously sometimes, and forget we live in a tiny, protected, 
privileged world where ideas and understanding have some intrinsic value, rather than always 
serving something else. But watching my dad disappear into the disease made me realize that 
minds, like bodies, are fleeting, temporary things, and I wonder even more about the academic 
practice of equating names—bodies—with ideas. My dad got into woodworking when he was 
around the age I am now. He made a wooden sign that lived in our garage. As a kid I always 
wondered what it meant, and it took growing up to finally understand. It read, "Golf—the most 
fun you can have with your pants on" (R. Poggioli, ~1980). I've now completed a PhD and 
haven't found a more solid social scientific law. 
Thank you also to my mom, Shirley, for her steadfast love and support and for working 
every day to make others' lives better and easier. Thanks to her, I had a childhood combination 
of safety and exploration that seems increasingly rare today but also seems like a great start for 
a scientist. She led the Scout troop that introduced me to the natural world. She led the church 
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groups that taught me people try to explain their world and what happens before and after it, 
one of the best introductions to social science I can imagine. (She might not see it that way…). 
When my dad, sister, and brother went to amusement parks for roller coasters, she took me to 
museums, fostering my interests. She probably bought or at least tolerated the home chemistry 
set that my brother and I used as kids, and she didn't ban science from our lives when we 
hypothesized that mixing all chemicals in a test tube and putting a fire under it would cause 
fun. Hypothesis confirmed. One of my favorite moments was starting to talk about some 
research papers I was reading in my first years of the PhD program. She immediately started 
pointing out questions and flaws in the research design that I and other PhD students struggled 
to grasp. She has accomplished so much in her own life and with her family, and I wonder 
what other things she would have accomplished had she applied her intelligence and energy to 
something else. But I am grateful she applied it to her family, including me, and those around 
her. I have so much of her in me, and I intend to use the advantages she gave me to somehow 
harness my work to helping others. 
Thank you to my sister Whitney for helping me through difficult times. I'm glad we're 
growing closer. It's wonderful seeing you build your family. Please be patient with me as I 
figure out how to be an uncle. Thank you to Andy M. for getting me interested in grilling, 
though you might regret it given your competitive approach to the sport. Thank you to my 
brother Andy S. for conversations about life, death, middle age, and haircuts, all more related 
than I realized. It's great to see you building your family. My extended family has been a source 
of support, comfort, and blistering perspective. We've lost irreplaceable folks and gained new 
ones through what I understand is "acquiring children" in which other humans are internalized 
into the family to take advantage of the efficiency advantage authority has over contracting. 
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That is a theory of the firm joke. I acknowledge it is bad. I can think of one person who might 
laugh at it. Worth it. 
 Thank you to my friends Adam, Christina, Devin, Molly, Pat, Nate, Seth (alphabetical 
order…you can't make me sort). I apologize to all of you for disappearing for years at a time. 
I will be a better friend. Thank you for talking, playing games, going to southern New Mexico 
on short notice, visiting me in Minnesota. Nate, thank you for doing the work to plan events 
that keep the group together. Seth, thank you for the conversations and helping me through 
difficult times. 
Completing a PhD is difficult under the best circumstances of a functioning department, 
personal health, financial stability, no crises for friends or family, and no need or desire to 
emotionally or financially support others. These conditions are of course rare, but some 
organizations assume them. Completing a PhD in the absence of several or many of these 
things is extraordinarily difficult. I am perhaps most proud of this dissertation as a symbol of 
persistence and survival. 
These comments do not reflect on my adviser Alfie Marcus. Thank you, Alfie, for 
supporting me as I found a way to finish the program. Our conversations about research and 
the profession of academia were often the highlight of my week. The first substantive 
conversation we had was when we shared a train from the Newark airport to Philadelphia for 
my first Academy of Management Meeting. I look forward to many more conversations. When 
he was a PhD student, he met with his advisor, and his advisor took his manuscript and threw 
it in the garbage, saying Alfie now had to go talk to people. I hope Alfie doesn’t mind me 
sharing that story. That kind of abusive supervision is of course ridiculous and should not be 
tolerated, but the story reveals Alfie's abilities to persist through such treatment and build a 
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career researching, teaching, and advising in ways that advance our understanding while 
building up the people around him. That's a rare combination in academia, and I feel extremely 
fortunate to learn from him, especially given my background is far removed from the culture 
of academia. 
I have more Midwestern working-class populism in me than I realized, and that 
viewpoint often puts the process of work first over outputs or accolades. This caused trouble 
for me because few things are more threatening to strategy research right now than focusing 
on process rather than results. The field is grappling with a credibility crisis and a fight over 
how to do its research. But science is process. Yet my focus on process, on method, often 
clashed with field-wide pressure to produce "results." I often felt isolated, sidelined, and 
undermined by colleagues. Unfortunately, my association with academia and science meant I 
sometimes got similar rejection from the world I came from. Halfway through my PhD, a 
cousin from back home asked me what I do. I told him I do research. He said I must get a lot 
of blisters on my fingers doing that. Sometimes life is a hackneyed country music song. So it 
goes. 
 Thank you to my professional family, especially my adviser Alfie Marcus and my 
committee members Paul Vaaler, Russ Funk, and Dave Knoke. Thank you for supporting me 
through finishing the program. Thanks also to Stephanie Bertels for your advice at the Atlanta 
Academy of Management Conference. Many more deserve thanks, including Minnesota 
faculty and PhD students.  
 Thank you to anyone committed to using scientific methods to understand the world. 
You never know who you inspire, even if they never say a word to you. We're part of an 
extraordinary project. We should be proud of what we've accomplished so far, and we should 
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be vigilant against those who use the appearance of science for self-enrichment. Finishing a 
PhD should be a celebration of a tremendous, collective achievement and of joining a 
community of scholars. I hope to eventually work with doctoral students, and I will strive to 
make their training worth celebrating. 
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This dissertation tests stakeholder influence capacity theory. Stakeholder influence capacity 
theory predicts that corporate social responsibility affects firm performance by influencing the 
behavior of stakeholders. In a series of chapters, this dissertation reviews research at the 
intersection of corporate social responsibility and stakeholder management, uses causal 
inference research designs to test for a direct effect of responsibility on performance, tests 
whether stakeholder influence capacity mediates the responsibility-performance relationship, 
and tests whether stakeholder influence capacity is stakeholder-specific rather than a single 
firm capability applicable to all stakeholders. 
 The findings are the following. First, they support the responsibility literature's lack of 
consensus about a main effect of responsibility on performance. Second, there is mixed 
evidence for whether stakeholder influence capacity mediates the effect of responsibility on 
performance, with some models showing partial mediation, some full mediation, and others no 
mediation. Third, stakeholder-specific mediation tests provide some evidence that stakeholder 
influence capacity varies by stakeholder group, with no evidence for customer stakeholders, 
some evidence for employee stakeholders, and strong evidence for environment stakeholders. 
 These findings suggest the responsibility performance literature's lack of consensus 
around an effect of responsibility on performance could be due to lack of attention to the 
specific mechanism that connects corporate responsibility actions to performance. Lack of 
attention to mechanisms was identified at least two decades ago, but only now are scholars 
beginning to specify and test mechanisms. Stakeholder influence capacity theory advances 
responsibility research by proposing a stakeholder influence capacity mechanism connecting 
responsibility to performance.  
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This dissertation is one of the first empirical tests of stakeholder influence capacity 
theory's mediation hypothesis. Prior work tested stakeholder influence capacity as a 
moderation hypothesis; the authors of that study explicitly note that the theory is a mediation 
theory while their empirical test is moderation. This dissertation using mediation analysis more 
directly tests the theory and finds suggestive evidence that the theory needs further 
development to account for stakeholder heterogeneity. 
The primary contributions of this dissertation are advancing the ongoing integration of 
corporate social responsibility and stakeholder management research, empirically testing 
stakeholder influence capacity, and advancing stakeholder influence capacity theory by 
showing the need for further theoretical development accounting for stakeholder-specific 
influence capacity. The final chapter charts future research directions needed to further develop 
the theory and understand whether and how firms' corporate social responsibility actions 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Companies are increasingly expected to address social issues through corporate social 
responsibility actions. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a corporate investment of 
resources that seeks to address a social welfare issue for some stakeholder group (Barnett, 
2007). CSR research examines the motivations, processes and performance of CSR 
investments (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Bansal & Song, 2017). CSR research originated in the 
1970s (Margolis & Walsh, 2003) with studies of the performance impact of pollution and the 
social responsibility of stock investments (Moskowitz, 1972). Since then, CSR research has 
grown into a mature research field, including competing theories and robust debate about 
methodological challenges in testing those theories. 
Despite decades of research, the CSR literature has yet to produce a consensus or 
consistent empirical findings on whether and how CSR actions influence firm performance. 
CSR scholars now point to both theoretical and methodological reasons for the lack of 
consistent findings. Theoretically, CSR research is turning toward theorizing exactly how 
specific CSR actions affect the welfare of specific groups (Barnett, 2007; see also Wood & 
Jones, 1995). This work seeks to uncover the mechanisms by which CSR could affect firm 
performance. CSR research has tended to ignore underlying mechanisms, instead assuming 
CSR can affect performance and examining correlations between CSR measures and 
performance measures without theorizing how, or even whether, the CSR being studied could 
affect the performance being studied (Wood & Jones, 1995). Recent work calls for CSR 
scholars to specify and test theoretical mechanisms by which CSR actions affect performance 
(Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Mattingly, 2017).  
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Methodologically, CSR research has used research designs that struggle to isolate 
causal effects and address the problem of reverse causality. Reverse causality has even been a 
central theoretical claim, with one influential study arguing there is a "virtuous circle" in which 
CSR increases performance and performance increases CSR (Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
Methodological studies identified problems in data commonly used in CSR research, 
suggesting past studies suffer from measurement error and construct validity problems that call 
into question insights gained from past CSR research (Chatterji, Durand, Levine, & Touboul, 
2016; Mattingly & Berman, 2006). 
This dissertation advances CSR research by empirically testing a specific theoretical 
mechanisms connecting CSR and performance recently developed in what I call stakeholder 
influence capacity theory (Barnett, 2007). Stakeholder influence capacity (SIC) theory 
advances CSR research by specifying an exact theoretical mechanism by which CSR affects 
firm performance. The theory pushes CSR beyond the question of whether "it pays to be good" 
toward questions of whether it pays to be good, why, when, and for whom. SIC theory proposes 
that CSR affects performance by first influencing the behavior of stakeholders whose actions 
drive changes in firm performance. I test stakeholder influence capacity with two 
counterfactual and one associational research designs and a new data source that improves on 
some of the methodological problems identified in past work. 
I make my primary theoretical contributions to the literature on CSR performance. The 
most recent review of CSR performance examined 104 articles and found a small, positive 
relationship between firm-level responsibility and financial outcomes (Aguinis & Glavas, 
2012). A meta-analysis of 52 studies found an overall positive association between social 
responsibility strategies and financial performance (Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003). 
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Another review of 109 studies found almost half report a performance increase associated with 
increased responsibility, 7 found responsibility predicts a performance decrease, 28 found no 
association, and 20 reported mixed results (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). A 2009 review of 128 
studies found more than 50% reported a positive responsibility performance relationship, about 
25% reported a mixed or neutral relationship, and about 15% reported a negative relationship 
(Peloza, 2009). 
These findings remain contentious. The tendency for published studies to report 
positive associations might be due to publication bias rather than a positive responsibility 
performance relationship (Rost & Ehrmann, 2017). Six responsibility data sets commonly used 
in responsibility performance studies do not agree on their ratings for the same firms (Chatterji 
et al., 2016). Ratings of firms' environmental responsibility do not use all publicly available 
information, suggesting ratings might contain measurement error that reduces the validity of 
empirical studies (Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009). Positive and negative responsibility 
actions and outcomes are different, but CSR studies often combine positive and negative 
actions into a single measure (Mattingly, 2017; Mattingly & Berman, 2006). A replication of 
Waddock and Graves (1997) supported the positive association between financial performance 
and future responsibility but not the relationship between responsibility and future financial 
performance (Zhao & Murrell, 2016). 
The diversity of measures is a pressing problem. Peloza's (2009) found 36 measures of 
responsibility and 39 measures of financial performance used in CSR research. The choice of 
firm performance measure affects whether CSR affects performance. There might not be a 
universal effect of CSR on performance. Richard, Devinney, Yip, and Johnson (2009) 
reviewed firm performance measures used in management studies and found high diversity in 
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the type and measures used to capture firm performance (Table 1). If responsibility affects 
each performance outcome differently, the responsibility performance literature's general 
inattention to exactly which firm performance outcome is affected by what type of CSR 
remains a large research gap in the CSR literature, despite identification of CSR mismatching 
more than twenty years ago (Wood & Jones, 1995). 
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Table 1: Performance measures by type, reproduced from Richard, Devinney, and Yip (2009) 
Accounting Financial market Mixed accounting/financial market 
   
Cash flow from operations Beta coefficient Balanced scorecard 
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) Earnings-per-share (EPS) Cash flow per share 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) Jensen’s alpha  Cash flow return on investment (CFROI) 
Market share Market value (or market 
capitalization) 
Cash value added (CVA) 
Net operating profits (earnings) Price-to-earnings ratio (P/E ratio) Discounted cash flows (DCF) 
Net operating profit less adjusted taxes (NOPLAT) (or net operating profit 
after taxes NOPAT) 
Return on market-valued assets  Economic value added (EVA) (aka 
economic profit) 
Profit margin Stock price  Free cash flows 
Return on assets (ROA) Total shareholder return (TSR)  Internal rate of return (IRR) 
Return on book-valued assets Tracking stocks Market-to-book value (MBV) 
Return on capital employed (ROCE) (or return on capital ROC)  Market value added (MVA) 
Return on equity (ROE)  Net present value (NPV) 
Return on investment (ROI)  Shareholder value analysis (SVA) 
Return on invested capital (ROIC)  Tobin's q 
Return on net assets (RONA)  Total business return (TBR) 
Return on sales (ROS)  Warranted equity value (WEV) 
Return on total assets  Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
Risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC) (or return on risk-adjusted 
capital RORAC) 
 Z-score 
Sales (revenue)   
Sales growth (revenue growth)   
Variance in accounting profitability   
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The measurement of CSR has also been criticized. One common CSR measure is the net KLD 
score from the MSCI KLD dataset. However, net KLD is constructed by subtracting negative 
CSR performance from positive CSR performance. The resulting net measure fails to 
distinguish between negative and positive CSR performance. If negative and positive CSR 
have different performance effects, conflating them in a single measure would not enable 
research to capture those separate effects A recent review recommended positive and negative 
responsibility actions be measured separately (Mattingly, 2017). Generally, responsibility 
performance studies need to explore specific responsibility measures regardless of the dataset 
being used (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; H. Wang, Tong, Takeuchi, & George, 2016). 
The research gaps filled by this dissertation address the theoretical and methodological 
problems reviewed so far and are described in Table 2. The gaps include theory about the exact 
mechanism(s) connecting responsibility to performance, whether responsibility causes 
performance or instead spuriously correlates with performance, how specific responsibility 
actions affect specific financial performance outcomes, which financial performance outcomes 
are affected by responsibility, how responsibility measures can be improved, and how 
researchers can avoid problems in commonly used data sets. 
Table 2: Research Gaps 
Gap Filled in 
Cause or correlation Chapter 2 
Mechanism connecting responsibility to performance Chapters 2 and 3 
Relevant performance outcome Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
Improved responsibility measure and data quality Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
Variation across stakeholder groups Chapter 4 
 
This dissertation contributes to identifying whether the relationship between responsibility and 
performance is causal. Past studies use associational research designs, usually regression of 
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observational data. I use two counterfactual research designs, propensity score matching and 
difference-in-differences estimation (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Morgan & Winship, 2007).  
Second, this dissertation addresses the theoretical mechanism gap by examining the 
mechanisms of stakeholder influence capacity (Barnett, 2007). Stakeholder influence capacity 
is the capacity of a firm to use social responsibility to influence stakeholder behavior in ways 
that increase firm performance. The theory claims a firm's influence capacity mediates the 
effect of CSR on performance. To test the theory, I use mediation analysis to examine whether 
stakeholder influence capacity fully or partially mediates the effect of CSR on performance. 
This analysis contributes to emerging empirical work on specific pathways through which 
responsibility affects specific stakeholder groups that, in turn, can influence specific 
performance outcomes. Responsibility studies are beginning to examine how responsibility 
works through specific stakeholder groups, such as employees (Flammer, 2015; Flammer & 
Luo, 2017; Shea & Hawn, 2019). I extend this work by testing mediation for the stakeholder 
groups of employees, customers, and environmental stakeholders. 
Third, I address the stakeholder mismatching problem by using a firm performance 
outcome that stakeholder groups can influence: revenue. Lev et al (2010) use revenue in their 
study of corporate philanthropy because they can theoretically motivate how philanthropy 
might affect revenue. Revenue can be influenced by stakeholders including customers through 
purchasing behavior, employees through effort, and environmental stakeholders through 
organizing boycotts that influence sales. Stakeholder influence on revenue can also happen 
quickly, while other performance outcomes' response to responsibility might require more time 
to manifest (Flammer, 2015; Lev et al., 2010). 
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Revenue is also an appealing performance measure because it is not a ratio. Ratio 
variables cause parameter estimates to fluctuate across estimations and inflate standard errors, 
causing inference errors. Yet ratio variables remain common in management and strategy 
research. Wiseman (2009) found 74% of empirical papers published in 2007 in Strategic 
Management Journal included ratio variables. Certo et al. (2018) found 79% of empirical 
articles published in Strategic Management Journal in 2015 included ratios, and more than 
two-thirds of empirical articles published in Academy of Management Journal in 2015 used at 
least one ratio variable. Using revenue as a level rather than a ratio facilitates more reliable 
estimation. 
 I also address gaps four and five related to data and measures. To avoid problems 
identified with the commonly used KLD dataset (Mattingly, 2017), I measure CSR with a 
dataset that aggregates multiple CSR measures into a single CSR measure. Aggregating across 
multiple measures uses information from many different CSR ratings rather than relying on a 
single rating. Single ratings do not converge on similar values (Chatterji et al., 2016). 
Combining multiple ratings uses information from each rating but avoids equating a single 
rating with overall CSR performance. Similar to how political scientists construct more 
accurate polls by aggregating across many different individual polls (Pasek, 2015), aggregating 
multiple responsibility datasets together can produce a more accurate CSR measure using 
information from all individual ratings. 
Research Questions 
Across three related chapters, I answer the following research questions: 
1. Chapter 2 (main relationship): What is the effect of corporate social 
responsibility on firm financial performance? 
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2. Chapter 3 (stakeholder influence capacity): Does stakeholder influence capacity 
mediate the effect of responsibility on performance? 
3. Chapter 4 (stakeholder heterogeneity): Is stakeholder influence capacity 
stakeholder-specific? 
Dissertation Structure 
Chapter 1 describes the research questions, justification for the studies, and reviews the 
relevant literature. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 each report the results of a study answering one of the 
research questions. Chapter 5 concludes with combined inferences across the three studies.  
Chapter 2 answers the research question, What is the effect of corporate social 
responsibility on firm financial performance? Prior research, replications, and reviews find a 
weakly positive association between responsibility and firm performance (Aguinis & Glavas, 
2012; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Zhao & Murrell, 2016). Recent empirical studies using 
counterfactual research designs capable of causal inferences also report a positive relationship 
(Flammer, 2015). Theoretical and empirical problems related to data and measurement remain 
a problem in this literature (Chatterji et al., 2016, 2009; Mattingly, 2017; Mattingly & Berman, 
2006). I incorporate solutions to these problems into my empirical strategy to test hypotheses 
about the responsibility performance relationship. 
I hypothesize a positive relationship between corporate social responsibility and firm 
financial performance. To test the hypothesis, I use a dataset created and maintained by 
CSRHub Inc., which I refer to as CSRHub. CSRHub aggregates multiple social responsibility 
measures into twelve measures of responsibility performance. I match firms in CSRHub data 
with firms in Compustat data to link responsibility to firm performance. To assess causality, I 
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use the counterfactual research designs of propensity score matching and difference-in-
differences estimation of the effect of responsibility on performance. I supplement the 
counterfactual designs with fixed effects panel regressions.  
Chapter 2 makes three contributions to the social responsibility performance literature. 
First, I build on the trend toward causal identification by using counterfactual research designs 
to capture the causal impact of responsibility on performance. Second, I contribute an empirical 
examination of the relationship using an alternative data source to the standard MSCI KLD 
STATS data, enabling a test of whether relationships found using KLD data hold using an 
alternative corporate social responsibility measure. Third, I test social responsibility's 
relationship with revenue as a measure of firm performance. Revenue is theoretically justified 
by instrumental stakeholder theory's linkage of firm performance to changes in stakeholder 
behavior toward the firm's products and services.  
Chapter 3 answers the question, Does stakeholder influence capacity mediate the effect 
of responsibility on performance? Examining the mediating effect of stakeholder influence 
capacity is a form of testing whether stakeholder influence capacity is a mechanism connecting 
responsibility to performance. Past studies of a direct relationship between responsibility and 
performance assume responsibility has an effect on performance independent of other factors. 
Mixed results from such studies might arise from the assumption of a direct, independent effect 
being wrong. If responsibility affects performance through one or multiple mechanisms, 
studying only the direct effect conflates those mechanisms. If some mechanisms positively link 
responsibility to performance but others link it negatively, studies conflating mechanisms 
could produce conflicting results over time.  
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To address this problem, responsibility scholars are calling for more direct examination 
of specific mechanisms. At the organizational level, only 7% of studies reviewed by Aguinis 
and Glavas (2012) examine a mechanism. Those studies identified two mechanisms: intangible 
resources (e.g., Surroca, Tribó, & Waddock, 2010) and whether managers interpret 
responsibility as an economic opportunity. Barnett and Salomon (2012) attempt to study the 
stakeholder influence capacity mechanism, but they acknowledge data limitations and hope 
their study motivates future research on how stakeholder influence capacity mediates the 
responsibility performance relationship. 
To examine how stakeholder influence capacity mediates the responsibility 
performance relationship, I use mediation analysis (Aguinis, Edwards, & Bradley, 2017; Baron 
& Kenny, 1986; Shaver, 2005). I use the same responsibility and performance data as in 
Chapter 2. Measuring stakeholder influence capacity is complicated by my inability to directly 
observe firm-level capability to influence stakeholder behavior with responsibility. Instead, I 
use a measure of how stakeholders perceive firms' responsibility on various dimensions as a 
proxy for firms' stakeholder influence capacity. The critical assumption with this measurement 
approach is that a positive change in perception indicates the firm has the ability to influence 
its stakeholders to behave in ways that increase performance. Conversely, a negative change 
in responsibility perception correlates with a firm's lack of stakeholder influence capacity. 
I use mediation analysis developed in psychology (Baron & Kenny, 1986) and modify 
it following the recommendations of Shaver (2005) and Aguinis et al. (2017) for using 
mediation analysis in strategy research. Shaver recommends addressing possible correlation of 
errors across the estimating equations in the classic Baron and Kenny test. Aguinis et al. 
identify both the popularity of mediation analysis in management research and a variety of 
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problems that reduce the knowledge gained from mediation studies. They recommend 
solutions to these problems that I implement in the mediation analysis. 
Chapter 4 answers the question, Is stakeholder influence capacity stakeholder-specific? 
Understanding whether stakeholder influence capacity differs across stakeholder groups is 
important given recent instrumental stakeholder theory development recognizing that 
stakeholder groups have different preferences and motivations that influence their attitudes 
toward and responses to their treatment by firms (Bosse, Phillips, & Harrison, 2009; Bridoux 
& Stoelhorst, 2014; Bundy, Vogel, & Zachary, 2018; Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips, 2010). If 
stakeholder groups vary on preferences, firms need to tailor their relationship maintenance to 
the preferences of each stakeholder group. The same responsibility action will be evaluated 
differently by stakeholder groups, suggesting the effect of that action on stakeholder behavior 
will vary across those groups. Initial development of stakeholder influence capacity assumed 
all stakeholders have similar preferences. Relaxing that assumption in the context of 
instrumental stakeholder theory development implies the responsibility performance 
relationship varies across stakeholder groups.  
To answer the research question, I derive and test hypotheses predicting the 
responsibility performance relationship for the stakeholder groups customers, employees, 
environmental stakeholders, and investors. As in previous chapters, I use CSRHub data to 
measure responsibility and Compustat data to measure performance. I test hypotheses 
predicting different responsibility performance relationships across stakeholder groups.  
Chapter 5 integrates findings across Chapters 2, 3, and 4, discusses limitations, and 
charts future research directions for understanding whether and how firms transform CSR into 
performance through influencing stakeholders.  
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CHAPTER 2: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF RESPONSIBILITY ON 
PERFORMANCE? 
This chapter tests for a direct effect of CSR on firm performance. The CSR literature generally 
claims a weak, positive association between CSR and performance (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; 
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Peloza, 2009; Wood, 2010). To test the relationship, I use two 
counterfactual research designs, difference-in-differences estimation and propensity score 
matching. I supplement the analysis with one associational design, fixed effects regression. I 
next describe the theory and hypothesis tested. I then describe the research designs, data, and 
empirical strategies. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The CSR performance literature examines CSR's contribution, if any, to firms' overall financial 
performance. Margolis and Walsh (2003) trace the origins of CSR performance research to the 
1970s (Bragdon & Marlin, 1972; Moskowitz, 1972). The most recent reviews and meta-
analyses of the literature cover studies published up to about 2010 and report a weak, positive 
association between CSR and performance. A meta-analysis by Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 
(2003) analyzed 52 studies and found responsibility "is likely to pay off," but the relationship 
is inconsistent across performance and responsibility measures. Peloza (2009) reviewed 159 
publications (128 academic, 31 practitioner). Of academic articles, 59% reported a positive 
CSR performance relationship, 27% a mixed or no relationship, and 14% a negative 
relationship. Of practitioner articles, 77% reported a positive association, 10% a mixed or no 
relationship, and 13% a negative relationship. Aguinis and Glavas (2012) reviewed 588 articles 
and 102 books on responsibility performance at the institutional, organizational, and individual 
levels of analysis published from 1970 to 2011. The 50 empirical and 54 conceptual studies 
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that examined responsibility performance at the organizational level reported a small, positive 
relationship between CSR and financial outcomes. 
Despite these reviews and meta-analyses claiming a positive performance effect of 
CSR, subsequent findings remain inconsistent. Waddock and Graves (1997) found a "virtuous 
circle" in which responsibility and future performance are positively associated and 
performance and future responsibility are positively associated. Later work questioned the 
virtuous circle finding. A meta-analysis of 42 responsibility studies published from 2003-2012 
found CSR and future performance positively related but performance and future CSR 
unrelated (Q. Wang, Dou, & Jia, 2016). A replication of Waddock and Graves (1997) found 
performance positively associated with future CSR but CSR not associated with future 
performance (Zhao & Murrell, 2016), contradicting both the original finding and the meta-
analysis. 
Inconsistent findings could be due to several factors. First, studies use different 
performance measures, and the effect of responsibility might differ across types of firm 
performance (Peloza, 2009). Second, studies continue to use associational designs vulnerable 
to misspecification and biased estimation results. Third, though Wood and Jones (1995) 
identified the problem of "stakeholder mismatching" two decades ago, studies still tend not to 
address the specific type of CSR and how it might affect the specific type of performance 
measured in the study. These and other problems contribute to the ongoing " notorious 
'inconsistencies' of this research stream" (Orlitzky et al., 2003, p. 422). . 
Trends in 87 CSR studies published in AMJ from 1958-2015 suggest CSR research is 
beginning to focus on CSR processes to address the problems in the literature (H. Wang et al., 
2016), including how stakeholders interpret and respond to CSR actions. Research is also 
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moving toward understanding underlying theoretical mechanisms connecting specific CS 
types to specific performance outcomes.  
Table 38 in the Chapter 2 Appendix describes responsibility performance research 
published since the last round of reviews and meta-analyses. Lev et al. (2010) found corporate 
philanthropy positively associated with future financial performance but performance not 
associated with future philanthropy, again rejecting the virtuous circle and contradicting the 
replication findings. 
Drawing on neo-institutional theory, Hawn and Ioannou (2016) separated 
responsibility actions into internal and external actions, relative to the firm. Internal 
responsibility actions aim to change the firm's structure into conformity with institutional 
expectations. External responsibility actions aim to gain the endorsement of powerful external 
constituents. The distinction resembles that between internal and external audiences in the 
stakeholder literature (Freeman, 1984). Internal responsibility aims to influence the behavior 
of internal stakeholders like employees, managers, and owners, while external responsibility 
aims to change the behavior of external stakeholders like regulators, customers, suppliers, 
shareholders, activists, and communities. Using data from 2002-2008, Hawn and Ioannou 
found prior internal and current external responsibility actions positively related to market 
performance. 
Flammer (2013) studied market reaction to firms' announcements of eco-friendly and 
eco-harmful news over the three decade period from 1980-2009. Through the entire period, 
eco-friendly news announcements were associated with increased share prices on markets, and 
eco-harmful announcements were associated with decreased share prices. However, the 
relationship changed over time. From 1980-1989, the positive market reaction to eco-friendly 
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announcements was positive, from 1990-1999, it was positive but weaker, and from 2000-2009 
the relationship disappeared. The negative market reaction to eco-harmful events also changes 
over time. From 1980-1989, there was no relationship. From 1990-1999, the relationship 
became negative, and from 2000-2009 the relationship became negative and twice as strong as 
the previous decade. From these results, Flammer inferred stakeholders' normative 
expectations on firm eco-behavior shifted over time. Early on, stakeholders expected firms to 
harm the environment, and markets rewarded firms that instead adopted eco-friendly initiatives 
or actions. However, the expectation changed toward expecting firms to act in eco-friendly 
ways. As expectations shifted, eco-friendly actions received less reward, but eco-harmful 
actions were increasingly punished by investors. These patterns suggest the preferences of 
shareholder stakeholders change over time. 
Flammer (2015) studied how the passage of responsibility-related shareholder 
proposals relates to market performance and other outcomes. From 1997-2012, markets 
responded more positively to proposals that barely passed compared to those that barely failed, 
suggesting markets believed firms adopting responsibility-related proposals would perform 
better than they would have without adopting the proposal. Flammer investigated several 
mechanisms through which better performance might occur: employees, customers, and 
infrastructure investment. Proposal passage was positively associated with labor productivity 
and sales, but not with capital expenditures. Flammer infers this to mean responsibility affected 
performance by altering the behavior of stakeholders like employees and customers, consistent 
with stakeholder influence capacity, rather than an infrastructure investment mechanism. 
As part of the turn toward replication in strategy research (Ethiraj, Gambardella, & 
Helfat, 2016), Zhao and Murrell (2016) conducted a replication study of Waddock and Graves 
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(1997). Waddock and Graves found a virtuous circle in which responsibility is positively 
associated with future financial performance and financial performance is positively associated 
with future responsibility. The replication used data from additional years and multiple 
measures of performance. It found accounting performance positively associated with future 
responsibility, though the effect size is half that reported in the original study. Responsibility 
is not associated with future market performance. Zhao and Murrell concluded that the virtuous 
circle findings of the original study might not generalize to other samples. Though Zhao and 
Murrell do not make this claim, their findings could also be driven by the types of changes in 
the CSR performance relationship over time found by Flammer (2013). 
Given the continued presence of mixed findings, even with counterfactual research 
designs, what is the expected effect of responsibility on firm performance? At this point in the 
history of the responsibility performance literature, we have not found enough consistent 
evidence at the firm level to conclude that responsibility causes either increased or decreased 
firm performance. Even though more studies report a positive relationship than a null or 
negative relationship, evidence suggests that disparity might be attributable to publication bias 
making it easier to publish papers finding a positive relationship than papers finding no or a 
negative relationship (Rost & Ehrmann, 2017). The possibility of publication bias suggests the 
weight of evidence in the published literature should be adjusted away from a positive 
association. Published studies tend to report more positive associations, but after adjusting this 
evidence away from a positive relationship to account for publication bias, there is likely no 
causal effect of responsibility on firm performance at the firm level. 
However, this conclusion changes if we consider a specific type of firm performance 
outcome. Using all published responsibility performance studies to determine if there is a 
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responsibility performance relationship assumes that all the different firm performance 
outcomes in those studies are conceptually and empirically equivalent. But the responsibility 
performance relationship empirically varies according to the firm performance measure used 
(Orlitzky et al., 2003; Zhao & Murrell, 2016), suggesting all firm performance outcomes are 
not interchangeable in their relationship with responsibility. 
I study a firm performance outcome that is theoretically relevant to a variety of 
stakeholders: revenue. By theoretically relevant, I mean it can be argued that the outcome (1) 
matters to the stakeholder and (2) can be affected by the stakeholder. Wood and Jones (1995) 
argue we should only expect a positive relationship between responsibility and performance 
when there is a theoretical mechanism linking them. Lev et al (2010) use revenue in their study 
of corporate philanthropy because they can theoretically motivate how philanthropy might 
affect revenue. I adopt a similar approach and use revenue as the financial performance 
outcome for responsibility. 
Using revenue in the context of the stakeholder influence capacity mechanism links the 
financial performance outcome to the theoretical mechanism. If stakeholder behavior toward 
the firm connects responsibility actions to performance, the performance construct should be 
something that matters to and can be affected by a variety of stakeholders. Revenue can be 
influenced by a variety of stakeholders, including customers most directly but also employees 
through effort and environmental stakeholders through organizing boycotts that influence 
sales. Employees can affect revenue through their effort selling the firm's products and 
services. Customer stakeholders can influence revenue by increasing or decreasing their 
purchases of the firm's offerings. Community stakeholders can affect revenue by choosing to 
become customers or by organizing community actions supporting or resisting the firm's 
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operations (Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2014). Environmental stakeholders can influence 
revenue by organizing social movement activities like boycotts against the firm. Stakeholder 
influence on revenue can also happen quickly, while other performance outcomes' response to 
responsibility might require more time to manifest (Flammer, 2015; Lev et al., 2010).  
Based on these arguments, I predict that CSR has a causal, positive effect on revenue. 
Hypothesis 1: Increased corporate social responsibility causes increased firm 
revenue. 
Data and Sample 
Testing the direct effect of CSR on performance requires data on both CSR and firm 
performance. Data on CSR come from CSRHub. I purchased access to the data with a grant 
from the University of Minnesota Institute on the Environment (Project #MS-003-17, Principal 
Investigator Prof. Alfred A. Marcus).  
Data on firm performance are from Compustat, accessed through the University of 
Minnesota institutional subscription to the Wharton Research Data Service. 
CSRHub 
The CSRHub data contain 965,877 firm-month observations on 17,458 unique firm names 
(14,362 unique CUSIP identifiers) from December 2008 to September 2017. I obtained 
CSRHub data through a 1-year subscription to the CSRHub data service. The subscription 
provided access to data from the beginning of the CSRHub service in December 2008 through 
September 2017, the last month available at the time the annual subscription expired. 
The CSRHub data are created and maintained by CSRHub, LLC, a private company 
founded in 2008. CSRHub's mission is to increase access to Environment, Society, and 
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Governance (ESG) ratings. Rather than create its own CSR measure, CSRHub contracts with 
other ESG measure providers to obtain access to their measures. CSRHub aggregates those 
providers' measures into a single ESG measure for each firm. As of April 1, 2019, CSRHub 
reports using 613 providers as data sources for its rating calculations (CSRHub LLC, 2019a). 
However, not all firms are rated by every provider, so the number of ratings that are used to 
calculate a CSRHub rating varies across firms and time. CSRHub's main providers are 
ASSET4 (Thomson Reuters), Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), IdealRatings, ISS (IW 
Financial), MSCI (ESG Intangible Value Assessment and ESG Impact Monitor), Trucost, and 
VigeoIRIS (CSRHub LLC, 2019c).  
The unbalanced panel of CSRHub data has 965,877 monthly observations on 17,458 
firms over 106 months, and 2,712 firms appear in all months. The median months per firm is 
54. Table 3 shows the number of firms rated in each year. 
Table 3: Number of firms rated by CSRHub, by year. 
Year 
Firms with at 
Least One 
Rating 




2008 3,027 1,128 37.3 % 
2009 4,646 2,575 55.4 % 
2010 6,552 3,930 60.0 % 
2011 8,655 4,748 54.9 % 
2012 9,649 5,617 58.2 % 
2013 10,771 6,256 58.1 % 
2014 10,686 6,733 63.0 % 
2015 11,716 7,281 62.1 % 
2016 13,931 8,255 59.3 % 
2017 17,419 8,813 50.6 % 
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Table 4 shows ratings by year and month. The number of ratings per month generally 
increases over time as more firms are added. The number of ratings occasionally declines (e.g., 




Table 4: CSRHub observations by month and year. Each observation is a firm-month. 
Month 1 (Jan) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 (Dec) Total 
2008 - - - - - - - - - - - 3,027 3,027 
2009 3,031 3,031 3,130 3,382 4,321 4,332 4,388 4,391 4,413 4,550 4,594 4,631 48,194 
2010 4,875 5,276 6,075 6,162 6,159 6,175 6,176 6,176 6,175 6,452 6,380 6,428 72,509 
2011 6,700 6,725 6,850 6,946 7,203 7,820 8,034 8,169 8,242 8,293 8,198 8,141 91,321 
2012 8,199 8,322 8,396 8,627 8,676 8,607 8,708 8,880 8,986 9,099 9,390 9,440 105,330 
2013 9,567 9,645 9,621 9,715 9,091 9,035 9,100 9,099 9,368 9,508 9,531 9,522 112,802 
2014 9,441 9,559 9,434 9,561 9,662 9,645 9,652 9,753 9,778 9,663 9,774 9,901 115,823 
2015 10,068 10,059 10,063 10,073 10,044 10,525 10,637 10,559 10,818 10,914 10,677 11,010 125,447 
2016 11,219 11,288 11,289 11,359 10,999 11,005 12,626 12,654 12,754 12,846 12,791 13,286 144,116 
2017 13,387 13,255 17,240 17,240 17,240 17,229 17,239 17,239 17,239 - - - 147,308 
Total 76,487 77,160 82,098 83,065 83,395 84,373 86,560 86,920 87,773 71,325 71,335 75,386 965,877 
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CSRHub uses a bottom-up process to create sub-category, category, and an overall rating. To 
create a category rating, two or more subcategory ratings must exist for the firm. Not all firm-
months contain a measure on all dimensions. Table 5 shows the number and percentage of 
firm-month observations on each dimension in the data. 
Table 5: Firm-month CSRHub observations by responsibility dimension. 
Type Rating  Rated  Not Rated %Rated 
Overall   561,501  404,376 58% 
     
Category Community  785,009  180,868 81% 
Subcategory Community development  755,656  210,221 78% 
Subcategory Product  614,193  351,684 64% 
Subcategory Human rights and supply chain  818,916  146,961 85% 
     
Category Employees  833,241  132,636 86% 
Subcategory Compensation and benefits  697,011  268,866 72% 
Subcategory Diversity and labor rights  788,659  177,218 82% 
Subcategory Training, health, and safety  686,667  279,210 71% 
     
Category Environment  591,179  374,698 61% 
Subcategory Energy and climate change  731,515  234,362 76% 
Subcategory Environmental policy and reporting  567,318  398,559 59% 
Subcategory Resource management  583,020  382,857 60% 
     
Category Governance  888,167  77,710 92% 
Subcategory Board  712,286  253,591 74% 
Subcategory Leadership ethics  884,364  81,513 92% 
Subcategory Transparency and reporting  822,771  143,106 85% 
     
Note: Two or more subcategories must be rated to calculate a category rating. Data from 
December 2008 to September 2017. Table created March 12, 2018. 
 
Table 6 shows descriptive statistics for each responsibility dimension. 
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Table 6: Firm-month CSRHub descriptive statistics. 
Rating  Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Overall    561,501  52.258600 7.6925610 16.84620 83.82450 
      
Community    785,009  53.835540 12.0379000 5.00000 94.00000 
Community development    755,656  51.294490 12.8621800 5.01000 94.94000 
Product    614,193  51.726500 13.3769200 5.16000 94.90000 
Human rights and supply chain    818,916  55.020870 12.4933900 5.11000 94.94000 
      
Employees    833,241  54.817720 12.5191300 5.00000 95.00000 
Compensation and benefits    697,011  53.859460 13.5531800 5.18000 94.90000 
Diversity and labor rights    788,659  54.742900 13.1170200 5.05000 94.71000 
Training, health, and safety    686,667  53.543150 13.3188900 5.04000 94.91000 
      
Environment    591,179  52.955830 10.8330000 6.00000 94.00000 
Energy and climate change    731,515  52.040430 12.8599700 5.04000 94.95000 
Environmental policy and reporting    567,318  53.692120 12.3928000 5.08000 94.98000 
Resource management    583,020  53.065360 11.2105200 5.72000 94.27000 
      
Governance    888,167  51.873580 12.0472800 5.00000 95.00000 
Board    712,286  50.187860 13.8914700 5.04000 94.53000 
Leadership ethics    884,364  54.384700 13.2615300 5.07000 94.94000 
Transparency and reporting    822,771  49.299580 13.1306100 5.27000 94.78000 
      
Note: Category ratings are bold. Subcategory ratings are nested beneath the categories for which they are used to 
generate the category rating. 
 
Using individual responsibility measures has been criticized due to questions about the validity 
of any single measuring system (Chatterji et al., 2016). By aggregating together information 
from multiple ESG sources, CSRHub's aggregation approach has the potential to produce a 
more valid CSR measure than any single measure used in the aggregation.  
For the overall responsibility rating, Figure 1 shows the relationship between overall 
rating and the number of sources used to calculate the rating. 
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Figure 1: CSRHub overall rating against number of sources used in rating. 
 
Note: CSRHub overall rating and number of sources used to calculate the overall rating. Point transparency set 
to 20%. Darker areas indicate more observations. 
 
CSRHub uses the following process to calculate its ratings from source ratings (CSRHub LLC, 
2019e). First, it creates a single framework of twelve sub-categories, four categories, and one 
overall rating of firms' ESG activities. CSRHub uses source ratings to generate sub-category 
ratings. Category and overall ratings are generated from sub-category ratings. 
Second, CSRHub converts each source rating to a rating from 0 to 100, where 0 is worst 
and 100 best. This standardizes the rating across rating sources. CSRHub refused to discuss 
how it converts source scores to the 0-100 scale. 
 Third, CSRHub normalizes input ratings by comparing across ratings and adjusting 
them to eliminate bias for disagreement between input rating systems. CSRHub refused to 
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discuss its adjustment process for fear such information could be used to reverse engineer their 
ratings methodology and enable firms to game their ratings. However, similar to how political 
scientists can adjust individual polls using knowledge of the polls' biases, it is possible 
CSRHub can identify biases in input systems and create a less biased aggregate measure.  
Fourth, CSRHub aggregates the input systems together by weighting each input system 
for its credibility and value. These aggregate ratings produce the sub-category ratings.  
Fifth, CSRHub applies rules determining if an aggregate rating is backed by sufficient 
information to retain (CSRHub LLC, 2019b). As of January, 2019, CSRHub dropped ratings 
on about 140,000 firms for which they felt they had insufficient information (CSRHub LLC, 
2019e). Finally, CSRHub assesses each rated firm and assigns it an industry of operation. Its 
industry classification system is based loosely on the NAICS code system, and CSRHub 
provides a crosswalk for translating its industry codes into NAICS codes (CSRHub LLC, 
2019d). 
By combining many different ratings systems into a pooled rating, CSRHub's 
methodology has the potential to produce a more reliable rating than any individual rating 
system. Political science research on how to aggregate multiple polls into a single poll more 
accurate than any individual poll suggests aggregate responsibility ratings might address the 
weaknesses identified in using single ratings (Chatterji et al., 2009). Work on polling 
aggregation in political science. Any individual poll will reflect biases in the polling 
procedures used, similar to how any individual ESG rating might reflect bias in the ratings 
procedure. Political scientists have shown how aggregating across multiple polls can produce 
a more reliable poll than any single poll used in the aggregation (Pasek, 2015). This is an 
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important strength of the data given recent criticism of ESG ratings that they do not converge 
toward agreement on individual firm ratings (Chatterji et al., 2016).  
Compustat 
Data on corporate financial performance and other firm characteristics are from Standard & 
Poor's Compustat Capital IQ database. I use both Compustat North America and Compustat 
Global. Compustat North America – Daily contains data on firms headquartered in North 
America. Compustat Global – Daily contains data on firms headquartered outside North 
America. 
Final Sample 
I match CSRHub with Compustat data to create my analysis sample. Month-level CSRHub 
data complicate matching with year-level Compustat data. I aggregate CSRHub data up from 
the firm-month to the firm-year level. 
I explore three aggregation methods. First, I calculate the CSRHub rating in the last 
month of data for each year. While this is typically December, it is sometimes another month 
if the firm drops out of the CSRHub ratings data before December in any year. Second, I 
calculate the average of the rating for each year as the yearly measure. Third, I calculate the 
median of the rating for each year as the measure for the year. Table 7 shows descriptive 
statistics for the overall rating measure for each aggregation method. Means and standard 
deviations for all three aggregations are within 0.3 and 0.2, respectively, and all three 
aggregation methods have identical minimum and maximum values. 
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics for year-level aggregated CSRHub overall rating measures. 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Last month of year 52.09012 7.764424 16.8462 83.8245 
Year median 51.92573 7.770861 16.8462 83.8245 
Year mean 51.89341 7.629368 16.8462 83.8245 
 
Correlations for the three aggregation methods exceed 0.93 (Table 8), supported by scatterplots 
(Figure 2). 
Table 8: Correlations of CSRHub aggregated overall rating measures. 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) 
(1) Last month of year 1   
(2) Yearly median 0.9328 1  
(3) Yearly mean 0.9424 0.9931 1 
 
These correlations suggest all three aggregation techniques capture similar variation in 
CSRHub scores. While aggregating from month- to year-level discards variation, all three 
aggregation methods produce year-level measures capturing similar information. 
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Figure 2: Scatterplots showing relationships between three methods of aggregating CSRHub 
overall rating from month- to year-level. 
 
In my empirical analyses, I use the last month of the year aggregation method. Using the last 
month of the year is similar to the method used by Compustat. Compustat annual data are 
calculated at the end of each firm's fiscal year, representing an end-of-year metric. 
Matching North American Firms on CUSIP-year 
To match firms with a CUSIP in CSRHub to Compustat – North America data, I use the 
Wharton Research Data Service's search function. The search takes CUSIPs and a date range 
as input and returns all firms with those CUSIPs in that date range. 
I first convert CSRHub's 9-digit CUSIP to an 8-digit CUSIP compatible with 
Compustat – North America Fundamentals Annual. I use the Compustat – Capital IQ CUSIP 
converter tool in WRDS to convert CSRHub's 9-digit CUSIP to an 8-digit CUSIP compatible 
with Compustat's search engine. I create a list of all unique CUSIPs in CSRHub, resulting in 
14,362 unique CUSIPs. I convert these 9-digit CUSIPs to 8-digit CUSIPs, producing a list of 
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13,195 unique 8-digit CUSIPs. The conversion results in a loss of 1,167 (8.1%) CUSIPs 
compared to the original list of 9-digit unique CUSIPs in CSRHub. The loss occurs because  
Using the converted CUSIPs, I search Compustat – North America Fundamentals 
Annual for all CUSIPs between 1990 and 2018. I then match these data to CSRHub on CUSIP 
and year. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 9 shows descriptive statistics for the final sample. Table 10 shows the correlation matrix. 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics. 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Revenue 55612 6148.777 18170.81 -45500 484000 
Revenue HIS 55612 7.827 2.101 -11.419 13.782 
CSRHub Overall 39112 52.264 7.846 16.846 80.252 
Treat 3 Positive 38143 .002 .047 0 1 
Treat 3 Negative 38143 .002 .047 0 1 
Treat 2 Positive 38143 .033 .179 0 1 
Treat 2 Negative 38143 .029 .167 0 1 
Treat 1 Positive 38143 .161 .368 0 1 
Treat 1 Negative 38143 .14 .347 0 1 
Debt 54870 4022.952 44292.47 -.407 3230000 
Assets 55617 23663.03 137000 0 3460000 
Age 37035 25.785 18.06 1 71 
Size 46367 17.863 51.92 0 2300 
Advertising 9333 141.426 516.677 0 9729 
R&D 25455 16567.41 265000 -73900 16800000 









Table 10: Correlation matrix. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Revenue 1.00 
(2) Revenue HIS 0.48* 1.00 
(3) CSRHub Overall 0.12* 0.12* 1.00 
(4) Treat 3 Positive 0.01* 0.03* 0.06* 1.00 
(5) Treat 3 Negative -0.00 0.02* -0.03* -0.00 1.00 
(6) Treat 2 Positive -0.00 0.00 0.12* 0.26* -0.01 1.00 
(7) Treat 2 Negative 0.01* 0.02* -0.07* -0.01 0.28* -0.03* 1.00 
(8) Treat 1 Positive 0.00 0.02* 0.15* 0.11* -0.02* 0.42* -0.08* 1.00 
(9) Treat 1 Negative -0.01 -0.04* -0.09* -0.02* 0.12* -0.07* 0.43* -0.18* 1.00 
(10) Debt 0.23* 0.13* 0.03* 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 1.00 
(11) Assets 0.39* 0.24* 0.08* 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.61* 1.00 
(12) Age 0.17* 0.34* 0.00 0.01* 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.03* 0.03* 0.02* 1.00 
(13) Size 0.64* 0.40* 0.11* 0.01* -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.10* 0.26* 0.14* 1.00 
(14) Advertising 0.59* 0.47* 0.17* 0.04* 0.00 -0.00 0.03* 0.00 -0.02 0.41* 0.31* 0.28* 0.39* 1.00 
(15) R&D 0.18* 0.09* 0.04* -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02* 0.04* 0.16* 0.08* 0.22* 0.58* 1.00 







I use three empirical approaches to test the hypothesis that responsibility causes increased 
revenue. Propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analysis are counterfactual 
research designs. Fixed effects regression is an associational design.  Each empirical approach 
requires different assumptions. Comparing results across approaches can generate greater 
insights than using a single approach. 
Prior to 2010, CSR performance research tended to use associational designs to analyze 
observational data. Like all research designs, associational designs require unverifiable 
assumptions to make causal inferences. One assumption required by associational designs 
using regression analysis is complete specification, which means the regression model 
accurately captures the relationship between performance and CSR. Misspecification occurs 
when a regression model does not accurately describe the relationship. McWilliams and Siegel 
(2000) tackled the misspecification problem by arguing past regression models omitted 
research and development, an important cause of both performance and CSR. After including 
research and development in regression models, McWilliams and Siegel found no relationship 
between CSR and performance, demonstrating how changes to specification can have large 
impacts on analysis results. 
Recently CSR researchers adopted counterfactual rather than associational research 
designs, hoping make inferences more robust to specification and other assumptions. 
Counterfactual designs mitigate the specification problem by using an understanding of the 
data generating process as the inference engine, rather than claiming to accurately model the 
relationship being studied.  
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Flammer (2015) used a regression discontinuity counterfactual design to study the 
performance effect of adopting a CSR-related shareholder proposal. The data generating 
process is shareholders voting on proposals. Proposal passage requires exceeding a threshold 
of votes in favor of the proposal. Proposals' positions relative to the threshold are observable, 
and the counterfactual research design regression discontinuity uses the observability of the 
threshold to eliminate confounds of the effect of proposal passage on other outcomes. Flammer 
compares the performance effects of proposals that barely pass to those that barely fail. 
Because such proposals are both close to the passage threshold, regression discontinuity 
assumes potential confounds are equally distributed in the group of firms that barely pass 
proposals and the group that barely fails to pass them. The only systematic difference between 
groups is proposal passage. Because the only difference between the groups is proposal 
passage, comparing performance outcomes of the two groups provides an estimate of the 
causal effect of barely-passed proposals on firm performance. If resolution passage does 
measure responsibility (a construct validity issue separate from the causal inference issue), the 
performance effect of resolution passage can be inferred to estimate the performance effect of 
taking a responsibility action. The analysis found CSR-proposal adoption caused increased 
stock market price, responsibility ratings, return on assets, net profit margin, Tobin's Q, sales 
growth, and labor productivity. Adoption had no effect on return on equity or capital 
expenditures.  
Counterfactual research designs 
Counterfactual research designs estimate causal relationships by approximating experimental 
designs in which the researcher controls treatment assignment and creates a treatment group 
and a control group (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Morgan & Winship, 2007; Rubin, 1974). 
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Approximate experiments are known as quasi-experiments. Because I cannot control treatment 
assignment, a quasi-experimental framework is the next best option for testing the causal effect 
predicted by Hypothesis 1. In the framework, responsibility is the treatment, and revenue is 
the outcome. Business firms are the research subjects.  
The counterfactual design estimates the causal impact of responsibility on revenue. The 
treatment effect of responsibility is calculated as the difference in average revenue between the 
treatment firms and the control firms that are similar to the treated firms but do not experience 
treatment. The validity of the treatment effect estimate is driven by the degree of similarity 
between treatment and control groups. If the two groups differ on non-treatment 
characteristics, and if those characteristics affect both treatment and outcome, the treatment 
effect estimate is biased and has low validity. Propensity score matching and difference-in-
differences estimation use the data generating process to eliminate such bias. 
Propensity score matching predicts each firm's probability of receiving treatment. 
Treated and control firms are matched on probability of receiving treatment. If the model of 
treatment likelihood is correct, treated and control firms should only systematically differ on 
receiving treatment. The treatment effect is estimated as the difference in outcomes between 
the treatment and control groups. 
Difference-in-differences estimation uses characteristics of the treatment event to 
create treatment and control groups. The most important characteristic is whether the treatment 
is exogenous to firms, in other words unexpected and outside firms' control. If yes, the 
treatment event quasi-randomly distributes treatment across firms. However, whether 
treatment is exogenous is typically unverifiable. Difference-in-differences estimation uses a 
proxy for whether treatment is exogenous: pre-treatment trends in the outcome for firms that 
   
35 
 
eventually experience treatment and control firms that do not. If pre-treatment outcome trends 
are the same prior to treatment, this is used as evidence that treatment is exogenous to the firms. 
Pre-treatment trend analysis is becoming more common in studies using difference-in-
difference designs (for an example, see Frake, 2017). 
Defining a treatment event 
Propensity score matching and difference-in-differences estimation both require discrete 
treatment events separating firms into treatment and control groups. I define a responsibility 
treatment event as a firm experiencing a large change in responsibility score from one year to 
the next. I define "large" in three ways, based on how far the change deviates from the firm's 
overall average responsibility score in the data. I create separate treatment event thresholds 
using how many standard deviations from the mean a firm's overall change in responsibility is 
from one year to the next. The three treatment events are experiencing a one-, two-, or three-
standard deviation change in social responsibility rating, relative to the firm's overall average 
rating in the panel.  
I use the following process to identify treatment events for each firm in my data: 
1. For each firm, calculate the standard deviation of the firm's responsibility rating for all 
years with a rating. This value is constant within firms but varies across firms. 
2. For each firm-year, calculate the change in responsibility rating from the previous year. 
This value varies within firms, except for firms whose responsibility scores don't 
change in the panel and varies across firms. 
3. For each firm-year, divide the year-on-year change in responsibility by the within-firm 
standard deviation of responsibility. The quotient is a z-score, a measure of how many 
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standard deviations away from the firm's average responsibility score the year-on-year 
change in responsibility is for that year.1 This value varies within and across firms. 
4. For each firm-year, create a dummy variable for whether the quotient from step 3 is 
greater than 1, greater than 2, and greater than 3. When the indicator equals 1, I consider 
the firm to have experienced a treatment event of either high or low unexpected change 
in responsibility. 
5. I create separate treatment variables for positive and negative responsibility changes. 
The standard deviation-based treatment definition captures how unexpected the change in 
responsibility is for a firm from one year to the next. The greater the z-score for a year-on-year 
change, the less likely that change is, compared to the firm's overall responsibility performance 
in the panel. The within-firm standard deviation captures how variable a firm's responsibility 
tends to be. This captures expectations about firms. Firms with high standard deviations tend 
to change on responsibility performance frequently with large magnitude, compared to firms 
with low standard deviations. 
I assume the more unlikely the change in a firm's responsibility rating, the less the 
change reflects actions taken by the firm. This is important because it relates to the likelihood 
that the responsibility change is exogenous or endogenous to firm choices (Shaver, 1998). 
Exogenous change refers to whether the firm chooses to change its responsibility. Exogenous 
change refers to whether factors outside the firm's control alter its social responsibility. When 
researchers control the assignment of responsibility to firms, change in responsibility is 
 
1 Z-scores are technically only possible when the population standard deviation is known. When the population 
standard deviation is unknown, as is the case most often, the T-score rather than the Z-score is used. However, in 
large samples, the normal distribution and t-distribution converge as sample size increases. Unless the sample is 
small (fewer than 40 units of observation), the difference between the z-score and t-score are negligible. 
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completely exogenous to the firm's other choices and characteristics. When the firm chooses 
to alter its responsibility, responsibility is endogenous to the firm's other choices and 
characteristics. Exogenous change simplifies treatment effect estimation: the difference 
between firms experiencing the change and those not experiencing the change is an estimate 
of the treatment effect. But endogenous change complicates treatment effect estimation and 
requires counterfactual research designs and assumptions. 
I assume the more unlikely a year-on-year change in responsibility is, the less likely 
the change is endogenous to the firm. This assumption relies on inertia in responsibility. I 
assume a firm's responsibility rating is somewhat difficult to change from year to year due to 
the difficulty of quickly reorganizing firm assets, the stickiness of firm routines, and the 
stability of social perceptions of firms' reputations. Thus, if a firm experiences a large 
responsibility change, either positive or negative, I argue it must in part be due to factors 
outside the firm's control, i.e., factors exogenous to the firm. 
I also assume within-firm responsibility is normally distributed, such that the number 
of standard deviations from the within-firm mean can be used as a measure of the probability 
of that change. Under assumptions that the within-firm average change in responsibility is 0 
and the change each year is normally distributed, responsibility changes with a z-score greater 
than 1 have a probability of about 34% of occurring by chance. A z-score of 2 has a probability 
of about 4% of occurring by chance. A z-score of 3 has a probability of about 2.6% of 
happening by chance. Thus year-on-year changes in responsibility that deviate more than 2 
standard deviations from the firm's average deviation are unlikely to occur and can be 
considered quasi-random responsibility shocks to the firm. 
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 Now that I have defined treatment events, I describe the three empirical approaches 
used to test the hypothesis: propensity score matching, difference-in-differences estimation, 
and fixed effects regression. 
Propensity score matching 
I use propensity score matching to create treatment and control groups for each of the three 
different treatment events at the 1, 2, and 3 standard deviation thresholds. 
Propensity score matching is a counterfactual research design in which the researcher 
manually creates a control group by estimating how likely each firm is to experience a 
treatment event. By estimating the likelihood of treatment for each firm regardless of whether 
the firm experienced a treatment event or not, the researcher can match treated firms with 
untreated firms based on identical treatment likelihoods. The untreated firms are the 
counterfactual for what would have happened to the treated firms if treatment had not occurred. 
 Prior studies have used propensity score matching to study the effect of responsibility 
on performance. Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2014) use propensity score matching to 
estimate the effect of adopting sustainability policies on long-run financial performance. Shen, 
Wu, Chen, and Fang (2016) use the design to study the effect of engaging in responsibility on 
banks' profit and rate of non-performing loans. Byun and Oh (2018) estimate the propensity 
score for firms to experience high media coverage of their responsibility actions. They combine 
the propensity scores with nearest-neighbor matching on covariates to match equal-propensity 
treated and untreated firms. After matching, they find firms experiencing high media coverage 
of responsibility actions have higher Tobin's q than firms not receiving high media coverage. 
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Propensity Score Model 
The ability of propensity score matching to produce unbiased treatment effect estimates 
depends on several factors, critically the validity of the model used to estimate treatment 
probability. I build a model predicting the probability of experiencing responsibility treatment 
events at each z-score threshold. To build the model, I reviewed responsibility literature 
reviews (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Bansal & Song, 2017; Orlitzky et al., 2003) and individual 
studies (Byun & Oh, 2018; Shen et al., 2016). From these, I collected predictors from models 
with responsibility as the outcome. Treatment propensity can be estimated using a logistic of 
probit regression model, and estimates should be roughly similar from both approaches 
(Imbens, 2015). 
I estimate the propensity of experiencing a responsibility treatment event as a function 
of the firm's assets, age, debt, employees, and market value (Equation 1). 
 Pr(𝐶𝑆𝑅 = 1) = 𝑓(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠, 𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡, 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠, 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) 1 
I specify this model as a logistic regression (Equation 2) 
 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 2 
Subscript i is firm and t is year. All right-hand variables are measured using Compustat. Assets 
is total assets, Age is years since the firm was first covered in Compustat data, Debt is total 
long term debt, Employees is the number of employees in the firm, and Market is Tobin's Q, a 
measure of how much financial markets value the firm compared to the firm's book value of 
assets. 
I use estimates of the betas from Equation 2 to generate propensity scores—predicted 
values of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡—for each firm i in each year t. Firms that experience treatment events are 
then matched on propensity scores with firms that did not experience treatment. Observations 
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with equal propensity scores are predicted to have the same probability of being treated, even 
if one or both are not treated in the data. Untreated firms are used as counterfactuals of what 
would have happened to treated firms if treated firms had not received treatment. The treatment 
effect is then calculated as the difference in mean outcomes between treated and untreated 
firms in the matched sample.  
Difference-in-differences Estimation 
Difference-in-differences estimation compares outcomes for a treatment group and a 
counterfactual control group before and after treatment occurs. Difference-in-differences 
estimation assumes the treatment event is exogenous to the firm and that trends in the outcome 
being studied only change for the treatment group as a result of the treatment occurring 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2009). If both assumptions are true, the treatment effect is the difference 
in outcomes between the two groups prior to treatment minus the difference between the two 
groups after treatment. 
 One challenge in using difference-in-differences in my context is that treatment does 
not occur simultaneously for all treated firms. In the classic difference-in-differences design, 
all firms that experience treatment experience it simultaneously. The difference in average 
outcome between treated and control groups before that treatment event is compared to the 
difference after that treatment event. Under various identification assumptions, the classic 
difference-in-differences design allows straightforward estimation of the causal effect of 
treatment, at the treatment-group level. 
 However, the design becomes more complicated when treatment occurs at different 
times for each treated firm, as in my context. One solution to this problem is to treat all treated 
firms as receiving treatment at the same time, setting treatment time to t0 for all events and 
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estimating the treatment effect as if the timing of treatment does not matter. I adopt that 
approach in this study.  
 Another important element of the difference-in-differences design is construction of 
the counterfactual control group. The counterfactual control group represents what treated 
firms' outcomes would have been had they not been treated. In my context, the counterfactual 
control group represents what the revenue of firms experiencing responsibility treatment events 
would have been if they had not experienced the treatment event. 
 Counterfactuals are imaginary and their quality cannot be empirically assessed. Instead, 
the quality of a counterfactual control group depends on rhetorical arguments about whether 
we should believe treated firms would have behaved exactly like counterfactual firms had they 
not been treated. 
 One approach to making this argument for difference-in-differences is to visually 
examine the trends in outcomes between treatment and counterfactual groups prior to treatment 
using a plot. The assumption is that if the outcome trend for the treatment group is parallel to 
the outcome trend for the counterfactual group up until the treatment date, then this provides 
support for the argument that the counterfactual group is a valid counterfactual for the treated 
group. In short, the argument is that if the outcome trends were parallel prior to treatment, they 
would have continued to be parallel after the treatment on the treatment group, if the treatment 
had not happened. When this assumption is true, the outcomes for the counterfactual group 
after the treatment date can inform what the outcomes for the treatment group would have been 
absent treatment. 
Difference-in-differences Model 
I estimate the following difference-in-differences regression model: 
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 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
In this model, the dependent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is firm i's revenue in year t. 𝛼𝑖 is an unobserved fixed 
effect for each firm i. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when firm i is a treated firm 
and 0 when a firm is an untreated control firm. The variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the observation occurs in a post-treatment year t, else 0. The regression includes an error 
term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 for each firm i in each year t. 
The parameters to be estimated are 𝛽, 𝛾, and 𝛿. The parameter of interest is 𝛿, the 
estimate of the causal effect of experiencing a responsibility treatment event on revenue. The 
estimate 𝛽 is the average revenue of treated firms in the pre-treatment period. The estimate of 
𝛼𝑖 is the average revenue of untreated firms in the pre-treatment period. The estimate of 𝛾 is 
the average revenue for treated firms in the post-treatment period.  
Fixed effects estimation 
I estimate the following fixed effects regression model: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 = 𝛽(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + 𝛄(𝐂𝐢𝐭 − 𝐂𝐢) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?) 3 
Subscript i refers to firms and subscript t refers to years. Within each parenthetical, the firm-
level mean of each variable is subtracted from year t's value, creating within-firm estimates. 𝛽 
is the coefficient of interest estimating the within-firm change in Y associated with a one-unit 
within-firm change in X. 𝐂 is a vector of control variables, and 𝛄 is the vector of coefficient 
estimates corresponding to each control variable. 𝜀 is an error term assumed random after 
clustering by firm. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured as revenue (or next-year's 
revenue in models exploring time-lagged treatment effects). Many firm performance measures 
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have been used in the responsibility performance and broader management literatures (Richard 
et al., 2009). Similar measurement diversity exists in the responsibility performance literature, 
where one review found 39 different performance measures (Peloza, 2009). 
Inattention to performance measures also complicates knowledge accumulation. 
Building on prior work requires the outcome being studied matches across studies. If the 
responsibility performance relationship differs according to the measures used, the hundreds 
of published studies on the relationship might reflect a small amount of knowledge 
accumulation—specific to each performance measure—rather than the large amount of 
knowledge implied by the number of published responsibility performance studies.  
Justifying the choice of performance measure is important because the choice of 
measure moderates the responsibility performance relationship. Orlitzky et al. (2003, p. 419) 
find "the association between [responsibility] and [performance] depends on the firm's or 
researcher's operational definition of each construct, or both." Accounting measures are more 
highly correlated with responsibility than market-based measures, particularly with reputation-
based responsibility measures. Disclosure-based responsibility measures show lowest 
correlation with performance. Orlitzky et al. claim their findings support the idea that study 
artifacts, stakeholder mismatching, and lack of theoretical specification drive the differences 
in the responsibility performance relationship across studies. 
Zhao and Murrell (2016) find responsibility positively correlates with one accounting-
based measure—return on assets—but not two other accounting-based measures of return on 
equity and return on sales. They find no association between responsibility and market-based 
measures. These findings somewhat support Orlitzky et al.'s (2003) findings that responsibility 
is associated with accounting-based measures but not market-based measures. 
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Differences could be driven by stakeholders viewing performance outcomes differently 
depending on their interests. Market-based performance might matter to shareholders, but not 
to community stakeholders more concerned about the local community impacts of firm 
operations (Wood & Jones, 1995). Another source of difference could be due to statistical 
artifacts driven by small sample sizes or measurement error.  (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Zhao & 
Murrell, 2016). This pattern could result if some financial outcomes matter more and less than 
others to specific stakeholders. Variation across financial performance measures captures 
differences in which stakeholders firms target with social strategy and which firm outcomes 
matter to those stakeholders. 
Scholars debate whether financial performance is a single construct or a meta-
construct. Meta-constructs can, and should, be measured in a variety of ways. Different 
measures reflect "differences in organizational strategies, structures, and environments" 
(Orlitzky et al., 2003, p. 425). The important thing for any one responsibility performance 
study is that its choice of financial performance measure is justified by theoretically connecting 
the performance measure to the responsibility being studied. We should only expect 
relationships between performance and responsibility measures connected together by some 
theoretical mechanism (Wood & Jones, 1995).  
I focus on a stakeholder mechanism connecting responsibility to performance. Market-
based performance measures prioritize the interests and actions of shareholder stakeholders. 
Accounting-based measures capture firms' internal efficiency, such as return on assets that 
measures the profit per unit of assets a firm controls. Subjective performance measures like 
ratings capture how stakeholders perceive performance. Measurement choice should reflect 
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differences in which stakeholders are theoretically expected to connect the performance and 
responsibility measures used in the study. 
To address these issues, I theoretically justify my choice of firm performance measure 
as revenue. I examine how stakeholders connect responsibility to performance, so I use a 
measure that matters to firms and a variety of stakeholders.  Revenue can be affected by 
customers through purchasing behavior. Employees can affect revenue through commitment 
and effort. Environmental activists affect revenue through organizing boycotts. Investors can 
affect revenue by pressuring the firm to change strategies, such as divesting or acquiring 
businesses.  
Evidence suggests responsibility can affect revenue. In the early 2000s, Sears Roebuck 
projected the promotion of its responsibility initiatives on a nationally-syndicated television 
talk show would increase sales by $13-40 million (Rochlin & Christoffer, 2000). Lev et al. 
(2010) examines the relationship between performance and corporate philanthropy, using 
revenue to measure performance. Increased philanthropy predicts future increased revenue, but 
increased revenue is not associated with increased future philanthropy. These results are 
strongest for firms most sensitive to consumer perception, suggesting philanthropy influences 
revenue through customer stakeholders. Philanthropy is also positively associated with 
customer satisfaction, further supporting the customer stakeholder mechanism. 
Independent Variable 
In propensity score matching and difference-in-differences models, the independent variable 
is an indicator variable equal to one in any year a firm experiences a responsibility treatment 
event. I use three indicator variables, each equal to a different treatment threshold. The 
thresholds are 1, 2, and 3 standard deviation changes in year-on-year responsibility for a firm. 
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 I separate each treatment into positive and negative changes in responsibility. Mattingly 
and Berman (2006) critique prior responsibility performance studies for conflating positive 
and negative responsibility into a single measure. I follow their recommendation to keep 
positive and negative responsibility events separate. 
 In fixed effects models, the independent variable is the level of CSRHub overall rating 
on corporate social responsibility. Rather than examining the cause of large deviations in CSR 
on performance, this approach examines whether changes in the actual rating of firms is 
associated with changes in firm performance. 
Control Variables  
In the fixed effects regression model, I use several control variables to eliminate potential 
sources of omitted variable bias. I control for research and development spending, following 
McWilliams and Siegel's recommendation that previous CSR performance studies were 
misspecified by omitting R&D spending (2000). Table 11 describes several other controls for 
potential causes of both CSR and firm performance. 
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Table 11: Control variables, measures, and data sources. 
Variable Measure Data source (variable name) 
Performance Revenue Compustat (revt) 
CSR treatment Deviation from mean CSRHub (over_rtg) 
CSR CSRHub rating CSRHub (over_rtg) 
Debt Long-term debt Compustat (dltt) 
Assets Total assets Compustat (at) 
Age Years in the data Compustat (ipodate; if ipodate missing, 
time since firm appears in Compustat) 
Size Number of 
employees 
Compustat (emp) 
Research and development 
capability 
R&D expenditure Compustat (xrd) 





Hypothesis 1 stated that increased CSR increases revenue. Taken together, the hypothesis tests 
reported below do not provide clear support or rejection of the hypothesis. In some estimation 
strategies, the hypothesis appears to have predictive power. In others, it does not. Some 
estimations even reject the hypothesis by showing that increased CSR causes decreased 
revenue. This pattern of mixed evidence persists in models using leading revenue rather than 
same-year revenue. Unfortunately, the results of these tests using CSRHub data do not provide 
unequivocal conclusions about the relationship between CSR and performance measured as 
revenue. However, they do inform our understanding of the relationship in ways that future 
work can explore to build toward a more consistent understanding of the relationship, if any, 
between social responsibility and firm performance. 
Propensity score matching and difference-in-differences models use treatment 
thresholds as the independent variable. Concerns about the endogeneity of treatment persist 
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regardless of the type of estimation method used. In this case, endogeneity could arise if there 
is a common cause of large changes in CSR and also firm performance that is not controlled 
for in the estimation strategies. However, as the size of CSR deviation increases, concern about 
endogeneity decreases, assuming the size (number of standard deviations from the mean) of 
the deviation indicates the unexpectedness of the event occurring. Firms likely have less 
control over large changes in CSR rating than small changes. Because of this, as the magnitude 
of the CSR change increases, there are fewer ways firms can influence the degree of CSR 
rating change. This also means there are fewer possible common causes of changes in CSR 
and performance, making larger CSR deviations more exogenous to performance than smaller 
deviations. 
But there is a tradeoff between the exogeneity of treatment events and the availability 
of data to estimate treatment effects using those treatment events. If treatment thresholds with 
higher deviations from the mean are more likely to be exogenous, we should expect estimates 
from higher thresholds to be less biased than those from lower thresholds. Ideally, there would 
be enough data to estimate all thresholds. But 3-standard deviation events are rare, and some 
years do not have enough of them to calculate estimates of treatment effects in those years. 
Treatments at 2-standard deviation are less rare and have enough data for estimation of all 
models, but these events are less likely to be exogenous than 3-standard deviation events. 
Consequently, estimates at the 2-standard deviation threshold are more susceptible to bias than 
those at the 3-standard deviation threshold. Treatment at 1-standard deviation is the most 
common. However, these events are expected to be the most vulnerable to bias due to 
endogeneity. 
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Propensity Score Matching 
I use two approaches to propensity score matching estimation. The first pooled years approach 
pools all years of data into a single dataset to estimate the propensity scores. In this approach, 
firms treated in year t can be matched with observations on firms in years other than t. One 
strength of this approach is that it utilizes all available data to calculate propensity scores, 
which improves the quality of counterfactual matches for treated firms. One weakness of this 
approach is that it assumes the observation year is independent of treatment probability: 
otherwise it would need to be included in the propensity score model. Another weakness is that 
this approach assumes every observation in the dataset is independent of all other observations. 
This is a strong assumption in panel data with repeated observations on the same firm because 
those observations are likely not independent over time. 
 The second single-year approach addresses weaknesses in the first approach but has 
other drawbacks. The single-year approach mitigates concerns about interdependence across 
years by using single years of data to calculate propensity scores, match firms, and estimate 
the treatment effect. However, the single-year approach uses less data to calculate propensity 
scores, potentially reducing the quality of counterfactual matches. 
 I report results from the pooled approach, then the single-year approach. 
Pooled years 
Table 12 reports the results of propensity score matching estimation using all years of data and 
revenue and treatment events in the same year for both positive and negative CSR treatment 
events. 
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Table 12: Propensity score matching estimation results.  
DV: Same year 
revenue 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 3 Standard Deviations  2 Standard Deviations  1 Standard Deviation 
Neighbors Positive Negative  Positive Negative  Positive Negative 





















































































































































































         
Observations for 
propensity scores 
25,048 25,048  25,048 25,048  25,048 25,048 
Treatment events 51 53  891 724  4,092 3,599 
*** p < 0.001,  ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Note: For revenue (in $millions USD) and treatment in same year for years 2009-2016. Each cell contains 
coefficient, standard error (in parentheses), and p-value. Propensity scores estimated by logistic regression of 
treatment indicator on debt, assets, age, and employees, using 25,048 observations. Treatment events is the 
number of treated firms in each model. 
 
The first column of Table 12 shows the number of neighbors used in each estimation. 
Neighbors is the number of untreated firms matched with each treated firm. The row with 
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neighbors equal to 1 shows estimate in which each treated firm is matched with 1 untreated 
firm. The row with neighbors of 2 matches 2 untreated firms with each treated firm.  
The number of neighbors involves a tradeoff between the bias and precision of 
estimates. Using fewer neighbors produces less biased but more imprecise estimates. 
Increasing the number of neighbors increases precision but also bias. When using 1 neighbor, 
each treated firm is matched with an untreated firm having the most similar propensity score 
as the treated firm. Comparing the outcome for the treated firm against the outcome for the 
untreated firm provides an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect. However, the 
estimate might have low precision because it uses only two data points. As the number of 
neighbors increases, the estimate becomes more precise due to the use of more data points. 
However, bias might increase as the difference between the treated firm's propensity score and 
the scores of neighbors increases. This concern is not applicable if all neighbors have the same 
propensity score as the treated firm, but that is not guaranteed. As the difference between 
propensity scores increase, so too do bias concerns. 
Table 13 shows the results of the propensity score models. These are logistic regression 
models regressing treatment indicators on variables that model the treatment process. 
Estimated coefficients from these models are used to calculate the predicted value of treatment 
for each firm-year. The predicted value of treatment is the propensity score for each firm-year. 
Firms that experience treatment are then matched on propensity score with firms that do not 
experience treatment.  
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Table 13: Propensity score matching estimation "first stage" logistic regression results used to 
calculate propensity scores. 
DV: Treatment 
indicator 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 3 Standard Deviations  2 Standard Deviations  1 Standard Deviation 
 Positive Negative  Positive Negative  Positive Negative 
         
Debt -0.000 -0.000  0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.751 0.908  0.127 0.575  0.949 0.220 
Assets 0.000 0.000  -0.000 0.000  -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.108 0.972  0.184 0.243  0.358 0.548 
Age 0.014* 0.011  -0.001 -0.000  -0.000 -0.005*** 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.041 0.103  0.536 0.962  0.650 0.000 
Employees 0.001 -0.002  0.000 0.001  0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.195 0.574  0.596 0.100  0.985 0.937 
Constant -6.705*** -6.452***  -3.267*** -3.536***  -1.618*** -1.656*** 
 (0.275) (0.262)  (0.061) (0.068)  (0.031) (0.032) 
 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
         
Observations 25,048 25,048  25,048 25,048  25,048 25,048 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Note: Estimates are from a logistic regression of treatment indicators on debt, assets, age, and employees. 
 
One implication of the bias variance tradeoff is that standard errors in each model in 
Table 12 should decrease as the number of neighbors increases. This pattern generally appears 
in Table 12 where standard errors with 10 neighbors are smaller than with 1 neighbor in all 
models, except Model 4. Increasing the number of neighbors increases the risk for biased 
coefficient estimation, and this risk manifests in changes to the estimated coefficient as the 
number of neighbors increases. Because estimates and standard errors change with the number 
of neighbors, p-values calculated using estimates and standard errors also change. 
The results in Table 12 provide partial support for Hypothesis 1, which predicts higher 
CSR causes higher revenue. Models 1 and 3 show consistent positive estimates across all 
neighbors, but Model 2 shows no treatment effect from 1-4 neighbors and a negative treatment 
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effect from 5-10 neighbors. Estimates with 1-4 neighbors have less bias and less precision than 
estimates with neighbors 5-10. Estimates from neighbors 1-4 support Hypothesis 1 more 
strongly than those from neighbors 5-10. 
Table 12 also reports estimates of the effect of CSR declines on revenue (Models 2, 4, 
and 6). Estimates for all negative treatment events are not statistically different from zero, 
suggesting that decreased social responsibility has no effect on revenue in the same year as the 
change in CSR. 
Substantively, the estimates suggest a 3-standard deviation positive change in CSR 
rating increases revenue from $5.5 to $8.1 billion USD in the same year as the CSR change. A 
2-standard deviation negative CSR change affects revenue from $-1.4 billion to $0 USD. A 1-
standard deviation positive change in CSR affects revenue from $700 to $900 million USD. 
Average revenue in the data is about $6 billion USD, with a median of about $1.4 billion. 
The estimates in Table 12 are for models in which the outcome revenue and the 
treatment of CSR occur in the same year. This specification assumes the effect of CSR changs 
on revenue occurs within the same year. But changes in CSR might take more time to impact 
revenue. To explore this possibility, I also estimate propensity score matching models using 
the next year's revenue as the dependent variable. Table 14 shows the results.  
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Table 14: Propensity score matching estimation results for 1-year leading revenue (in $millions 
USD) and treatment for data from 2009-2015. 
DV: Next year's 
revenue 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 3 Standard Deviations  2 Standard Deviations  1 Standard Deviation 
Neighbors Positive Negative  Positive Negative  Positive Negative 
         
1 7,708* 2,028  -261.1 2,028  332.0 431.7 
 (3,133) (3,140)  (777.6) (3,140)  (330.3) (535.9) 
 0.0139 0.518  0.737 0.518  0.315 0.420 
2 7,787* 2,129  -209.0 2,129  172.6 243.3 
 (3,306) (3,521)  (762.9) (3,521)  (304.6) (462.7) 
 0.0185 0.545  0.784 0.545  0.571 0.599 
3 8,809** 3,327  -213.1 3,327  106.3 203.6 
 (3,151) (3,474)  (725.5) (3,474)  (293.7) (440.4) 
 0.00518 0.338  0.769 0.338  0.718 0.644 
4 8,136* 3,391  -515.8 3,391  177.0 188.7 
 (3,162) (3,260)  (697.6) (3,260)  (292.7) (435.2) 
 0.0101 0.298  0.460 0.298  0.545 0.664 
5 7,663** 3,466  -578.9 3,466  262.8 219.0 
 (2,934) (3,262)  (683.7) (3,262)  (290.6) (452.4) 
 0.00902 0.288  0.397 0.288  0.366 0.628 
6 7,264** 3,613  -655.2 3,613  289.7 195.5 
 (2,747) (3,389)  (673.5) (3,389)  (291.4) (453.3) 
 0.00819 0.286  0.331 0.286  0.320 0.666 
7 6,908* 3,230  -797.7 3,230  280.1 227.8 
 (2,710) (3,417)  (669.1) (3,417)  (292.2) (462.0) 
 0.0108 0.344  0.233 0.344  0.338 0.622 
8 6,568* 2,820  -929.9 2,820  290.7 238.2 
 (2,571) (3,203)  (650.7) (3,203)  (293.7) (464.2) 
 0.0106 0.379  0.153 0.379  0.322 0.608 
9 6,536* 2,688  -934.1 2,688  291.8 256.8 
 (2,639) (3,110)  (640.1) (3,110)  (293.2) (468.9) 
 0.0133 0.387  0.144 0.387  0.320 0.584 
10 6,584** 3,223  -982.2 3,223  319.0 290.4 
 (2,511) (3,244)  (619.7) (3,244)  (291.4) (475.2) 
 0.00873 0.320  0.113 0.320  0.274 0.541 
         
Observations for 
propensity scores 
20,267 20,037  20,267 20,267  20,267 20,267 
Treatment events 50 49  858 631  3,652 2,688 
*** p < 0.001,  ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Note: Each cell contains coefficient, standard error (in parentheses), and p-value. Propensity scores estimated by 
logistic regression of treatment indicator on debt, assets, age, and employees, using 20,267 observations. 
Treatment events is the number of treated firms at each threshold. 
 
The results for next-year revenue effects provide mixed support for Hypothesis 1 and are more 
consistent than the Table 12 results using same-year revenue. At the 3-standard deviation 
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threshold (Model 1), all estimates are positive and significantly different from zero, supporting 
the prediction that increased CSR leads to increased revenue. All estimates from the 2- and 1-
standard deviation threshold estimations are not statistically different from zero (Models 3 and 
5). Similar to the estimates with same-year revenue, all models estimating the revenue effects 
of negative CSR changes are not statistically different from zero. These results suggest 
increased CSR does increase revenue after one year, but only for the largest changes in CSR 
(greater than 3 standard deviations from the firm's mean CSR performance). No other changes 
in CSR affect next year's revenue. 
Estimates from next-year models are more consistent than estimates from same-year 
models. All next-year estimates have the same sign regardless of the number of neighbors. The 
number of neighbors does not change whether estimates are statistically significant at p<0.05, 
though estimates sometimes become significant at p<0.01. 
Substantively, the estimated effect of a 3-standard deviation change in CSR on the 
following year's revenues is between $6-8 billion USD. Average revenue in the data is about 
$6 billion USD, with a median of about $1.4 billion. 
The results above are from the pooled years approach to the data. I now describe the 
results from the single-year approach. 
Single years 
Table 15 shows the results of propensity score estimation using single years of data and same-
year revenue as the outcome. All models use 1 neighbor matching, producing the least biased 
and least precise estimates. Some years have too few treatment events at the 3-standard 
deviation threshold to estimate a treatment effect. A "." character indicates those years in the 
table. 
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Table 15: Propensity score matching model estimation results of revenue (in $millions USD) 
and treatment in same year, estimated separately by year. 
DV: Same year 
revenue 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Neighbors: 1 3 Standard Deviations  2 Standard Deviations  1 Standard Deviation 
Year Positive Negative  Positive Negative  Positive Negative 
         
2009 . 3,144  1,243 4,251  2,635 3,949 
 . (8,257)  (1,812) (3,013)  (3,684) (2,384) 
 . 0.7034  0.493 0.158  0.475 0.098 
2010 3,809 -2,397  6,062*** -1,368  4,573* -2,023 
 (2,137) (1,428)  (1,499) (3,196)  (1,804) (1,252) 
 0.0747 0.0933  0.000 0.669  0.011 0.106 
2011 . .  -4,116** 3,200  -1,366 2,384 
 . .  (1,384) (1,653)  (1,098) (1,281) 
 . .  0.003 0.053  0.214 0.063 
2012 . -1,742***  -4,415*** -1,617  -1,228 -260 
 . (466)  (1,186) (2,005)  (1,437) (935) 
 . 0.0002  0.000 0.420  0.393 0.781 
2013 . .  -2,317 -2,032***  -628 -519 
 . .  (1,453) (415)  (616) (5,324) 
 . .  0.111 0.000  0.308 0.922 
2014 . .  -1,863** 423  -2,696*** 4,303** 
 . .  (585) (1,283)  (402) (1,594) 
 . .  0.001 0.742  0.000 0.007 
2015 . .  -3,921*** -3,106***  4,365 -1,351*** 
 . .  (325) (822)  (2,971) (320) 
 . .  0.000 0.000  0.142 0.000 
2016 . .  534 -3,402***  4,015*** -2,238*** 
 . .  (1,511) (428)  (1,036) (295) 
 . .  0.724 0.000  0.000 0.000 
         
*** p < 0.001,  ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Note: The outcome variable is revenue. The treatment variable is a change in CSR rating. Each cell contains the 
coefficient, standard error in parentheses, and p-value. Cells with "." have too few treatment events for estimation. 
 
The results in Table 15 suggest Hypothesis 1 does not predict the relationship in these data. 
The results do not show a consistent relationship between changes in CSR and revenue. Models 
1 and 2 have too few data points to produce estimates for most years. Models 3 and 4 are at 
the 2-standard deviation level and have enough data to estimate treatment effects. Model 3 
shows positive CSR changes sometimes have a negative, positive, or no effect on same-year 
revenue. Model 4 shows negative CSR changes have either a negative or no effect on same-
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year revenue. Models 5 and 6 at the 1-standard deviation threshold show CSR changes 
sometimes negatively, positively, or do not affect same-year revenue. 
 Table 16 shows the results of single-year estimation using next-year revenue as the 
outcome, allowing for a delay in the effect of CSR ratings changes on revenue. Similar to the 
results using same-year revenue, the results using next-year revenue suggest Hypothesis 1 does 
not accurately predict the relationship between CSR and revenue in these data. All models 
show a mix of negative, positive, and null estimates, and there are no clear time trends in the 
estimates, such as an increasing effect from early to later in time. 
Table 16: Propensity score matching model estimation results of 1-year leading revenue (in 
$millions USD) and treatment, estimated separately by year. 
DV: Next year's 
revenue 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 3 Standard Deviations  2 Standard Deviations  1 Standard Deviation 
Year Positive Negative  Positive Negative  Positive Negative 
         
2009 . -1,759  1,419 2,352  3,687 6,602 
 . (6,679)  (2,345) (2,573)  (1,905) (4,768) 
 . 0.792  0.545 0.3606  0.0530 0.1662 
2010 3,010 -5,552***  6,838*** -1,549  5,373*** -3,788** 
 (2,498) (1,368)  (1,756) (3,457)  (1,470) (1,329) 
 0.228 0.000  0.000 0.6541  0.0003 0.0044 
2011 . .  -4,334** 1,273  -3,159*** 5,144*** 
 . .  (1,444) (1,342)  (887) (1,258) 
 . .  0.003 0.3430  0.0004 0.0000 
2012 . -5,975***  -4,869*** -773  -1,037 432 
 . (727)  (644) (2,088)  (1,430) (1,203) 
 . 0.000  0.000 0.7113  0.4684 0.7195 
2013 . .  -1,568 -2,014***  -72 -1,966 
 . .  (1,418) (345)  (654) (1,752) 
 . .  0.269 0.0000  0.9119 0.2618 
2014 . .  -1,482*** 311  -2,711*** 1,616 
 . .  (252) (1,019)  (503) (1,155) 
 . .  0.000 0.7605  0.0000 0.1619 
2015 . .  -3,828*** -3,166***  3,359 -2,332*** 
 . .  (334) (889)  (2,425) (584) 
 . .  0.000 0.0004  0.1661 0.0001 
         
*** p < 0.001,  ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Note: The outcome variable is revenue. The treatment variable is a change in CSR rating. Each cell contains the 
coefficient, standard error in parentheses, and p-value. Cells with "." have too few treatment events for estimation. 
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Overall, the results of propensity score matching offer very weak support for Hypothesis 1. 
Table 14, the results from pooled year estimation of the effect of CSR changes on next-year 
revenue, especially show support for Hypothesis 1 that increased CSR increases revenue. 
Those results only apply for the rarest 3-standard deviation increases in CSR. Results of other 
propensity score estimation strategies show a mixed and inconsistent relationship between 
CSR and revenue in these data. 
 To further explore the CSR-performance relationship, I next report the results of 
difference-in-differences estimation approaches. 
Difference-in-differences 
Difference-in-differences estimation assumes treatment is quasi-random and the trend in 
outcome variables is only affected by treatment. I report the estimation of treatment effects for 
various treatment thresholds of changes in CSR rating using both same-year and next-year 
revenue as the outcome. I also estimate models using a transformed dependent variable to 
examine whether outliers on revenue exert large influence on estimates using the 
untransformed level of revenue.  
Same-year revenue 
Table 17 shows difference-in-difference estimates of same-year revenue on treatment events 
in each year. For each year in the first column of the table, treatment events in that year are 
used as treated firms, and all other firms are used as untreated firms for the counterfactual. 
Years in which estimates appear as "." have too few treated firms to calculate an estimate. 
Because difference-in-differences requires observations in periods both before and after 
treatment, estimates from the first year of data (2009) and last year of data (2017) cannot be 
calculated. 
   
59 
 
Table 17: Average treatment effect estimation from difference-in-differences models for each 
year from 2010 to 2016. 
DV: Same year 
revenue 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 3 Standard Deviations  2 Standard Deviations  1 Standard Deviation 
Year Positive Negative  Positive Negative  Positive Negative 
         
2010 6,198* 5,802***  7,109*** 6,126***  7,227*** 6,426*** 
 (2,819) (1,123)  (1,285) (1,532)  (1,072) (1,057) 
 0.0279 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
2011 1,783 19,826  2,902** 3,783  4,163*** 4,029** 
 (2,916) (10,913)  (1,110) (2,208)  (667.6) (1,549) 
 0.541 0.0693  0.00893 0.0867  0.000 0.00931 
2012 . 2,332***  2,577*** 2,282**  3,542*** 1,445* 
 . (439.6)  (516.3) (804.3)  (503.4) (711.4) 
 . 0.000  0.000 0.00455  0.000 0.0422 
2013 . .  1,748*** 2,194***  2,072*** 1,527* 
 . .  (462.2) (405.8)  (445.1) (692.7) 
 . .  0.000156 0.000  0.000 0.0275 
2014 2,519** 1,991*  2,004*** 1,357  2,315*** 1,550* 
 (928.4) (774.9)  (282.1) (1,071)  (303.7) (673.0) 
 0.00667 0.0102  0.000 0.205  0.000 0.0213 
2015 . 8,661***  1,649*** 2,109***  -1,598 1,922*** 
 . (1,530)  (353.5) (301.3)  (1,310) (314.1) 
 . 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.222 0.000 
2016 264.2 .  -223.3 850.9  -2,432** 1,303*** 
 (556.6) .  (983.8) (586.0)  (831.1) (268.2) 
 0.635 .  0.820 0.147  0.00343 0.0000 
         
Observations 38,111 38,111  38,111 38,111  38,111 38,111 
Year FEs Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
         
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Note: Reported coefficients, standard errors, and p-values are for the interaction term of treatment and post-
treatment period in a regression of revenue on treatment, treatment period, and year fixed effects. 
 
Results in Table 17 support Hypothesis 1 that increased CSR causes increased revenue. Models 
1 and 2 show results for 3-standard deviation changes, both negative and positive. Several 
years do not have enough data to estimate a coefficient. Years that are estimated show a mix 
of positive and null coefficient estimates. However, the sparseness of treatment events at this 
threshold suggests caution about these estimates. 
 Model 3 and 4 show results at the 2-standard deviation of treatment. Positive treatment 
in Model 3 shows a positive effect on same-year revenue in all years except 2016. 
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Substantively, the estimates range from a $0 to $7 billion increase in same-year revenue. These 
estimates strongly support Hypothesis 1. However, Model 4 of negative treatment events also 
show a positive effect on revenue, though not as consistently as for positive treatment events. 
In half of the years, negative changes in CSR cause between $2 and $6 billion more in same-
year revenue. In the other years, there is no relationship between negative treatment and 
revenue. The estimates show no discernible time trend, alternating between positive and null 
relationships. These results undermine the support for Hypothesis 1 provided by Model 3. 
 Models 5 and 6 show results at the 1-standard deviation threshold. These results are 
similar to the results for Models 3 and 4. The 2016 estimate for positive events in Model 5 is 
negatively different from 0, but this result uses only 1 year of post-treatment data and should 
be considered a weaker estimate than years closer to the middle of the data window. 
 The estimate tables only show estimates of the interaction term capturing the treatment 
effect. Difference-in-differences models estimate three other coefficients: average outcome for 
treated firms prior to treatment, average outcome for untreated firms prior to treatment, and 
average outcome for untreated firms after treatment. Figure 3 graphically reports these 





Figure 3: Coefficient plots of difference-in-differences estimates of treatment effects on same-year revenue from Table 17.  The x-axis 
is revenue in $millions USD. 
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Two patterns emerge from the coefficient plots in Figure 3. First, in the pre-treatment period, 
untreated firms tend to have higher revenues than treated firms. Second, in the post-treatment 
period, untreated firms tend to have lower revenues than treated firms. 
 One concern about difference-in-difference estimates using the level of revenue is that 
outlier firms—firms like Walmart with large revenues compared to other firms in the sample—
might exert large influence on estimates and obscure more generalizable estimates. 
Approaches to dealing with outliers include dropping them from the sample or transforming 
the data in some way to reduce the influence of outliers. I choose the latter and transform the 
revenue dependent variable. A common transformation is the logarithmic transformation, but 
that transformation excludes values of 0 or negative values from the data. The inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformation has similar properties as the logarithmic transformation but has 
the additional advantage of retaining values of 0 and below (see Burbidge, Magee, & Robb, 
1988 for a discussion of outcome variable transformations).  
I estimate difference-in-differences models using inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed 
revenue and report the results in the next section. Interpretation of coefficients estimated on 
inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed dependent variables is approximately equal to 
interpretation of coefficients estimated with log-transformed variables (Burbidge et al., 1988). 
Inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed same year revenue 
Figure 4 compares the distribution of untransformed revenue data to inverse hyperbolic sine-
transformed revenue data. The left panel shows how untransformed revenue data is highly 
skewed, with a small number of firms having very large revenue compared to the overall 
sample. The right panel shows how transformed revenue is much less skewed, reducing the 
influence of outlier firms on estimation. 




Figure 4: Comparison of the distribution of revenue and transformed revenue. 
 
Table 18 shows the results of difference-in-differences estimation using inverse hyperbolic 
sine-transformed revenue as the dependent variable. I compare the results to estimates using 
the untransformed variable, reported in Table 17.  
Coefficient interpretation for inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed dependent variables 
is similar to interpretation for log-transformed variables. The coefficient is approximately the 
percent change in the dependent variable associated with a treatment event. For example, 
Model 3 estimates the effect of CSR on revenue in 2013 as 0.296. This can be interpreted as 
an average 29.6% increase in revenue for firms experiencing positive treatment at this 
threshold, compared to untreated firms. The estimate using untransformed data is a $1.748 
billion average increase in revenue for treated firms. 
   
64 
 
The results using transformed data are generally in the same direction and significance 
level as the results using untransformed data, suggesting outliers have a limited impact on 
estimation in these data. Figure 4 graphically shows the other coefficients produced by the 
difference-in-differences models using transformed revenue data. 
Table 18: Average treatment effect estimation from difference-in-differences models for each 




(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 3 Standard Deviations  2 Standard Deviations  1 Standard Deviation 
Year Positive Negative  Positive Negative  Positive Negative 
         
2010 0.788*** 0.895***  0.891*** 1.046***  1.006*** 1.247*** 
 (0.225) (0.214)  (0.102) (0.165)  (0.0874) (0.119) 
 0.0005 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
2011 0.276 1.111  0.602*** 0.656***  0.793*** 0.710*** 
 (0.328) (0.948)  (0.116) (0.113)  (0.0636) (0.0735) 
 0.4004 0.2411  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
2012 . 0.526***  0.646** 0.584***  0.759*** 0.545*** 
 . (0.140)  (0.226) (0.0976)  (0.0627) (0.0583) 
 . 0.0002  0.0043 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
2013 . .  0.296*** 0.599**  0.469*** 0.537*** 
 . .  (0.0800) (0.202)  (0.0408) (0.158) 
 . .  0.0002 0.0031  0.0000 0.0007 
2014 0.585* 0.369  0.347*** 0.296  0.381*** 0.287*** 
 (0.288) (0.265)  (0.104) (0.185)  (0.0449) (0.0661) 
 0.0423 0.1625  0.0009 0.1094  0.0000 0.0000 
2015 . 0.911***  0.217 0.341**  -0.00260 0.277*** 
 . (0.198)  (0.451) (0.125)  (0.122) (0.0465) 
 . 0.0000  0.6310 0.0064  0.9830 0.0000 
2016 0.103 .  0.159 0.145  0.0109 0.174* 
 (0.105) .  (0.118) (0.225)  (0.0620) (0.0842) 
 0.3286 .  0.1776 0.5201  0.8606 0.0382 
         
Observations 38,111 38,111  38,111 38,111  38,111 38,111 
Year FEs Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
         
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Note: Reported coefficients, standard errors, and p-values are for the interaction term of treatment and post-
treatment period in a regression of same year inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed revenue on treatment, treatment 




Figure 5: Coefficient plots of difference-in-differences estimates of treatment effects on next-year revenue. The "Treatment effect" plots 




To explore whether the effect of CSR changes on revenue occurs over a longer time period 
than assumed by same-year models, I report the results of models using the next-year's revenue 
as the outcome variable. Table 19 reports the results of difference-in-differences model for 
each year using the next-year's revenue as the dependent variable. Results are similar to the 
results using same-year models and provide mixed support for Hypothesis 1. 
 Figure 6 graphically reports the results for all coefficients estimated in the models. 
Table 19: Average treatment effect estimation from difference-in-differences models for each 
year from 2010 to 2016. 
DV: Next-year 
revenue 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 3 Standard Deviations  2 Standard Deviations  1 Standard Deviation 
Year Positive Negative  Positive Negative  Positive Negative 
         
2010 5,400 5,179***  6,044*** 6,221***  6,529*** 7,150*** 
 (3,042) (1,540)  (1,463) (1,697)  (1,208) (1,110) 
 0.076 0.001  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
2011 1,703 18,354  3,281** 2,791  4,316*** 3,096 
 (3,147) (13,312)  (1,153) (2,390)  (744.0) (1,726) 
 0.588 0.168  0.004 0.243  0.000 0.073 
2012 . 2,503***  2,813*** 2,356**  3,717*** 1,566* 
 . (480.9)  (555.6) (869.6)  (562.7) (764.9) 
 . 0.000  0.000 0.007  0.000 0.041 
2013 . .  1,934*** 2,231***  2,155*** 1,648* 
 . .  (504.3) (452.8)  (487.4) (738.6) 
 . .  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.026 
2014 2,647* 2,154**  2,001*** 1,142  2,420*** 1,142 
 (1,066) (818.9)  (317.1) (1,158)  (332.8) (751.3) 
 0.013 0.009  0.000 0.324  0.000 0.129 
2015 . 7,200***  1,039* 1,753***  -2,008 1,604*** 
 . (1,899)  (440.9) (379.4)  (1,520) (382.1) 
 . 0.000  0.018 0.000  0.187 0.000 
2016 -218.8 .  -1,941 -809.3  -4,353*** -25.82 
 (565.2) .  (1,137) (572.8)  (1,149) (426.1) 
 0.699 .  0.088 0.158  0.000 0.952 
         
Observations 30,833 30,833  30,833 30,833  30,833 30,833 
Year FEs Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
         
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Note: Reported coefficients, standard errors, and p-values are for the interaction term of treatment and post-




Figure 6: Coefficient plots of difference-in-differences estimates of treatment effects on next-year revenue. The "Treatment effect" plots 




Fixed Effects Regression 
I estimate fixed effects regressions to estimate the within-firm relationship between revenue 
and overall social responsibility ratings. In contrast to previous propensity score matching and 
difference-in-differences estimations using thresholds of CSR rating mean deviation, the fixed 
effects estimations examine the relationship between revenue and the level of CSR rating. 
 Table 20 shows the results of fixed effects estimation of revenue on CSR rating in the 
same year. Model 1 estimates the bivariate relationship between revenue and CSR with firm 
fixed effects and firm-clustered robust standard errors. Model 1 does not include year fixed 
effects. The results indicate a $13.25 million USD change in the average within-firm revenue 
associated with a 1-point change in CSR rating. The estimate is significantly different from 
zero with a p-value of 0.033. However, Model 2 shows this result is not robust to the addition 
of year fixed effects and other control variables, and the relationship sometimes becomes 
negatively different from zero. In the full Model 8, the association between the average within-
firm change in revenue and a 1-point change in CSR overall rating score is $-46.78 million 
USD, significantly different from zero with a p-value of 0.026. In the full Model 9 that assumes 
missing data on advertising and research and development is equal to 0 (this assumption is 
made in other studies of CSR performance, such as Barnett & Salomon, 2012), the estimate 
falls to $-15.25 million USD and has a p-value of 0.11. 
 The results in Table 20 largely reject Hypothesis 1 that increased CSR causes increased 
firm revenue. Within firms, increased CSR is more often negatively or not associated with 
revenue than it is positively associated with revenue. These findings suggest that firms that 
experience increased CSR scores also tend to experience decreased or no change in revenue.  
Table 21 results for the same models with the dependent variable transformed by inverse 
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hyperbolic sine to control for outliers show a similar pattern of results as Table 20, suggesting 
the results are not driven by revenue outliers. 
Findings from Table 20 and Table 21 come from regressions of revenue on CSR in the 
same year. These estimations would not reveal an effect of CSR on revenue that occurs over a 
period longer than a year. To explore that possibility, I also estimate fixed effects regression 





Table 20: Fixed effects regressions of same-year revenue. 
DV: Same-year revenue (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
          
Overall rating 13.25* -9.582 -13.96 -18.20* -18.81* -19.48 -23.41 -46.78* -15.25 
 (6.213) (9.499) (9.198) (8.967) (8.733) (10.19) (16.54) (21.04) (9.553) 
 0.0330 0.3131 0.1292 0.0424 0.0313 0.0559 0.1572 0.0264 0.1106 
Debt   0.0503*** -0.000696 0.00775 0.00643 0.210** -0.474 -0.00771 
   (0.0109) (0.00859) (0.00654) (0.00689) (0.0697) (0.246) (0.0146) 
   0.0000 0.9354 0.2359 0.3511 0.0026 0.0547 0.5976 
Assets    0.0473*** 0.0348*** 0.0356*** 0.0232 0.542** 0.0522** 
    (0.00738) (0.00607) (0.00679) (0.0270) (0.178) (0.0163) 
    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3910 0.0024 0.0014 
Employees     174.9*** 177.7*** 152.8*** 103.4* 189.6*** 
     (21.15) (24.32) (46.20) (44.28) (41.63) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0197 0.0000 
Age      -136.3*** 212.5* -70.44 -44.99 
      (28.66) (83.02) (93.92) (94.13) 
      0.0000 0.0106 0.4534 0.6328 
Advertising       9.959*** 3.149 2.441* 
       (2.410) (2.575) (0.985) 
       0.0000 0.2217 0.0132 
R&D        0.707 4.494* 
        (1.052) (1.806) 
        0.5014 0.0129 
          
Observations 39,080 39,080 38,677 38,677 33,719 25,731 6,914 4,042 16,887 
Firms 7,301 7,301 7,239 7,239 6,552 4,925 1,530 915 3,543 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Panel is firm-year. Coefficients are the average within-firm change in firm revenue associated with a 1-point change in 
the variable. Model 9 assumes missing xrd/xad = 0 for North American data. Firm-clustered robust standard errors in 
parentheses. P-values below standard errors. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table 21: Fixed effects regressions of same-year inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed revenue. 
DV: Same-year  
IHS-transformed 
revenue 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Overall rating 0.0038*** -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0023* -0.0012 -0.0011 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0011) 
 0.0000 0.3449 0.1730 0.1231 0.0706 0.0795 0.0362 0.4358 0.3262 
Debt   0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0163 0.1484 0.2802 0.6204 0.2662 0.0378 0.7154 
Assets    0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000* 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.0000 0.0008 0.0010 0.7815 0.0017 0.0323 
Employees     0.0072*** 0.0065*** 0.0039*** 0.0030** 0.0062*** 
     (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0026 0.0000 
Age      -0.0048 0.0298*** 0.0342*** 0.0242*** 
      (0.0052) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0056) 
      0.3523 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0003*** 0.0003** 0.0001 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
       0.0000 0.0028 0.0637 
R&D        -0.0000 0.0001 
        (0.0000) (0.0000) 
        0.6529 0.0698 
          
Observations 39,080 39,080 38,677 38,677 33,719 25,731 6,914 4,042 16,887 
Firms 7,301 7,301 7,239 7,239 6,552 4,925 1,530 915 3,543 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Panel is firm-year. Coefficients are the average within-firm change in firm revenue associated with a 1-point change in 
the variable. Model 9 assumes missing xrd/xad = 0 for North American data. Firm-clustered robust standard errors in 
parentheses. P-values below standard errors. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Table 22 shows the results of fixed effects estimation using leading revenue as the 
dependent variable. These estimations capture the possibility of a 1-year delay in the effect of 
changes in CSR on revenue. The results of Models 1-9 suggest no association between changes 
in CSR and revenue in the next year. Table 20 suggests changes in a firm's CSR rating do not 




Table 22: Fixed effects regressions of next-year revenue.  
DV: Next-year revenue (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
          
Overall rating 3.716 8.268 7.396 4.776 7.626 11.91 8.284 7.547 14.96 
 (6.613) (10.84) (10.91) (10.81) (14.10) (13.38) (20.08) (28.45) (14.50) 
 0.5742 0.4458 0.4980 0.6586 0.5887 0.3735 0.6799 0.7909 0.3025 
Debt   0.00510 -0.0327*** -0.0352*** -0.0273*** 0.207*** -0.678** -0.0376* 
   (0.0113) (0.00973) (0.00947) (0.00816) (0.0423) (0.255) (0.0162) 
   0.6503 0.0008 0.0002 0.0008 0.0000 0.0079 0.0206 
Assets    0.0359*** 0.0374*** 0.0269*** 0.00849 0.612*** 0.0369* 
    (0.00499) (0.00542) (0.00427) (0.0338) (0.160) (0.0167) 
    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8016 0.0001 0.0273 
Employees     -335.9*** -165.5*** 349.5*** 170.0 297.1*** 
     (43.46) (28.36) (80.30) (98.69) (68.65) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0853 0.0000 
Age      178.2*** 187.7*** 140.4** 226.2*** 
      (23.73) (44.08) (43.95) (37.25) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 
Advertising       9.285*** 1.192 2.446** 
       (2.532) (2.347) (0.833) 
       0.0003 0.6118 0.0034 
R&D        0.478 4.210** 
        (1.537) (1.632) 
        0.7560 0.0099 
          
Observations 31,833 31,833 31,509 31,509 22,234 20,939 5,463 3,190 13,376 
Firms 6,370 6,370 6,318 6,318 4,494 4,319 1,299 776 3,039 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Panel is firm-year. Coefficients are the average within-firm change in firm revenue associated with a 1-point change in 
the variable. Model 9 assumes missing xrd/xad = 0 for North American data. Firm-clustered robust standard errors in 




Taken together, the results of hypothesis tests suggest increased CSR does not always increase 
firm revenues and sometimes causes decreased revenues. These results resemble the current 
disagreement in the CSR performance literature over whether and when it "pays to be good." 
The results also lend further weight to recent calls to move beyond looking for a single, 
consistent causal relationship between CSR performance and financial performance outcomes. 
These calls suggest CSR researchers should instead focus on the ethical dimensions of CSR, 
rather than only whether CSR increases financial performance. More research also needs to 
address the conditions under which CSR increases financial performance, when it has no effect 
on performance, and when it hurts performance. 
Limitations 
The CSR performance literature suffers accusations of methodological overreach, specifically 
that studies in the literature claiming causal interpretations that are only justified by their 
estimation strategies if strong, unverifiable assumptions are true. The counterfactual designs 
used in this chapter—propensity score matching and difference-in-differences estimation—
make causal claims that rely on fewer assumptions than some other methods. But 
counterfactual designs still require assumptions to justify causal inference, and these 
assumptions present limitations to the analyses in this chapter. 
 Propensity score matching assumes the model to generate propensity scores accurately 
predicts treatment probability. If the propensity score model—in this case a logistic linear 
regression model—suffers from omitted variable bias or other estimation problems, propensity 
scores could be biased. Matches made using biased propensity scores could then produce 
biased estimates of treatment effects. 
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 Difference-in-differences estimation assumes that treatment events are outside the 
control of treated units and that trends in the outcome being studied would, had treatment not 
occurred, have continued in the same way after treatment as they did before treatment. Both 
assumptions are unverifiable. In this chapter, the most reasonable treatment events to be 
outside firms' control would be 3-standard deviation changes in CSR. Such changes are very 
rare and likely require events outside the firm's control to occur. However, in some cases such 
CSR changes occur in response to scandals at companies. Pfizer, Inc., a pharmaceutical 
company, experienced a 3-standard deviation increase in CSR rating from 2009 to 2010. In 
2009, the company agreed to pay the largest settlement in the history of health care fraud 
prosecution in the United States. The decision to settle a legal prosecution is directly within 
the control of the firm, and settlement decisions are not controlled for in the difference-in-
differences estimation. Such decisions could bias the treatment effect estimates. 
 Finally, fixed effects estimation relies on the assumptions criticized as too strong in the 
CSR performance literature. The approach is vulnerable to omitted variable bias in which 
common causes of CSR and performance are not controlled for in the regression model. While 
fixed effects estimation does eliminate some common causes with firm and year fixed effects, 
those common causes are only controlled for if they do not change over time. 
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CHAPTER 3: DOES STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE CAPACITY CONNECT 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PERFORMANCE? 
Whether CSR affects performance remains contested. This chapter contributes to the 
development of stakeholder influence capacity theory that connects CSR to performance 
through CSR's impact on stakeholders (Barnett, 2007; Barnett & Salomon, 2012; Bridoux & 
Stoelhorst, 2014; Bundy et al., 2018). Stakeholder influence capacity (SIC) is defined as a 
firm-level ability "to notice and profitably exploit opportunities to improve stakeholder 
relations through corporate social responsibility" (Barnett, 2007, p. 803). I test the theory's 
prediction that CSR affects performance by first influencing stakeholder behavior. I find some 
support for the theory's predictions, with important limitations that suggest a need to focus on 
heterogeneity across stakeholder groups to further develop stakeholder influence capacity 
theory. 
SIC is a mechanism by which CSR affects firm performance. The CSR literature more 
commonly tests a direct CSR performance effect rather than a mechanism: 168 of 181 reviewed 
CSR performance studies tested a direct relationship rather than a mechanism (Aguinis & 
Glavas, 2012). The studies that tested mechanisms identified two mechanisms at the 
organizational level of analysis: a firm's intangible resources (e.g., Surroca et al., 2010) and 
managerial interpretation of responsibility as a business opportunity (e.g., Sharma, 2000).  
Surroca et al. (2010) found four intangible resources of innovation, human capital, 
reputation, and culture fully mediated the CSR performance relationship and argued prior 
findings of a direct relationship between CSR and performance were spurious because they did 
not account for these separate mechanisms. They recommended scholars focus on mediating 
mechanisms and contextual conditions linking responsibility to performance, such as 
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intangible firm resources. Stakeholder influence capacity is an intangible firm resource 
(Barnett, 2007), and Surroca et al.'s findings suggest stakeholder influence capacity might be 
one channel by which responsibility affects performance. 
Mehrpouya and Chowdhury (2018) theorize two categories of mechanisms: relational 
mechanisms and capabilities mechanisms. Relational mechanisms change how stakeholders 
relate to and behave toward the firm as a result of the firm's CSR actions. Relational 
mechanisms include a market-based mechanism that applies to stakeholders with a market and 
exchange-oriented relationship with the firm and an institutional relational mechanism for 
stakeholders with institutional relationship with the firm. Institutional stakeholders set 
constraints on firms and include regulators and non-state organizations like supply chain 
monitors (Short, Toffel, & Hugill, 2016). Mehrpouya and Chowdhury do not claim markets 
and institutions are entirely separate. Instead, they view institutions as the structure or setting 
in which markets exist (Marquis, Toffel, & Zhou, 2016). Capabilities mechanisms apply to 
how CSR actions change stakeholders' capabilities and the capabilities of the firm itself. 
The stakeholder influence capacity mechanism adds another possible theoretical 
mechanism by which CSR might affect performance. Research suggests CSR improves a firm's 
performance by increasing its reputation and goodwill with stakeholders (Orlitzky et al., 2003), 
such as customers (Lev et al., 2010; Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006). These findings hint at the 
connection between CSR's effects on stakeholders and the subsequent influence those 
stakeholders have on firm performance, the process theorized in stakeholder influence 
capacity. If responsibility affects performance through first affecting stakeholders, 
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understanding the SIC mechanism will meaningfully advance our understanding of how CSR 
relates to firm performance.2 
Theory 
In this section, I develop a hypothesis from stakeholder influence capacity theory, which arises 
from resource-based theory and instrumental stakeholder theory (Barnett, 2007; Bridoux & 
Stoelhorst, 2014; Bundy et al., 2018). I first review resource-based theory and instrumental 
stakeholder theory. I then describe stakeholder influence capacity theory and derive the 
hypothesis tested in this chapter. 
Resource-based Theory 
The stakeholder influence capacity mechanism is grounded in resource-based theory (Barnett, 
2007). Resource-based theory's main proposition is that firm performance depends on the 
resources controlled, managed, developed, and acquired by the firm (Leiblein, 2011). Firm 
performance differs across firms because firms vary in their capabilities to control, manage, 
develop, and acquire resources. Three branches of resource-based theory have emerged around 
these concepts: resource endowments, strategic factor markets, and dynamic capabilities. 
The resource endowment branch considers how founding conditions influence firms' 
resource endowments (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984). Resource endowments 
containing rare, difficult to imitate resources provide firms competitive advantage against 
rivals. If such resources are bound to the firm rather than mobile or tradeable, firms are 
protected from entry by competitors who cannot acquire the same resource mix. Even if 
resources are not entirely bound to the firm, firms can protect resource endowments by using 
 
2 Responsibility could seek to achieve other ends than performance, such as fulfilling a moral obligation to the 
firm's stakeholders. Stakeholder influence capacity theory arises in part from instrumental stakeholder theory, 
which assumes stakeholder engagement seeks only to increase firm performance.  
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isolating mechanisms to increase competitors' costs of acquiring or imitating resources 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989; S A Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, 1984). 
The second and third branches of resource-based theory consider performance 
differences if resource endowments at founding are easily changed and managers can alter 
resource endowments. The strategic factor markets branch considers whether and how firms 
acquire and sell new resources or "factors" on strategic factor markets (S A Lippman & Rumelt, 
1982; Rumelt, 1984). Managers adjust their firms' resource mix over time but struggle to 
accurately predict the total value factors will create. Factor markets are not efficient, and prices 
are not perfect, allowing managers to acquire factors at costs below their value creation 
potential. 
The strategic factor markets literature has developed three mechanisms linking 
resource acquisition to superior performance. First, firms might be lucky and acquire resources 
that were undervalued (Barney, 1986; Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Makadok & Barney, 
2001). Second, firms with superior information about the value-creating potential of resources 
can make more lucrative resource acquisition and divestment decisions, outperforming firms 
with inferior information. Third, variation in the resource mixes firms control can produce 
performance differences if some resources produce more value when paired in certain 
combinations than alone. Existing resource mixes can lead to different performance outcomes 
by presenting each firm with a different cost of acquiring complementary resources 
(Adegbesan, 2009; Steven A. Lippman & Rumelt, 2003). 
The dynamic capabilities branch explores how firms alter their resource base in 
quickly-changing competitive environments (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat, 2007; Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). A dynamic capability is a firm's ability to stay apace with the 
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dynamism of its operating environment by creating, extending, and modifying new resources. 
The dynamic capabilities branch tends to focus on three processes: resource allocation policies, 
organization structure, and managerial decision making (Leiblein, 2011). Firms that allocate 
resources to understanding the nature of their operating environment are thought to have higher 
dynamic capability than firms that do not. Helfat (1994, 1997) examines this in the context of 
stable allocations to research and development. However, the idea that stable resource 
allocation policies enable a dynamic capability is disputed (Knott, Bryce, & Posen, 2003), and 
more research is needed on the specific types of investments that develop dynamic capabilities. 
Investment in stakeholder influence capacity is one promising direction for research that could 
contribute to both responsibility performance and the dynamic capabilities literature. 
 How do these resource-based theory branches relate to stakeholder influence capacity 
and corporate social responsibility? The resource endowment branch of resource-based theory 
suggests a firm's initial endowment of stakeholder relationships and its initial endowment of 
stakeholder influence capacity drive some variation in firm performance. The initial 
endowment of stakeholder relationships can both enable and restrict managers' choices about 
future relationships. For example, startups funded through venture capital must balance the 
need to establish new relationships with funders against existing investors' desire to avoid 
dilution of their initial investments. A firm's initial endowment of stakeholder influence 
capacity also could drive variation in firm performance outcomes. Whether firms' initial 
endowments of stakeholder relationships and stakeholder influence capacity provide sustained 
competitive advantage depends on how bound these resources are to firms and whether firms 
can develop isolating mechanisms around these resources to prevent rivals from imitating or 
acquiring the same stakeholder relationships and levels of stakeholder influence capacity. 
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 A firm's stakeholder influence capacity also "depends on its prior stakeholder 
relationships" (Barnett, 2007, p. 803), linking stakeholder influence capacity to the strategic 
factor markets branch of resource-based theory. That branch notes that the most profitable mix 
of resources a firm might acquire from strategic factor markets depends on the mix of resources 
it controls. If each firm controls a unique mix of resources, no two firms will demand the same 
mix of resources from strategic factor markets. Complementarities between resources further 
create differences between the resource mix a firm currently controls and the resource mix it 
would be most profitable for the firm to acquire. Similarly, a firm's stakeholder influence 
capacity depends on its existing mix of stakeholder relationships, and the mix of stakeholder 
relationships it would be most profitable for the firm to develop in the future depends on the 
existing relationships it has with stakeholders. If no two firms have identical relationships with 
stakeholders, then no two firms will have the same mix of stakeholder relationships that would 
be most profitable to develop in the future. Further, complementarities between stakeholder 
groups and relationships suggest that firms might vary on the value creation and capture 
potential of current and potential relationships, introducing variation in firms' demand for 
stakeholder relationships and variation in firms' ability and interest in allocating time and effort 
to increasing stakeholder influence capacity. 
 Finally, stakeholder influence capacity is theorized as a firm-level ability "to notice and 
profitably exploit opportunities to improve stakeholder relations through corporate social 
responsibility" (Barnett, 2007, p. 803). This is similar to the dynamic capabilities approach that 
emphasizes the firm's ability to perceive and respond to changes in its competitive 
environment. Firms notice opportunities to improve stakeholder relationships by monitoring 
changing stakeholder demands on the firm and changes in the institutional environment in 
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which they operate. These changes can take the form of shifting expectations for what firms 
should and shouldn't do in their normal operations.  
Over time the positive stock market reaction to firms announcing eco-friendly news 
has declined while the negative stock market reaction to eco-harmful news has increased 
(Flammer, 2013), suggesting shareholder stakeholders have shifted from rewarding firms for 
eco-friendly behavior to simply expecting it from firms while increasing negative reactions to 
eco-harmful behavior. Firms that accurately perceive these shifting stakeholder perceptions 
should be better able to adjust how they manage their responsibility actions. 
Resource-based theorists call for integrating a stakeholder approach into resource-
based theory's model of profit appropriation (Barney, 2018). The assumption that shareholder 
stakeholders are the only stakeholder group with a claim on profit created by a firm is 
incompatible with resource-based theory's profit creation model in which firms combine 
resources from many different stakeholders to generate profit. Firms that only distribute that 
profit to shareholders will struggle to attract resources from non-shareholder stakeholders. To 
attract more diverse resources and perform better, firms need to distribute profit to more 
diverse stakeholders than shareholders. A firm's ability to influence stakeholders plays an 
important role in both profit creation and appropriation. 
Instrumental Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory views the firm as a collection of relationships with stakeholders, defined as 
individuals, organizations, or groups affected by the firm's operations or that the firm depends 
on for resources (Parmar et al., 2010). Instrumental stakeholder research studies how the 
management of stakeholder relationships affects firm performance. Instrumental stakeholder 
theory's core proposition is that firms that correctly assess stakeholder preferences and develop 
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and maintain stakeholder relationships in line with those preferences will perform better than 
firms that do not (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Managing stakeholder relationships can 
increase firm performance by increasing stakeholder commitment to the firm, lowering 
transaction costs, and reducing certain types of business risks (Barnett, 2007; Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; T. M. Jones, 1995; T. M. Jones, Harrison, & Felps, 2018). The primary strategic 
challenges are (1) understanding stakeholder preferences and (2) fostering relationships built 
around those preferences (Berman & Johnson-Cramer, 2016).  
Wood and Jones (1995) identified the need to integrate stakeholder theory into the 
responsibility performance literature. CSR performance studies suffered from "stakeholder 
mismatching" in which no theoretical mechanism linked the CSR measure to the performance 
measure, suggesting inferences were theoretically vacuous. For example, studies tested 
whether corporate charitable giving as a form of CSR affected return on investment as a 
performance measure but provided no theoretical rationale for why or how charitable giving 
could affect a firm's overall return on investment.  
Wood and Jones argued responsibility performance studies needed to theoretically link 
the form of responsibility to the type of performance. They provided several ways integrating 
stakeholder theory into CSR studies could reduce stakeholder mismatching. First, 
understanding which stakeholder groups set expectations for how firms act would help 
theoretically justify why a relationship should exist between a responsibility measure and 
performance measure. Second, multiple stakeholders experience the effects of corporate 
action, and understanding the joint effects of those stakeholders on performance would clarify 
responsibility performance relationships. Third, stakeholders evaluate the outcomes of 
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corporate behavior, and stakeholder reaction based on those evaluations likely influences 
performance outcomes. 
 Relationship management can increase performance by fostering cooperation with 
stakeholders. Factors that foster cooperation include norms-based factors like trust, perceptions 
of fairness, and norms of reciprocity (Bosse et al., 2009; Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014, 2016; 
Hahn, 2015; Harrison et al., 2010; Harrison & Wicks, 2013; Tantalo & Priem, 2016) and 
instrumental factors like perceptions of competence, shared resource capabilities and needs, 
and interdependencies between firms and stakeholders (Bosse & Coughlan, 2016; Bridoux & 
Stoelhorst, 2014). Firms can have different levels of capabilities on each factor. 
Instrumental stakeholder theory initially assumed stakeholders prioritize fairness and 
predicted strategies that treat stakeholders fairly would increase firm performance by building 
more trusting, productive relationships with stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Freeman, 1984; Harrison et al., 2010; T. M. Jones, 1995; Wood, 1991). Recent theoretical 
advances relax this assumption and consider stakeholders with heterogeneous preferences, 
including self-interested stakeholders, and how strategies treating stakeholders as self-
interested parties affect firm performance (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014). Firms that do not 
recognize heterogeneous stakeholder preferences and assume stakeholders only care about 
fairness risk alienating self-interested stakeholders.  
Bosse and Coughlan (2016) examine stakeholders' perceived psychological bonds with 
the firm that influence whether the stakeholder continues its relationship with the firm and how 
much effort to contribute to the relationship. These psychological bonds would be a key 
element of the stakeholder relationship firms would want to understand and influence with 
responsibility actions to motivate continued relationships with profitable stakeholders, 
   
85 
 
discontinued relationships with unprofitable stakeholders, and increased effort from 
stakeholders that could improve firm performance.  
The "fit" between the firm's actions and its stakeholders' motivations is another area of 
instrumental stakeholder theory development (Bundy et al., 2018). Congruence between firm 
and stakeholders on values is predicted to increase intrinsically motivated cooperation. 
Strategic complementarity between firm and stakeholder resource needs and/or capabilities 
will increase extrinsically motivated cooperation. Initial congruence on values leads to the 
development of strategic complementarity, and initial strategic complementarity will lead to 
congruence on values. Combative behavior emerges from firm-stakeholder relationships with 
high incongruence on values and high strategic incompatibility, but high values on one 
dimension with low on the other will lead to relational compromise. These predictions about 
firm-stakeholder fit remain untested. 
These predictions also suggest stakeholder groups have different values and strategic 
resources and needs. Firms that attend to such differences could have more cooperative than 
combative relationships with stakeholders. Stakeholder cooperation with the firm can increase 
firm performance by allowing the firm to gain more information about stakeholders' 
preferences for improvements to products and services or which products and services to 
develop to serve unmet stakeholder preferences (Harrison et al., 2010). 
Garcia-Castro and Francoeur (2016) argue instrumental stakeholder theory has 
assumed an additive, linear relationship between stakeholder investment and financial 
performance, implying that more investment in stakeholder relationships is always better. But 
stakeholder investments can be expensive and their financial returns contingent on complex 
complementarities within the firm and specific contextual factors outside the firm. The costs 
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and returns to responsibility actions might differ depending on the stakeholder group being 
invested in with those actions.  
Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey (2014) analyze instrumental stakeholder theory's core 
proposition that improving relationships with stakeholders leads to increased firm financial 
performance. Using media reports and data on 26 gold mines owned by 19 firms from 1993-
2008, they investigate the relationship between stakeholder perception of firms in media, firm 
value, and the net present value of unmined gold deposits and other firm physical assets. They 
find markets discount firms' physical assets less when firms have positive stakeholder 
perceptions in media, suggesting market performance increases when firms develop and 
maintain good relationships with stakeholders. 
Also using data on mining firms, Dorobantu and Odziemkowska (2017) demonstrate 
the contingencies of stakeholder investment financial returns in their study of mining firms 
signing community benefit agreements with community stakeholders around mines. They 
examine the effects of these agreements on shareholder stakeholders through changes in firm 
market value associated with the signing of benefit agreements. Shareholders appear to reward 
firms that sign agreements with local communities more when those communities have 
stronger property rights claims and histories of activism against mining firms. Dorobantu and 
Odziemkowska infer shareholders react more positively because the firm signing the 
agreement reduces the likelihood of the community mobilizing against the firm in the future. 
These results demonstrate how competitive context, firm and stakeholder characteristics, and 
stakeholder group preferences and histories interact to connect responsibility actions to firm 
performance. 
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Translating responsibility into performance appears to require firms to have deep 
knowledge of stakeholders and of complementarities with existing firm resources. 
Responsibility after a crisis can affect performance in the food and beverage and the 
pharmaceuticals industries, but it does so differently depending on interactions between 
stakeholders and characteristics of the pre-crisis competitive environment (O’Higgins & 
Thevissen, 2017). 
Stakeholder Influence Capacity 
Stakeholder influence capacity offers a theoretical mechanism that can serve as the focal point 
for integrating social responsibility, stakeholder, and resource-based theories into an improved 
theory of social responsibility's effect on firm performance outcomes.  Some firms have high 
capacity, others low capacity, and others no capacity. Stakeholder influence capacity is a 
learned capability to influence stakeholders to behave in ways that increase firm performance, 
one at which firms can become more and less adept over time. Firms develop their stakeholder 
influence capacity, becoming more efficient at increasing performance through responsibility. 
They can also lose the capability. 
Only one study has tested the theory. Barnett and Salomon (2012) found a U-shaped 
relationship between responsibility and performance and inferred learning effects in 
stakeholder influence capacity drove the relationship. Firms with low capacity struggle to 
translate responsibility into performance but can improve through learning effects if they 
continue engaging in responsibility actions over time. Eventually, firms build their capability 
enough to be able to use responsibility to influence stakeholders in ways that increase firm 
performance. 
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However, Barnett and Salomon (2012) did not examine whether stakeholder influence 
capacity mediates the responsibility performance relationship. Instead, they examined 
stakeholder influence capacity as a moderator. "Mediators are those variables that explain the 
underlying processes and mechanisms of why [responsibility] initiatives are related to an 
outcome, while moderators describe the conditions under which [responsibility] initiatives 
influence outcomes" (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012, p. 934). Mediators are mechanisms. 
Stakeholder influence capacity was developed as a mechanism explaining the underlying 
process by which responsibility affects performance (Barnett, 2007). Examining stakeholder 
influence capacity as a moderator does not fully test the mechanism hypothesis. 
Barnett and Salomon (2012) acknowledge the difference between mediation and 
moderation. Recognizing limitations in their data, they argue the relationship between 
responsibility, stakeholder influence capacity, and performance "is likely more complex than 
the available data allowed us to model herein, of course, and so we hope that this study will 
encourage future work that specifically examines how [stakeholder influence capacity] 
mediates the relationship between social and financial performance" (Barnett & Salomon, 
2012, p. 1318 emphasis added).  
Building on resource-based theory and instrumental stakeholder theory, stakeholder 
influence capacity theory provides a mechanism that explains how responsibility actions affect 
firm performance (Barnett, 2007). Stakeholder influence capacity links resource-based theory's 
emphasis on firm-specific capabilities with instrumental stakeholder theory's focus on the 
performance outcomes of how firms manage stakeholder relationships.  
From resource-based theory, a firm's ability to influence stakeholders is a firm-level 
capability, and variation across firms in this capability could explain differences in 
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performance outcomes. It is a firm-level capability that cannot be purchased from factor 
markets. Instead, it must be developed over time through learning and experience (Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989), similar to absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Inability to purchase 
the capacity combined with long development cycles creates variation across firms in 
stakeholder influence capacity. Because a firm's stakeholder influence capacity enables it to 
transform responsibility actions into financial performance, two firms that take the same 
responsibility action but differ on their stakeholder influence capacity will experience different 
financial performance outcomes.  
From instrumental stakeholder theory, a firm's ability to influence its stakeholders is a 
means by which the firm manages the quality and content of stakeholder relationships, which 
then affects performance. Combining these theoretical expectations, stakeholder influence 
capacity is the firm's ability to use responsibility actions to profitably improve relationships 
with stakeholders, and "the benefits to firms from social responsibility come through improved 
stakeholder relationships" (Barnett & Salomon, 2012, p. 1306). 
The idea that social responsibility is a way firms address stakeholder concerns about 
economic, social, and environmental impacts is not new. McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis 
(1988, p. 865) claim responsibility affects firm financial performance "through its effects on 
stakeholders," and the challenge of being a socially responsible firm has been conceptualized 
as the problem of understanding and following the rules for acceptable behavior defined by the 
firm's various stakeholders (Chandler, 2015). 
Despite reference to stakeholders in responsibility studies, the responsibility-
stakeholder connection did not become a central pillar of either the stakeholder or social 
responsibility literatures. The stakeholder literature tends to focus on the quality and depth of 
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firms' relationships with stakeholders, implicitly assuming better relationships mean higher 
financial performance. The CSR literature tends to evaluate associations between CSR 
performance measures and financial performance measures, implicitly assuming a direct 
connection between the two. 
Studies examining the direct relationship between responsibility and performance 
would not be able to capture differences in underlying stakeholder influence capacity. If one 
firm has low capacity and the other high, the firm with low capacity might experience a 
negative financial outcome but the firm with the high capacity might experience a positive 
financial outcome. Examining only the direct relationship between the responsibility action 
and financial outcome might in this case suggest no relationship, when in fact there is an 
underlying relationship dependent on the stakeholder influence capacity capability mechanism.   
Methodological work in mediation analysis debates whether to hypothesize full or 
partial mediation in the absence of theoretical guidance (James, Mulaik, & Brett, 2006). A 
crucial difference in mediation is whether the mediation is full or partial. Full mediation is 
more parsimonious—requiring fewer assumptions—but less realistic given the complex 
relationships in organizations. If SIC fully mediates the responsibility-performance 
relationship, responsibility has no effect on performance except through its effect on SIC, 
which then affects performance. If SIC partially mediates the relationship, responsibility 
affects performance through affecting SIC, but responsibility also has an effect on performance 
independent of its effect through SIC. Hypothesis derivation should address whether mediation 
is full or partial (James et al., 2006). Assuming full mediation is a stronger assumption than 
partial, but testing partial often requires stronger assumptions than testing full mediation 
(DeVaro, 2011). 
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Stakeholder influence capacity theory only predicts that SIC mediates the effect of CSR 
on performance. It does not provide guidance on whether mediation is full or partial. I assume 
CSR could affect performance independent of a firm's SIC. This assumption leads to a 
hypothesis of partial mediation because it leaves open the possibility that CSR affects 
performance independent of CSR's effect on SIC. However, I also test for full mediation. 
Hypothesis 2: Stakeholder influence capacity partially mediates the effect of 
corporate social responsibility on performance. 
Data and Sample 
The analysis sample combines data from three datasets: CSRHub, MSCI KLD ESG STATS, 
and Compustat North America. I merge these datasets on firm-year. CSRHub is originally 
firm-month. I aggregate the CSRHub data to firm-year level using the rating of the last month 
of a year. This procedure is described in the Data and Sample section of Chapter 2. All other 
datasets are firm-year level. MSCI KLD ESG STATS data only exist for companies based in 
the United States. Chapter 2 uses Compustat data from both North American and global firms, 
but merging those data with KLD data drops all firms located outside the United States. Due 
to KLD's restricted coverage, the combined dataset used in this chapter is limited to firms based 
in the United States. 
 Table 23 shows descriptive statistics for variables used in the empirical tests. Table 24 
shows the correlation matrix. 
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Table 23: Descriptive statistics. 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Revenue ($millions) 15585 6167.85 21151.72 -1965 483521 
Inverse hyperbolic sine revenue 15585 7.85 1.85 -8.28 13.78 
Overall rating 12880 52.07 6.61 21.92 78.88 
Net KLD 15588 0.18 2.52 -12 19 
Net KLD strengths 15588 1.61 2.53 0 22 
Net KLD concerns 15588 -1.43 1.81 -18 0 
Long-term debt ($millions) 15525 2874.27 14916.29 0 459022 
Assets ($millions) 15587 16464.5 96112.66 .8 2570000 
Age (years) 15506 26.51 17.69 1 67 
Employees (1000s) 15508 17.24 67.51 0 2300 
Advertising ($millions) 6835 167.73 577.26 0 9729 
R&D ($millions) 8473 228.45 932.01 0 16085 






Table 24: Correlation matrix. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) Revenue ($millions) 1.00 
(2) Inverse hyperbolic sine revenue 0.49* 1.00 
(3) Overall rating 0.11* 0.08* 1.00 
(4) Net KLD 0.13* 0.26* 0.30* 1.00 
(5) Net KLD strengths 0.44* 0.51* 0.27* 0.74* 1.00 
(6) Net KLD concerns -0.43* -0.35* 0.02 0.35* -0.37* 1.00 
(7) Long-term debt ($millions) 0.40* 0.29* 0.06* 0.14* 0.33* -0.26* 1.00 
(8) Assets ($millions) 0.39* 0.27* 0.06* 0.16* 0.31* -0.21* 0.80* 1.00 
(9) Age (years) 0.24* 0.42* 0.10* 0.18* 0.35* -0.24* 0.15* 0.12* 1.00 
(10) Employees (1000s) 0.71* 0.36* 0.09* 0.10* 0.34* -0.33* 0.27* 0.24* 0.19* 1.00 
(11) Advertising ($millions) 0.58* 0.50* 0.19* 0.30* 0.51* -0.37* 0.43* 0.30* 0.29* 0.38* 1.00 
(12) R&D ($millions) 0.36* 0.33* 0.21* 0.36* 0.52* -0.25* 0.37* 0.53* 0.21* 0.18* 0.55* 1.00 







I use mediation analysis to test whether stakeholder influence capacity mediates the effect of 
responsibility on performance (Agler & De Boeck, 2017; Aguinis et al., 2017; Baron & Kenny, 
1986; DeVaro, 2011; James et al., 2006; Kenny, 2008; Lee, Herbert, & McAuley, 2019; 
Shaver, 2005; Vancouver & Carlson, 2015). Several approaches to mediation are available. 
The most common approach in management research is the Baron and Kenny causal-steps 
procedure (Aguinis et al., 2017). I use that approach in this chapter. 
Figure 7 graphically displays theoretical models of both a full and partial mediation 
relationship (Aguinis et al., 2017; Baron & Kenny, 1986; Shaver, 2005). If X = responsibility, 
M = stakeholder influence capacity, and Y = financial performance, Figure 7 shows either full 
or partial mediation of the responsibility-performance relationship by stakeholder influence 
capacity. Relationship a is the effect of responsibility on stakeholder influence capacity. 
Relationship b is the effect of stakeholder influence capacity on performance. Relationship c' 
only exists in partial mediation and is the effect of responsibility on performance independent 
of stakeholder influence capacity's effect on performance.  
Figure 7: Mediation models. 
 
Note: In each model, X is a cause, Y is an outcome, and M is a mediator. In full mediation, X does not affect Y 
(c' = 0). In partial mediation, X affects Y (c' ≠ 0) independent of the effect of X on Y through mediator M. 
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The Baron and Kenny mediation approach uses a three-step sequence of regression models to 
test relationships a, b, c, and c' from Figure 7 (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Kenny, 2008; Shaver, 
2005). Step 1 estimates the direct relationship c between the cause X and outcome Y (Equation 
4: 
 𝑌 = 𝛼0 + 𝑐𝑋 + 𝜀0 4 
Step 2 estimates the main relationship a between the cause X and mediator M (Equation 5): 
 𝑀 = 𝛼1 + 𝑎𝑋 + 𝜀1 5 
Step 3 estimates the relationship between cause X and outcome Y while controlling for the 
mediator M (Equation 6): 
 𝑌 = 𝛼2 + 𝑏𝑀 + 𝑐
′𝑋 + 𝜀2 6 
Mediation is tested by comparing the estimates of a, b, and c'. If a, b, and c' test statistically 
different from zero, M partially mediates the effect of X on Y. If a and b test different from zero 
but c' does not, M fully mediates the effect of X on Y. Earlier applications of the Baron and 
Kenny test also required c to test different from zero, but later development of the method 
questioned this requirement because if c' and b are different from zero with opposite signs, c 
could not test different from zero when mediation exists (see Aguinis et al., 2017 for a review). 
Testing mediation with the Baron and Kenny model assumes no measurement error in 
variables, causal relationships between variables are correctly specified, and no interaction 
effect between the cause X and mediator M (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004). A 
literature has developed around exploring and refining the Baron and Kenny method. Shaver 
(2005) argues it is possible and even probable that the error terms in Equations 2 and 3 are 
correlated rather than independent as Baron and Kenny assume. Correlated error terms could 
bias estimation of c' and b in Equation 3, even under asymptotic assumptions. Biased estimates 
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decrease the validity of hypothesis tests using those estimates. Two-stage least squares 
estimation within the Baron and Kenny sequence or an alternative structural equation modeling 
approach can reduce the validity threat posed by correlated error terms. Two-stage least 
squares introduces an instrumental variable for X into Equation 2. Predicted values of M from 
the instrumented estimation can then be used in Equation 3, eliminating correlation between 
the error terms in Equations 2 and 3 and producing unbiased coefficient estimates in Equation 
3. Structural equation modeling explicitly models the suspected correlation between error 
terms. 
 James, Mulaik, and Brett (2006) compare the Baron and Kenny approach to the 
structural equation modeling approach to mediation analysis contributed by James and Brett 
(1984). They argue the two approaches are similar for testing partial mediation. The 
approaches differ, however, for testing full mediation. They recommend researchers begin by 
determining whether they are testing complete or partial mediation, ideally by deriving 
hypotheses from theory and prior research. When theory and prior research are incapable of 
producing mediation hypotheses, James et al. recommend testing for complete mediation 
because the complete mediation requires fewer assumptions, i.e., it is more parsimonious than 
partial mediation. After determining mediation type, the researcher should use the structural 
equation modeling technique. However, James and Brett have a conflict of interest in this 
recommendation because they are recommending the use of methods that might generate 
citations to their 1984 article on the structural equation modeling approach to mediation 
analysis (James & Brett, 1984). 
 DeVaro (2011) compares the Baron and Kenny approach to the structural equation 
modeling approach, reiterates the problems identified in each approach and solutions to those 
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problems, and laments that known solutions have low adoption rates in published mediation 
analyses. DeVaro then sets out a program of mediation remediation based on recommendations 
to improve the use of mediation analysis in the field of strategic organization. The central 
recommendation mirrors Shaver's (2005) call to incorporate instrument-based methods into 
mediation analysis. Shaver recommends two-stage least squares regression; DeVaro seconds 
that recommendation and adds three-stage least squares estimation. 
DeVaro reiterates James et al.'s (2006) recommendation to begin by using theory to 
determine if mediation is full or partial. DeVaro asserts that "organizational theory will rarely 
offer a compelling justification a priori [i.e., prior to analyzing data] for complete mediation" 
(DeVaro, 2011, p. 339), in part because the researcher might not be able to think of all possible 
indirect effects of X on Y that would produce partial mediation. Note, though, that it is theory's 
job, not the researcher, to incorporate such explanations of a phenomenon. If the researcher's 
goal is to test a theory, research design and analysis should remain within the world specified 
by the theory. If the theory repeatedly fails to explain the phenomenon, then additional theory 
building should examine whether there are missing indirect relationships that, if incorporated 
into the theory, would improve the theory's explanatory power. DeVaro concludes by 
recommending instrumental variable approaches to mediation analysis. 
Aguinis, Edwards, and Bradley (2017) review methodological problems in articles 
using mediation or moderation analysis published between 2005 to 2014 in Strategic 
Management Journal and Organization Science. They describe six problems in papers using 
the Baron and Kenny approach: 
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1. Requiring c test different from zero in Step 1 to continue with the mediation analysis. 
2. Ignoring the magnitude of the indirect mediation effect estimated as the product of the 
a and b coefficients. 
3. Requiring c' test different from zero in Step 3. 
4. Requiring c' test different from zero when testing complete mediation. 
5. Testing mediation with cross-sectional data. 
6. Ignoring measurement error. 
Aguinis et al. recommend solutions to each problem. First, the estimate of c does not need to 
test different from zero for mediation to exist. Assuming c must test different from zero to 
continue mediation analysis leads researchers to abandon tests that would reveal partial 
mediation in which the direct effect and indirect effect have opposite effects. In such mediation, 
the main effect in Step 1 could be canceled out, resulting in the coefficient not testing different 
from zero. But that would not mean there is not mediation occurring in the model. 
 Second, testing the indirect mediation effect requires testing whether the product of 
coefficients a and b is different from zero. The Sobel test has been used for this test, but it 
assumes the distribution of the a*b product is normal. Aguinis et al. recommend dropping that 
assumption by using a nonparametric testing process. 
 Third, while original formulation of the Baron and Kenny procedure describes testing 
whether c'=0, subsequent work suggests testing c' is not required. Requiring a test of c', and 
for that test to be significantly different from zero to proceed with analysis, leads researchers 
to abandon mediation analysis that would show that M mediates the effect of X on Y in models 
in which X has no direct effect on Y after mediation, i.e., full mediation models. Rather than 
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using the statistical significance of the test of c' to determine the presence of mediation, 
researchers should use tests of the b, the coefficient assessing mediation. 
 Fourth, including a test of c' when testing theory about complete mediation is a 
mismatch of theory and empirical testing strategy. If the theory being tested is one of complete 
mediation, c'X should not be included in the regression model. If c'X is included, the theory of 
the regression model is that X has a direct effect on Y when controlling for M, which is a partial 
mediation model. 
 Fifth, Aguinis et al. argue that mediation models imply the passage of time. Using 
cross-sectional data incapable of capturing time effects cannot test theoretical models the imply 
time passage. Instead, longitudinal data should be used that capture time effects. 
 Sixth, the problem of measurement error has been known for some time in mediation 
analysis (Shaver, 2005) but receives little attention in published studies. Measurement error 
can bias coefficient estimates, reducing the validity of hypothesis tests and inferences made 
from those tests. Researchers should attempt to create measures with less measurement error. 
When that is not possible, Aguinis et al. recommend multiple-item measures be analyzed with 
structural equation modeling. 
 Lee, Herbert, and McAuley (2019) show how mediation analysis can be used to 
partition effects into indirect and direct effects. They note the limitations of statistics-based 
mediation analysis like the Baron and Kenny and structural equation modeling approaches to 
accurately estimate mediation in the presence of non-linear relationships, including when there 
is an interaction effect between the treatment and the outcome. If responsibility and 
performance have interactive effects, the Baron and Kenny approach used in this chapter might 
not accurately estimate mediation effects. Lee et al. recommend a causal mediation analysis 
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approach rather than statistical analysis. However, they make this recommendation for medical 
research fields where experimental control of treatment assignment is more feasible than in 
organizational research. 
 The literature on mediation analysis suggests many questions of interest to organization 
and strategy researchers likely involve mediation effects, but the application of mediation 
analysis remains underdeveloped in published studies. Problems remain with the practice of 
mediation analysis despite known solutions to those problems. Implementation of solutions is 
slowed by the difficulty of finding instrumental variables and low-error measures. 
Methodological training also poses a problem: many researchers are trained in regression 
analysis but not structural equation modeling. The analysis in this chapter implements 
recommended solutions when possible. 
Dependent Variable 
In Equations 4 and 6, the dependent variable Y is revenue, measured using firm revenue 
reported in annual and other reports and collected by Compustat into Compustat North 
America and Global datasets accessed through the Wharton Research Data Services portal. 
The Chapter 2 dependent variable section further describes the variable. 
Independent Variable 
The independent variable X is corporate social responsibility, measured using the overall 
CSRHub rating data. This variable is described in the independent variable section of Chapter 
2. 
Mediating Variable 
The mediating variable is stakeholder influence capacity, represented as M in Equations 5 and 
6. SIC is measured as a firm's net corporate social responsibility rating in the MSCI KLD 
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STATS ESG dataset (KLD) maintained by MSCI. MSCI employs analysts who update and 
create new KLD ratings each year. The resulting KLD dataset "combines objective steps firms 
have (or have not) taken to improve (or not improve) their social performance with subjective 
assessments reached by KLD’s analysts that are often primed or constructed by stakeholder 
activity" (Werner, 2015, pp. 1998–1999). 
KLD ratings measure stakeholder influence capacity because the ratings incorporate 
both firms' responsibility actions and stakeholders' perceptions of those actions. KLD data also 
contain separate assessments of social responsibility strengths and concerns, capturing two 
dimensions of firms' ability to influence stakeholder attitudes toward the firm with 
responsibility actions. Distinguishing positive and negative influences from responsibility 
actions is an important methodological advance in the measurement of corporate social action 
(Mattingly & Berman, 2006). Strengths proxy for high stakeholder influence capacity because 
the firm's objective actions have been perceived positively by stakeholders. When stakeholders 
react positively to a firm's actions, it implies the firm has the capability to use responsibility 
actions to generate positive responses from stakeholders. Such firms can use social 
responsibility actions to influence stakeholders to respond in ways benefiting the firm.  
KLD concerns proxy for low stakeholder influence capacity. The more concerns a firm 
has across responsibility dimensions, the weaker the firm's stakeholder influence capacity. If a 
firm's objective social responsibility actions generate negative stakeholder response, the firm 
does not have the capability to translate responsibility actions into stakeholder actions 
beneficial to the firm. 
To support using KLD to measure stakeholder influence capacity, I describe how the 
data are created and structured, then explain the justification and assumptions I use to measure 
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stakeholder influence capacity with KLD data. The MSCI ESG KLD dataset is common in 
responsibility performance studies but my use of the data to measure stakeholder influence 
capacity departs from the usual use of the data to measure overall responsibility performance. 
However, Barnett and Salomon (2012) use KLD data to measure both firm's responsibility 
performance and stakeholder influence capacity. 
The logic of the measure rests on the way KLD data are created. For each responsibility 
dimension, analysts evaluate the firm's responsibility performance on that dimension for the 
year of the data. I argue analysts proxy for stakeholders when evaluating firms on each 
dimension. Just as stakeholder groups view firms' responsibility actions and evaluate whether 
to change behavior in response to firm actions, KLD analysts view firms' responsibility actions 
and decide how to score each firm on that dimension. Firms with high stakeholder influence 
capacity should be able to take responsibility actions that influence KLD analysts to rate the 
firm in a way that would increase the firm's performance, presumably by increasing the number 
of strengths the firm has across KLD dimensions. Firms with low stakeholder influence 
capacity do not have the capability to take responsibility actions that influence stakeholders to 
respond in ways that increase their performance. KLD analysts will be more likely to rate these 
firms as having concerns on responsibility dimensions. Because KLD data are created through 
the perceptions of external observers, and the stakeholder influence capacity mechanism relies 
on how external stakeholders respond to firm responsibility actions, I use KLD data as a proxy 
for stakeholder influence capacity. 
KLD data consist of firm-year ratings on more than 100 responsibility dimensions. The 
ratings are published near the end of each calendar year. KLD rates publicly traded firms, and 
the universe of rated firms changes over time: from 1991 – 2000, firms listed on the S&P 500; 
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from 2001 – 2002, firms listed on the Russell 1000; and from 2003 onward firms listed on the 
Russell 3000. The Russell 3000 Index tracks the 3,000 largest U.S.-traded stocks by market 
capitalization and includes both the Russell 1000 and the S&P 500.  KLD changed its 
methodology for calculating ratings in 1998 by increasing the number of dimensions in which 
firms are rated (Barnett & Salomon, 2012). Studies using a sum of strengths and concerns must 
adjust for this addition of dimensions. One adjustment is to drop observations prior to 1998 
(e.g., Barnett & Salomon, 2012).  
For each firm in each year, MSCI ESG Research creates an initial rating by reviewing 
responsibility information from academic, government, and nongovernmental datasets, 
company disclosures (e.g., 10-K reports, sustainability reports, proxy reports), media reports, 
and other sources. After MSCI creates an initial rating, companies are invited to participate in 
verifying the rating, which increases measurement error and possible confounding because 
some firms might be able to systematically alter their ratings while others cannot. If a firm's 
ability to alter its ratings is caused by something that also affects performance, regressions of 
performance on KLD ratings that do not control for that ability would produce biased 
estimates. 
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KLD rates firms on twelve responsibility dimensions: community, diversity, 
employment, environment, governance, human rights, products, alcohol involvement, 
gambling involvement, military involvement, nuclear involvement, and tobacco involvement. 
The first seven dimensions include both strength and concern ratings. Dimensions 8-12 address 
controversial business involvement and only include concern ratings. Each dimension contains 
multiple sub-dimensions. Table 25 describes the sub-dimensions in the Environment 
dimension. 
Each sub-dimension is an indicator variable for whether the firm in that year does or 
does not have the strength or concern. Each sub-dimension is scored either a 1 (presence) or a 
0 (absence) of a strength or concern. Because the strength and concern sub-dimensions are not 
symmetric—i.e., a strength is not simply the opposite of a concern—a firm can have both 
strengths and weaknesses on the same dimension. 
 
Table 25: Sub-dimension strengths and concerns of the KLD Environment dimension. 
Strengths Concerns 
Beneficial Products and Services Hazardous Waste 
Pollution Prevention Regulatory Problems 
Recycling Ozone Depleting Chemicals 
Clean Energy Substantial Emissions 
Property, Plant, Equipment Agriculture Chemicals 
Management Systems Climate Change (from 1999) 
Natural Resource Use: Water Stress Negative Impact of Products & Services 
Natural Resource Use: Biodiversity and Land Use Land Use & Biodiversity 
Natural Resource Use: Raw Material Sourcing Non-Carbon Releases 
Natural Resource Use: Financing Environmental Impact Supply Chain Management 
Environmental Opportunities: Green Buildings Water Management 
Environmental Opportunities in Renewable Energy Environment Other Concerns 
Waste Management: Electronic Waste  
Climate Change: Energy Efficiency  
Climate Change: Product Carbon Footprint  
Climate Change: Insuring Climate Change Risk  
Environment Other Strengths  
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The typical use of KLD data in measuring responsibility performance is to sum the 
strengths and concerns across all sub-dimensions for each firm-year and subtract the sum of 
concerns from the sum of strengths. This produces a "net KLD score" measuring a firm's 
overall responsibility performance in that year. However, use of the net KLD score approach 
has been criticized for conflating strengths and concerns into a single measure, ignoring that 
positive and negative responsibility actions are different theoretical constructs expected to 
influence stakeholders in different ways (Mattingly, 2017; Mattingly & Berman, 2006). 
Table 26 reports descriptive statistics for each strength and concern on each dimension 
for the entire KLD dataset from 1991 – 2015. 
Table 26: Descriptive statistics for KLD data 1991-2015. Both strengths and concerns are sums 
so values are always positive. 
Dimension Type Sub-dimensions Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Governance Concern 10 50,761 0.30 0.53 0 4 
 Strength 8 41,804 0.16 0.39 0 3 
Community Concern 4 50,758 0.06 0.26 0 3 
 Strength 8 42,890 0.17 0.50 0 5 
Diversity Concern 5 50,762 0.40 0.61 0 3 
 Strength 9 42,856 0.50 0.96 0 7 
Employees Concern 7 50,761 0.28 0.56 0 5 
 Strength 13 50,280 0.38 0.83 0 8 
Environment Concern 12 50,761 0.19 0.61 0 6 
 Strength 17 50,659 0.31 0.76 0 6 
Human Rights Concern 10 50,760 0.05 0.23 0 3 
 Strength 4 37,474 0.05 0.26 0 2 
Product Concern 6 50,761 0.19 0.52 0 4 
 Strength 12 45,455 0.12 0.34 0 3 
Tobacco Concern 2 50,762 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Military Concern 4 50,762 0.05 0.21 0 2 
Gambling Concern 2 50,762 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Alcohol Concern 2 50,762 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Nuclear Concern 4 50,762 0.02 0.15 0 2 
 
Control Variables 
I build on the model in the only other empirical test of SIC and control for total assets, long-
term debt, firm age, firm size, advertising spending, and research and development spending 
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(Barnett & Salomon, 2012). Control variables are described in the Chapter 2 Control Variables 
section. 
Controls for research and development and advertising spending require elaboration. 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) argue responsibility performance models are misspecified if 
they omit research and development, so I include it as a control variable in some models. 
However, these variables are missing for many observations in Compustat North America data. 
I estimate models assuming missing values of research and development and advertising 
spending in North American data are equal to zero, an assumption made in prior research on 
stakeholder influence capacity and the responsibility-performance relationship  (e.g., Barnett 
& Salomon, 2012). 
Results 
Hypothesis 2 predicts stakeholder influence capacity partially mediates the effect of CSR on 
performance. Table 27 summarizes the results of testing this hypothesis. Tests using an 
unadjusted performance measure reject Hypothesis 2. Tests using an adjusted performance 
measure correcting for the influence of outliers support Hypothesis 2. Three tests using the 
adjusted performance measure indicate full rather than partial mediation. The summary results 
suggest stakeholder influence capacity does moderate the effect of CSR on performance, but 
that the moderation effect is detectable only when controlling for the influence of outlier firms 
on the performance measure. Prior studies that do not control for the effects of performance 
outliers might have missed these mediation effects.  
The Baron and Kenny approach tests mediation by comparing the coefficients in 
Equations 4, 5, and 6 on page 95. Mediation exists if a and b test different from zero. The 
mediation is full if c' does not test different from zero and partial if c' tests different from zero. 
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The tests utilize several estimation approaches and model assumptions, including two different 
specifications to explore temporal dynamics. Results in Panel A are from a specification in 
which all variables are measured in the same year. Panel B results are from a specification 
assuming a 1-year lag between each mediation step. 
Table 27 compares coefficient estimates from a series of model specifications described 
by each column in each table in the Appendix. The "full" model in each estimation includes 
all variables. However, there are two full models in each table that differ by the assumptions 
each model makes about missing values of the advertising and research and development 
variables. Column 8 of each table reports the full model without assuming missing values of 
advertising and research and development are equal to 0. Column 9 of each table reports the 
full model assuming missing values are 0. One of the few other empirical tests of stakeholder 
influence capacity also makes this assumption (Barnett & Salomon, 2012). Compared to Model 
9 with missing values assumed equal to 0, Model 8 without assumptions is more parsimonious 
but less statistically powerful. Model 9 has greater statistical power due to more observations, 
but assuming missing values are 0 is a strong assumption because some missing values occur 
when firms do not disclose advertising or research and development costs. Such firms do spend 





Table 27: Summary of mediation test results using the Baron and Kenny mediation analysis method. 
            
Model 
Assume missing R&D 
& advertising = 0 a Std. error 
 
b Std. error 
 
c' Std. error 
 
Mediation 
PANEL A: Same year  SIC=a(CSR)  Rev=b(SIC)+c'(CSR)   
Pooled No 0.1613*** (0.0169)  -190.7880 (184.6827)  -27.1075 (34.4387)  No 
Pooled  Yes 0.1029*** (0.0073)  -425.3357 (246.4481)  46.1960 (39.2335)  No 
            
Pooled IHS No 0.1613*** (0.0169)  0.1056*** (0.0121)  -0.0131* (0.0054)  Partial 
Pooled IHS Yes 0.1029*** (0.0073)  0.1117*** (0.0100)  -0.0095** (0.0034)  Partial 
            
Fixed effects No 0.0590*** (0.0101)  84.6574 (43.9918)  -42.3308 (25.4235)  No 
Fixed effects Yes 0.0420*** (0.0047)  -86.1643 (61.4216)  -8.2062 (12.5040)  No 
            
Fixed effects IHS No 0.0590*** (0.0101)  0.0112*** (0.0026)  -0.0013 (0.0014)  Full 
Fixed effects IHS Yes 0.0420*** (0.0047)  0.0033 (0.0029)  -0.0012 (0.0011)  No 
            
PANEL B: Time dynamics  SICt=a(CSRt-1)  Revt+1=b(SICt)+c'(CSRt-1)   
Pooled No 0.1365*** (0.0166)  -59.1698 (203.4813)  -11.0430 (37.6858)  No 
Pooled  Yes 0.0835*** (0.0074)  -347.9597 (283.7297)  66.1406 (49.7025)  No 
            
Pooled IHS No 0.1365*** (0.0166)  0.0954*** (0.0117)  -0.0086 (0.0057)  Full 
Pooled IHS Yes 0.0835*** (0.0074)  0.0972*** (0.0100)  -0.0070* (0.0034)  Partial 
            
Fixed effects No 0.0363** (0.0120)  -72.6073 (160.1584)  -18.3234 (29.1385)  No 
Fixed effects Yes 0.0243*** (0.0053)  -71.8517 (63.0057)  33.0616 (27.4861)  No 
            
Fixed effects IHS No 0.0363** (0.0120)  0.0078* (0.0032)  0.0020 (0.0013)  Full 
Fixed effects IHS Yes 0.0243*** (0.0053)  0.0025 (0.0020)  0.0025** (0.0008)  No 
            
Robust firm-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
IHS: Inverse hyperbolic sine transformed dependent variable revenue to control for influence of outliers. Revenue is not the DV in estimation of a, so estimates a 
are not affected by transforming revenue. 
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Models using revenue as the dependent variable show no mediation effects. Models 
using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of revenue to control for outliers show a 
pattern of mediation effects across all models and specifications, except models that assume 
missing observations on research and development and advertising are equal to 0. 
Pooled regression models assume all observations are independent after clustering 
errors by firm. Pooled regression models use both within-firm and between-firm variation to 
estimate coefficients. Coefficient estimates should be interpreted as the change in the 
dependent variable associated with a change in the independent variable. Pooled regression 
enables inference comparing firms to one another but suffers from possible omitted variable 
bias due to firm-specific confounds. 
In Panel A of Table 27, the estimate of b is -190.7880 and not statistically different 
from zero. This implies that, after controlling for CSR, a change in SIC is not statistically 
associated with a change in revenue. The results of the same model using inverse hyperbolic 
sine (IHS) transformed revenue to control for extreme outliers on revenue suggest a different 
inference (Burbidge et al., 1988). In the IHS-transformed model without assumptions about 
advertising and R&D, the estimate of b is 0.1056 and statistically significant from zero at 
p<0.001. This implies that, after controlling for CSR, a 1-point increase in a firm's SIC causes 
revenue to increase by 10.56% on average. Because this is a pooled regression, the inference 
is across observations: an observation with 1 point higher SIC will have on average ~10% 
higher revenue than an observation with 1 point lower SIC. In the same model, the estimate of 
c' is -0.0131 and different from zero at p<0.05. This means that after controlling for SIC, 
observations with 1 point higher CSR will have on average 1.31% lower revenue than 
observations with 1 point lower CSR. The implication is that the direct effect of CSR on 
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revenue is negative, but the mediation effect of CSR working through SIC is positive, 
supporting the prediction of stakeholder influence capacity theory in this sample. These results 
hold in other IHS estimations, including in the Panel B alternative time dynamics specification. 
The fixed effects regression models improve on pooled regression by controlling for 
firm-specific confounds, but only those that do not change over the time period of the panel. 
However, fixed effects regressions sacrifice pooled regression's ability to understand across 
observation relationships. Fixed effects regression models estimate within-firm associations 
only. Fixed effects coefficient estimates should be interpreted as the average change in a firm's 
dependent variable associated with a change in the independent variable. Because fixed effects 
estimates discard between-firm information, they do not enable inference comparing firms to 
one another. 
In Panel A of Table 27, the fixed effects regressions with unadjusted revenue show no 
mediation. The IHS-adjusted revenue models show full mediation without advertising and 
research and development assumptions and no mediation with those assumptions. The estimate 
of b in the IHS-adjusted fixed effects regression without missing data assumptions is 0.0112, 
significantly different from 0 at p<0.001. The interpretation of this estimate is within-firm: the 
average increase in a firm's revenue from a 1-point increase in a firm's SIC is 1.12%. The 
estimate of c' is -0.0013 and not different from zero, implying that, within firms, SIC fully 
mediates the effect of CSR on performance. This pattern of results also appears in the Panel B 
alternative time dynamics specification.  
What inferences can by made by comparing the pooled results to the fixed effects 
results? Both models show mediation with IHS-adjusted revenue but not with unadjusted 
revenue, suggesting outliers in the unadjusted data might have a large influence on estimation 
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and could potentially mask effects. The influence of outliers in this context is not surprising, 
given that unadjusted revenue is highly skewed. 
Table 28: Descriptive statistics for unadjusted and inverse hyperbolic sine transformed 
revenue.  
Variables  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev. Median  Min  Max  Skew 
Revenue 15585 6,167.85 21,151.72 1,238.27 -1965 483,521 11.17 
IHS Revenue 15585 7.85 1.85 7.81 -8.28 13.78 -.72 
Note: Revenue in (unadjusted in $millions USD). IHS-transformed data are much less skewed, reducing the 
influence of outliers in the highly-skewed unadjusted data. 
 
The main difference in results for IHS-adjusted models is whether mediation is partial or full. 
Three of four pooled regression models show partial mediation, and one pooled model shows 
full mediation. Two of four fixed effects regression models show full mediation, and zero show 
partial mediation. This implies the mediation process might work differently between firms 
rather than within firms. Distinguishing between between- and within-firm relationships has 
been neglected in strategy theory but needs more attention, especially as fixed effects 
regression models become the default estimation approach (Certo, Withers, & Semadeni, 
2017).  
Pooled regression models provide inferences that compare observatoins against one 
another. In those models, partial mediation across observations implies that CSR retains some 
direct effect on performance independent of its operation through the SIC mechanism. The 
fixed effects models showing full mediation imply that, within individual firms, CSR has no 
direct effect on performance and only affects performance through the SIC mechanism.  
These differences in the mediation relationship depending on whether the relationship 
occurs across observations or instead within individual firms needs further research to 
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understand why CSR might have a direct effect on performance when comparing a firm against 
rivals but not when comparing the firm against its own past performance. 
Discussion and Limitations 
This chapter empirically tested the stakeholder influence capacity theory hypothesis that 
stakeholder influence capacity is a mechanism mediating the relationship between CSR and 
firm performance. It found evidence supporting that hypothesis in regression analyses 
measuring performance as revenue, but only in models in which the revenue measure was 
transformed to control for the influence of outlier firms on revenue. 
 The empirical tests in this chapter extend our understanding of stakeholder influence 
capacity through the first empirical test of SIC theory using separate measures of CSR and 
SIC. Barnett and Salomon's (2012) tests used the same measure for both CSR and SIC: net 
KLD score. This chapter measures CSR with a novel dataset—CSRHub—that incorporates 
information from many individual CSR evaluations into an aggregate assessment of firms' 
responsibility performance. This chapter measures SIC with KLD data that is created by 
analysts assessing both firms' objective responsibility actions and also inferring how 
stakeholders respond to those actions. KLD better measures SIC than responsibility because it 
combines perceptions of responsibility actions with actions themselves. 
The empirical tests in this chapter have a number of limitations. First, the measure of 
stakeholder influence capacity is both a strength and limitation. KLD has been a standard 
dataset in the responsibility  performance literature for decades (Mattingly, 2017; Perrault & 
Quinn, 2018). KLD data have been criticized for several weaknesses. One concern is that KLD 
ratings do not accurately measure the underlying construct of social responsibility (Mattingly, 
2017; Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Perrault & Quinn, 2018). Another criticism is that ratings 
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capture reputation in addition to social responsibility, introducing the possibility that changes 
in ratings better measure reputation than other constructs like SIC (Chatterji et al., 2009). 
Another criticism is that ratings are simply poor measures of underlying constructs. For 
example, a comparison of several different ratings that all claim to measure responsibility 
found a lack of convergence across the ratings, which would be unexpected if the ratings all 
accurately measured the same underlying construct (Chatterji et al., 2016). However, if KLD 
captures SIC, comparing it to other measures of CSR is not going to produce convergence. 
Another limitation of the KLD data is that MSCI gives firms the opportunity to review 
and comment on their ratings. This raises the possibility of measurement error in the ratings 
that could cause problems using the data. If better-managed firms are more likely to protest 
their ratings and get them changed, and if better management is correlated with better firm 
performance, then unobserved firm influence on KLD ratings confounds the relationship 
between KLD ratings and firm performance. In this chapter, this confounding would cause bias 
in the estimate of stakeholder influence capacity's effect on performance. I know of no studies 
assessing which firms can and cannot alter their ratings through MSCI's review process. 
Another limitation relates to stakeholder motivations. The drivers of a stakeholder 
continuing its relationship with the firm might differ from drivers of stakeholder effort in the 
relationship (Bosse & Coughlan, 2016). This distinction implies stakeholder influence capacity 
might have separate dimensions for firms being able to keep stakeholder relationships active 
and also for being able to alter stakeholder effort level within continued relationships. 
Discriminating between these two channels of influence could be an important future research 
area for stakeholder influence capacity and responsibility performance research. 
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CHAPTER 4: IS THE RESPONSIBILITY PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP 
STAKEHOLDER-SPECIFIC? 
This chapter examines variation in stakeholder influence capacity across several stakeholder 
groups. Stakeholder influence capacity (SIC) theory assumes firms have a single SIC capability 
used for all stakeholders (Barnett, 2007; Barnett & Salomon, 2012). This chapter explores 
whether SIC differs across stakeholder groups rather than being a generic firm capability 
applicable to all stakeholders. 
Instrumental stakeholder theory suggests firms' SIC differs depending on stakeholder 
groups because stakeholder groups have heterogeneous preferences for how they are treated 
by firms (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014; Bundy et al., 2018). A firm's CSR action might satisfy 
some stakeholders' preferences but not others. Firms might not be able to influence all 
stakeholders the same way with the same responsibility action. An SIC capability for 
employees might enable a firm to translate employee-focused CSR actions into increased 
performance, but those same actions might not influence customer stakeholder behavior at all 
or could negatively influence customer stakeholder behavior. To explore whether SIC is 
stakeholder specific, I conduct mediation tests for SIC and CSR related to different stakeholder 
groups: customers, employees, and the environment. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Stakeholder influence capacity theory explains firm performance as a function of stakeholder 
relationship maintenance through actions to improve social welfare (Barnett, 2007). An action 
is corporate social responsibility if it satisfies two conditions. First, the action seeks to increase 
social welfare for some group. Second, the action manages a stakeholder relationship. The 
emphasis on improving social welfare enables theorizing about what aspects of social welfare 
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matter to which stakeholder groups, including the degree to which firms understand what their 
stakeholders value and whether firms have the ability to identify and execute responsibility 
actions that improve social welfare for specific stakeholders. 
The effect of responsibility actions on stakeholder groups varies according to how 
stakeholders view firm actions. Stakeholder groups vary in the degree to which they prioritize 
self-interest and the perceived fairness of distributional outcomes (Bosse et al., 2009). Self-
interest is bounded by norms of fairness. How firms distribute profit among stakeholders 
affects stakeholder perceptions of self-interest and fairness, which in turn affects stakeholder 
behavior toward the firm. When firms allocate more to stakeholders than stakeholders need to 
satisfy their needs and demands, stakeholders reciprocate by providing firms more information 
about their preferences than the firm demands (Harrison et al., 2010). Additional preference 
information enables firms to create more value for stakeholders. If the firm captures some of 
that additional value, performance increases. Responsibility as a form of over-provision for 
some stakeholders can influence those stakeholders to provide additional information to the 
firm, connecting responsibility to performance through stakeholder influence. 
Building on these ideas, I test mediation for three stakeholder groups of customers, 
employees, and environmental stakeholders. Table 29 summarizes the hypotheses tested in this 
chapter. 
Table 29: Summary of hypotheses. 
Hypothesis Prediction 
3 Customer-focused SIC partially mediates the effect of customer-focused CSR on performance. 
4 Employee-focused SIC partially mediates the effect of employee-focused CSR on performance. 
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All three hypotheses predict partial rather than full mediation. In full mediation, CSR would 
have no direct effect on performance. In partial mediation, CSR would have some direct effect 
on performance even after controlling for CSR's effect on SIC. Partial mediation hypotheses 
leave open the possibility that CSR affects performance through other channels than through 
influencing stakeholders. The following hypothesis development sections discuss some of 
these alternative channels through which CSR might affect performance independent of 
stakeholder influence. 
Customers 
I consider revenue as the firm performance outcome. The most direct link between revenue 
performance and responsibility might be through customers. Customers create revenue by 
trading money for the firm's products and services. Theoretically, customers should change 
their purchasing behavior in response to responsibility actions by firms, and responsibility 
information provided by sources other than the firm should influence customer behavior more 
than information provided by the firm itself (Schuler & Cording, 2006). Information about 
CSR from CSRHub should influence customer behavior more than firms' own self-disclosed 
CSR information. 
Flammer (2015) examines how responsibility affects performance through customers. 
Adopting a responsible shareholder proposal influences customer stakeholders who care about 
responsibility to increase their purchases from the firm. Flammer finds a positive association 
between revenue and proposal adoption, suggesting this form of CSR action works through the 
customer channel. Firms that barely adopt responsibility-related shareholder proposals have 
higher sales one year after adoption, compared to firms that barely reject such proposals. The 
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weakly positive effect persists even four years after proposal adoption. These theoretical 
expectations and empirical findings suggest the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Customer-focused SIC partially mediates the effect of customer-
focused CSR on performance. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts partial mediation that allows for a direct effect of CSR on performance 
independent of CSR's effect on SIC. Partial mediation occurs when customer-focused CSR 
affects performance independent of its effect on customer-focused SIC. For example, efforts 
within the firm to increase employee-focused CSR might reveal opportunities for process 
improvements that increase performance independent of customer reactions to CSR actions. 
Employees 
Employees respond to responsibility actions by employers and potential employers. A firm's 
culture of organizational citizenship is positively associated with higher employee 
commitment to the firm (Maignan, Ferrell, & Hult, 1999). Glavas and Kelley (2014) survey 
827 employees in 18 North American food and agriculture firms to understand how employee 
perceptions moderate the relationship between firms' responsibility actions and employee 
commitment to the firm and employee job satisfaction. They examine employee perception of 
work meaningfulness, measured using the three items for the meaning scale from the Overall 
Job Satisfaction Questionnaire (Cammann, Fichman, Jenkins, & Kelsh, 1983). The three items 
ask whether the respondent's work is valuable to them, their job activities are personally 
meaningful to them, and the work they do is meaningful to them. Higher work meaningfulness 
positively moderates the responsibility-employee commitment relationship and the 
responsibility-job satisfaction relationship. They also examine perceived organizational 
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support, measured using six questions related to whether the respondent's employer values the 
respondent's contributions, cares about employee well-being, strongly considers goals and 
values of employees, is willing to help employees if they need a special favor, shows little 
concern for employees, or takes pride in accomplishments of employees. Perceived 
organizational support has no moderating effect on the responsibility-commitment relationship 
and positively moderates the responsibility-job satisfaction relationship. 
In an experimental setting, undergraduate students rated fictitious firms as more 
attractive places to work when manipulated websites for those firms mentioned community or 
environment social responsibility, providing some evidence for a causal effect of responsibility 
information on a firm's attractiveness as an employer (D. A. Jones, Willness, & Madey, 2014). 
A similar pattern was found in observational data from job seekers at a job fair, but only for 
firms whose promotional materials mentioned community responsibility and not for 
environment responsibility. Suggested mechanisms for these relationships include anticipated 
pride working for the firm, organizational prestige, perceived values fit between employee and 
firm, and expected employee treatment. While these results suggest responsibility can 
influence job seeker stakeholders, they do not allow inference about the performance impacts 
of that influence. Future studies of whether employees who chose firms based on these criteria 
contribute more to the firm's value appropriation than employees who do not choose based on 
these criteria could generate inferences about whether responsibility affects performance 
through employee selection.  
Jones, Willness, and Madey (2014) study how information about a firm's responsibility 
actions affects job seekers' evaluation of how attractive the firm is as an employer. They find 
undergraduate experimental subjects rate firms as more attractive employers when the firms 
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include community and environmental responsibility information on their websites. They 
extend these findings to a non-experimental context of a job fair and report undergraduate job 
seekers rate firms including community responsibility information in promotional material as 
more attractive, but inclusion of environmental responsibility information has no association 
with employer attractiveness. Authors infer from these results that the effect of responsibility 
on firm attractiveness to potential employees is more due to how potential employees expect 
to be treated if they join the firm's community than how the firm treats the environment.  
Passage of responsible shareholder proposals is associated with increased labor 
productivity the following year, but the relationship disappears after one year, suggesting a 
possible short-term influence of responsibility on employee stakeholders (Flammer, 2015). 
This implies adopting CSR proposals affects employee and customer behavior, which then 
effects two types of firm performance, labor productivity and revenue. 
When states increase unemployment benefits, firms tend to increase their employee-
focused responsibility actions, suggesting firms attempt to use employee-focused 
responsibility actions to influence employee behavior in response to increased outside options 
(Flammer & Luo, 2017). In states adopting more generous unemployment benefits, firms 
increase their responsibility actions targeting their relationship with employees. When 
contextual changes reduce the costs of employees getting fired, firms respond by providing 
more benefits to employees through responsibility actions. This result supports the idea that 
responsibility can act through the management of stakeholder behavior to influence firm 
performance, in this case by preventing employees from shirking after incentive changes that 
reduce the costs of being fired. These findings assume changes in state unemployment benefits 
are unrelated to firms' influence on the political process, which might be an unreasonable 
   
120 
 
assumption given research on corporate influence on political processes (Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, 
& Siegel, 2016). 
These findings suggest that employee-focused responsibility actions have the potential 
to alter employee behavior in ways that increase firm revenues, such as through improved labor 
productivity (Flammer, 2015), increasing competition among potential employees for 
employment in the firm (D. A. Jones et al., 2014), and preventing employees from leaving the 
firm when outside compensation and employment options increase (Flammer & Luo, 2017). 
Hypothesis 4: Employee-focused SIC partially mediates the effect of employee-
focused CSR on performance. 
Environmental stakeholders 
Whether responsibility increases revenue through environmental stakeholders is less 
straightforward than for customer and employee stakeholders. Environmental stakeholders 
include groups that prioritize firms' impacts on natural environmental systems. These 
stakeholders often seek to prevent firms from impacting the environment. Environmental 
responsibility targeting environmental stakeholder could affect revenue in several ways. first, 
firms demonstrating or committing to reduced or eliminated environmental impacts might 
influence some environmental stakeholders to increase their purchases, which would increase 
revenue. Second, environmental responsibility might reduce stakeholder pressure on firms to 
change their practices, but this stakeholder response has no clear connection to firm revenue 
and could even reduce revenue by eliminating news attention to firms. Third, environmental 
responsibility actions might be used as a marketing tactic by firms. This approach could 
increase revenue by attracting new customers, but it could also decrease revenue if the action 
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is perceived as greenwashing. It is also difficult to clearly differentiate the customer and 
environmental channels because of the potential impact of changes in environmental CSR on 
customer behavior. 
Empirical evidence is also mixed. Some studies find a positive association between 
environment focused responsibility and performance (Jiao, 2010). Barnett and Salomon (2006) 
find that the use of investment screens focused on community relations increase financial 
performance. Flammer (2013) examines how share prices change in response to new 
information about firms' responsibility actions over three decades 1980-2009. Over time, 
market reactions to eco-friendly announcements start positive and decay to no reaction. Over 
the same period, markets do not react to eco-harmful announcements early on, and market 
reaction steadily intensifies toward declines in share price by the end of the period. These 
findings suggest investors care about environment-related responsibility actions, care in 
different ways about positive and negative actions, and that the effect of environment-related 
responsibility on investors has changed over time. At the end of the study period, investors did 
not respond to eco-friendly news announcements and responded negatively to eco-harmful 
events. 
Mattingly's (2017) review supports the idea that time effects are important for 
understanding responsibility performance. Firms with higher responsibility tend to have higher 
profitability. However, the time needed to build higher performance from higher responsibility 
appears to be long- rather than short-term. This supports Barnett's theorization that stakeholder 
influence capacity is a firm-level capability that takes time to learn and that firms can build 
over time through consistent investment. Consistent investment in responsibility over at least 
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5 years is more likely to be associated with increased performance than shorter-term 
responsibility investments (Garcia-Castro, Ariño, & Canela, 2011). 
 Hawn, Chatterji, and Mitchell (2018) examine how markets respond to firms being 
added to, removed from, or continuing on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, using data on 
firms from 27 countries over the 17 years from 1999-2015, a shorter and later period than 
Flammer (2013). They find over the entire time period that markets penalize firms that are 
added to or continue on the index but do not react to firms removed from the index. When the 
data are analyzed for temporal trends, there is a temporal trend of markets responding slightly 
positively to firms being added to the index. However, when market reactions are analyzed in 
a regression model including control variables, investors do not react at all to firms being added 
to, removed from, or continuing on the index. 
 The results of Flammer (2013) and Hawn et al. (2018) are somewhat contradictory. 
Flammer finds markets react more negatively over time to eco-harmful events, but Hawn et al. 
find no reaction over time to firms being removed from the index. These conflicting results 
could be due to differences in what the two studies capture with their measure of responsibility. 
Flammer's measure of eco-harmful announcements captures actions firms take that generate 
enough attention to be covered by news outlets. Hawn et al.'s measure of removal from the 
index captures only one organization's once-yearly determination of whether a firm should be 
included on a list of 2,500 firms. The information value of the events studied in Hawn et al. 
might be less relevant to investors about firms' social responsibility than the events studied in 
Flammer. 
Whereas positive environment-focused responsibility could be perceived as either 
genuine or as greenwashing, resulting in no clear causal effect of such responsibility on 
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revenue, negative responsibility has no clear theoretical means by which it might increase 
revenue. 
Hypothesis 5: Environment-focused SIC partially mediates the effect of 
environment-focused CSR on performance. 
Data and Sample 
I test the hypotheses using CSRHub and Compustat data described in Chapter 2. Table 30 and 
Table 31 present descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in the hypothesis 
tests in this chapter. 
Table 30: Descriptive statistics. 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Revenue ($millions) 15585 6167.85 21151.72 -1965 483521 
Inverse hyperbolic sine revenue 15585 7.85 1.85 -8.28 13.78 
Customer CSR rating 12446 54.3 13.63 6.11 92.36 
Net KLD product 12287 -.02 .62 -4 3 
KLD product strengths 12287 .17 .4 0 3 
KLD product concerns 15588 .17 .49 0 4 
Employee CSR rating 15412 53.88 9.75 14.33 93 
Net KLD employees 15392 .28 1.01 -4 8 
KLD employee strengths 15392 .47 .95 0 8 
KLD employee concerns 15588 .18 .51 0 5 
Environment CSR rating 12880 50.13 10.75 6 94 
Net KLD environment 15544 .26 .89 -5 6 
Net KLD environment strengths 15544 .41 .9 0 6 
Net KLD environment concerns 15588 .15 .52 0 5 
Long-term debt ($millions) 15525 2874.27 14916.29 0 459022 
Assets ($millions) 15587 16464.5 96112.66 .8 2570000 
Age (years) 15506 26.51 17.69 1 67 
Employees (1000s) 15508 17.24 67.51 0 2300 
Advertising ($millions) 6835 167.73 577.26 0 9729 
R&D ($millions) 8473 228.45 932.01 0 16085 
Year 15588 2012.62 2.37 2008 2016 
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Table 31: Correlation matrix. 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Revenue ($millions) 1.00 
(2) Inverse hyperbolic sine revenue 0.49* 1.00 
(3) Customer CSR rating -0.04* -0.22* 1.00 
(4) Net KLD product -0.25* -0.23* 0.27* 1.00 
(5) KLD product strengths 0.16* 0.18* 0.20* 0.53* 1.00 
(6) KLD product concerns 0.38* 0.37* -0.15* -0.76* 0.15* 1.00 
(7) Employee CSR rating 0.11* 0.14* 0.49* 0.01 0.14* 0.09* 1.00 
(8) Net KLD employee 0.09* 0.17* 0.11* 0.13* 0.20* 0.00 0.18* 1.00 
(9) KLD employee strengths 0.26* 0.35* 0.02 0.00 0.26* 0.18* 0.20* 0.87* 1.00 
(10) KLD employee concerns 0.31* 0.32* -0.20* -0.24* 0.08* 0.33* 0.03* -0.36* 0.15* 1.00 
(11) Environment CSR rating 0.10* 0.05* 0.39* 0.00 0.07* 0.04* 0.49* 0.11* 0.12* 0.01 1.00 
(12) Net KLD environment 0.18* 0.28* 0.14* 0.01 0.24* 0.16* 0.20* 0.26* 0.30* 0.05* 0.23* 
(13) Net KLD environment strengths 0.37* 0.45* 0.04* -0.11* 0.27* 0.31* 0.23* 0.24* 0.39* 0.26* 0.25* 
(14) Net KLD environment concerns 0.33* 0.30* -0.16* -0.20* 0.05* 0.24* 0.06* -0.03* 0.17* 0.37* 0.04* 
(15) Long-term debt ($millions) 0.40* 0.29* -0.04* -0.19* 0.14* 0.32* 0.08* 0.14* 0.21* 0.12* 0.06* 
(16) Assets ($millions) 0.39* 0.27* -0.03* -0.19* 0.13* 0.33* 0.09* 0.16* 0.21* 0.07* 0.05* 
(17) Age (years) 0.24* 0.42* -0.08* -0.15* 0.12* 0.22* 0.13* 0.10* 0.22* 0.22* 0.07* 
(18) Employees (1000s) 0.71* 0.36* -0.02 -0.22* 0.10* 0.32* 0.08* 0.03* 0.21* 0.33* 0.09* 
(19) Advertising ($millions) 0.58* 0.50* -0.01 -0.26* 0.19* 0.44* 0.19* 0.13* 0.31* 0.31* 0.16* 
(20) R&D ($millions) 0.36* 0.33* 0.06* -0.15* 0.28* 0.39* 0.19* 0.32* 0.41* 0.14* 0.15* 
(21) Year -0.02* -0.08* 0.63* 0.24* 0.14* -0.18* 0.29* 0.22* 0.04* -0.36* 0.18* 






 Variables (continued) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(12) Net KLD environment 1.00          
(13) Net KLD environment strengths 0.83* 1.00         
(14) Net KLD environment concerns -0.28* 0.31* 1.00        
(15) Long-term debt ($millions) 0.15* 0.24* 0.16* 1.00       
(16) Assets ($millions) 0.15* 0.21* 0.10* 0.80* 1.00      
(17) Age (years) 0.21* 0.37* 0.28* 0.15* 0.12* 1.00     
(18) Employees (1000s) 0.21* 0.29* 0.14* 0.27* 0.24* 0.19* 1.00    
(19) Advertising ($millions) 0.40* 0.49* 0.28* 0.43* 0.30* 0.29* 0.38* 1.00   
(20) R&D ($millions) 0.36* 0.43* 0.18* 0.37* 0.53* 0.21* 0.18* 0.55* 1.00  
(21) Year 0.13* 0.02* -0.19* -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02* -0.01 0.00 1.00 







I use mediation analysis for three stakeholder subgroups: employees, customers, and the 
natural environment. I use the pooled regression and fixed effects specifications described in 
Chapter 3. Standard errors are clustered by firm in all models to correct for the non-
independence of repeated observations on the same firms over time. Clustering standard errors 
by firm assumes observations are independent across firms. 
I use two specifications differing on assumptions about time effects. The first 
specification uses same-year measures on all variables. Equations 4 and 5 describe the same-
year specifications. Subscript i is firm and t is year. 
 𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎(𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 7 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏(𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡) + 𝑐
′(𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 ) +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 8 
Mediation tests examine two conditions. First, is a significantly different from zero in Equation 
4. If a is not different from zero, CSR is not associated with SIC, rejecting mediation. Second, 
conditional on a testing different from zero, does b test different from zero. If yes, mediation 
exists, and the type of mediation depends on the test of c'. If c' tests different from zero, 
mediation is partial. If c' does not test different from zero, mediation is full. 
The second specification assumes a 1-year time lag between each stage of the mediation 
chain, described in Equations 9 and 10. 
 𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎(𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 9 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑏(𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡) + 𝑐
′(𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 10 
In these equations, SIC is measured in the focal year t. CSR is assumed to take one year to 
affect a firm's SIC, so CSR is measured in year t-1. SIC is assumed to take one year to affect 
revenue, so Rev is measured in t+1. The result of this assumption about mediation time 
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dynamics is that the direct effect, if any, of CSR on revenue is assumed to take two years 
because CSR is measured in time t-1 and Rev in year t+1. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable measuring performance is firm revenue. I estimate models with 
untransformed and transformed revenue to control for the influence of outlier firms. Revenue 
is positively skewed, with a small number of firms having much larger revenues than the mean 
and median revenue (Table 32). Firms with extremely large revenues tend to be oil and gas 
firms. An exception is Walmart, Inc., a retail firm with some of the largest revenues in the data. 
Variable transformation is common in research on organizations, especially the 
logarithmic transformation (Becker, Robertson, & Vandenberg, 2018). The logarithmic 
transformation drops all observations with values equal to or below zero. Other approaches 
approximate the logarithmic and retain values less than or equal to zero. I use the inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformation that approximates the logarithmic transformation but retains 
observations with values equal to or below zero (for a review of transformations to handle 
extreme values, see Burbidge et al., 1988).  
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Table 32: Revenue descriptive statistics by industry and transformation. 
  Untransformed  Transformed 
SIC 2-digit category Obs. Mean Median Skew  Mean Median Skew 
Ag, forestry, fishing 41  $    3,980.39   $    1,699.64  1.30  7.80 8.13 -0.56 
Construction 253  $    4,019.05   $    2,086.19  2.53  8.46 8.34 0.13 
Finance 3,171  $    4,317.83   $       650.70  6.11  7.42 7.17 -0.36 
Manufacture 5,954  $    5,882.64   $    1,306.13  10.91  7.74 7.87 -0.95 
Mining 673  $    5,580.26   $    1,351.85  9.03  7.80 7.90 -2.04 
Public administration 38  $  60,205.04   $  34,949.50  0.90  9.99 11.15 -0.8 
Retail 1,123  $  13,798.56   $    2,675.21  7.87  8.77 8.58 0.59 
Services 2,422  $    2,892.77   $       919.34  8.44  7.59 7.52 0.1 
Transportation 1,457  $    7,899.37   $    2,380.65  5.18  8.48 8.47 -1.12 
Wholesale 453  $  13,629.19   $    3,415.67  3.62  8.97 8.83 0.26 
     
    
Total 15,585  $    6,167.85   $    1,238.27  11.17  7.85 7.81 -0.72 
         
Note: "Public administration" includes Berkshire Hathaway and General Electric. Mean and median 
untransformed revenue ($millions USD) and inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed revenue by 2-digit SIC code, 
demonstrating skewness and the skewness reduction of the transformation. The transformation reduces the 
influence of outlier firms. 
 
The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation reduces skewness across all SIC categories and in 
the total dataset. Figure 8 shows the distributions of the untransformed and transformed 
revenue variable. 
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Figure 8: Revenue distribution by transformation. 
 
Independent and mediating variables 
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 predict how stakeholder-specific SIC mediates the effect of stakeholder-
specific CSR on performance for customers, employees, and the environment. Table 33 
describes the variables and datasets for each measure capturing stakeholder-specific CSR and 
mediating variables capturing stakeholder-specific SIC. 
Table 33: Independent and mediating variables for mediation hypothesis tests. 




3 Customer SIC partially mediates the effect of 
customer-focused CSR on performance. 
Customer CSR rating Product strengths and 
concerns 
4 Employee SIC partially mediates the effect of 
employee-focused CSR on performance. 
Employee CSR rating Employee strengths and 
concerns 
5 Environment SIC partially mediates the effect 
of environment-focused CSR on performance. 
Environment CSR rating Environment strengths 
and concerns 
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I use the KLD data for mediating variables capturing stakeholder-specific SIC. KLD 
rates firms on twelve dimensions: Community, Diversity, Employment, Environment, 
Governance, Human Rights, Products, Alcohol Involvement, Gambling Involvement, Military 
Involvement, Nuclear Involvement, and Tobacco Involvement. I use the Products dimension 
as the mediating variable capturing a firm's SIC with customer stakeholders, the Employment 
dimension for a firm's SIC with employee stakeholders, and the Environment dimension for 
SIC with environment stakeholders. 
Control variables 
I use the same control variables for each empirical approach as described in the control 
variables section of Chapter 2. 
Results 
The results provide little evidence for mediation for customers in these data, some evidence of 
mediation for employees, and moderate evidence of mediation for environment stakeholders. 
Table 34 summarizes the results of all hypothesis tests. The table reports estimation results 
from full models that do and do not assume missing observations of advertising and research 
and development spending are equal to 0. Full estimation results for all models are in this 
chapter's Appendix. 
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Table 34: Stakeholder-specific mediation test results. 
Stakeholder  Customer  Employee  Environment 
Missing data assumption  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Model Time         
          
Pooled Same year No No  No No  No Full 
 Dynamic No No  No No  No No 
Pooled IHS Same year No No  Full Partial  Full Partial 
 Dynamic No No  Partial Partial  Full Partial 
          
Fixed Effects Same year No Partial  No No  No No 
 Dynamic No No  No No  No No 
Fixed Effects IHS Same year No No  No No  Full Full 
 Dynamic No No  No No  No No 
          
Note: Missing data assumption is "Yes" when missing values of advertising and research and development are 
assumed equal to 0. Same year "Time" models measure all variables in the same year. Dynamic "Time" models 
assume 1-year lag between mediation effects. "IHS" models control for outliers on firm performance by using 
inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed revenue as the dependent variable. 
 
I test hypotheses with standard mediation analysis (Aguinis et al., 2017; Baron & 
Kenny, 1986; Shaver, 2005), using two estimation strategies of pooled ordinary least squares 
regression and fixed effects regression. Each estimation strategy makes different assumptions 
about the underlying data generating process. Pooled ordinary least squares regression assumes 
time-invariant firm characteristics do not confound the estimation. This is a strong assumption. 
However, pooled regression uses information from both between- and within-firm 
comparisons for estimation. Fixed effects regression does not assume time-invariant firm 
characteristics are not confounds but instead controls for them. However, the tradeoff is that 
controlling for time-invariant firm characteristics throws away between-firm information, and 
the fixed-effects estimates only test whether mediation occurs within firms, not across firms 
(Certo et al., 2017).  
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Hypothesis 3: Customer stakeholders 
The bulk of evidence from mediation tests for customer SIC and customer CSR do not support 
Hypothesis 3. Table 35 summarizes the results of the hypothesis tests. Panel A reports the 
results of same-year tests. Panel B reports results from models assuming 1-year lag time 
dynamics. 
Taken together, the evidence from same-year pooled models is that customer SIC does 
not mediate the effect of customer CSR on revenue performance. All same-year models in 
Panel A show a strong positive relationship between customer CSR and customer SIC, 
satisfying the first condition for mediation. Two models satisfy the second condition for 
mediation and suggest customer SIC mediates the effect of customer CSR on performance. 
Pooled models with untransformed revenue show mixed evidence depending on assumptions 
about missing observations of R&D and advertising. The model that does not assume missing 
observations equal 0 shows no evidence for mediation. The model assuming missing 
observations equal 0 shows evidence for full mediation, but the mediation effect is negative: 
controlling for customer CSR, customer SIC is associated with reduced revenues.  This 
contradicts stakeholder influence capacity theory that predicts firms with higher SIC are better 
able to translate CSR into performance gains.  
The three other same-year pooled models show no evidence for mediation. The pooled 
models using inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed revenue to control for outliers show 
customer CSR has a direct, negative effect on revenue independent of customer SIC. This 
result suggests firms that improve customer CSR have decreased revenues in the same year as 
the customer CSR improvement. 
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 Compared to the pooled regression models, the fixed effects same-year models control 
for unobserved, time-invariant firm characteristics. Fixed effects models with untransformed 
revenue as the dependent variable show mixed evidence for mediation. The model that does 
not assume missing R&D and advertising observations equal 0 shows no evidence for 
mediation. The model assuming missing observations equal 0 shows evidence for partial 
mediation, with customer SIC positively affecting revenue and customer CSR negatively 
affecting revenue. This is a within-firm model, and coefficients are the average within-firm 
change in the conditional mean of revenue associated with a change in the independent 
variable. The partial mediation results suggest a 1-point increase in customer SIC is associated 
with a within-firm average increase of ~$347,000,000 in revenue. A 1-point increase in 
customer CSR is associated with a within-firm average decrease of ~$24,000,000 in revenue. 
 Fixed effects models using IHS-transformed revenue to control for outliers imply no 
mediation effect. Instead, both models suggest customer CSR has a positive effect on within-
firm revenue after controlling for customer SIC. The average within-firm change in revenue 
associated with a 1-point increase in customer CSR is 0.61% in the model that does not assume 
missing observations equal 0 and 0.42% in the model assuming missing observations equal 0. 
 The evidence from time dynamics models in which effects are assumed to occur over 
1 year show no evidence for mediation. Pooled models show a positive relationship between 
customer CSR and customer SIC, satisfying the first condition for mediation, but fixed effects 
models do not. The pooled model using IHS-transformed revenue suggests customer CSR has 
a negative effect on revenue independent of customer SIC. Fixed effects models using IHS-
transformed revenue show customer CSR has a positive effect on within-firm revenue 
independent of customer SIC. However, the fixed effects time dynamic models show no 
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evidence that customer CSR effects within-firm SIC in the following year. This result strongly 
contradicts stakeholder influence capacity theory's prediction that SIC is a capability built 
through experiential learning within firms. The model, though, assumes a 1-year lag between 
changes in CSR and changes in SIC. If the learning effect requires more or less than 1 year, 




Table 35: Mediation test results for customer SIC and customer CSR. 
            
Model 
Assume missing R&D 
& advertising = 0 a Std. error 
 
b Std. error 
 
c' Std. error 
 
Mediation 
PANEL A: Same year  SIC = a(CSR)  Rev = b(SIC) + c'(CSR)   
Pooled No 0.0170*** (0.0024)  24.3278 (560.1630)  23.5669 (26.1637)  No 
Pooled  Yes 0.0109*** (0.0010)  -924.1630* (432.2209)  -14.5762 (21.9219)  Full 
            
Pooled IHS No 0.0170*** (0.0024)  0.0564 (0.0681)  -0.0215*** (0.0040)  No 
Pooled IHS Yes 0.0109*** (0.0010)  -0.0107 (0.0389)  -0.0295*** (0.0026)  No 
            
Fixed effects No 0.0068** (0.0023)  493.4205 (324.7857)  -13.0437 (9.7658)  No 
Fixed effects Yes 0.0076*** (0.0012)  347.0784* (159.0567)  -24.6657*** (7.4201)  Partial 
            
Fixed effects IHS No 0.0068** (0.0023)  -0.0115 (0.0110)  0.0061*** (0.0012)  No 
Fixed effects IHS Yes 0.0076*** (0.0012)  -0.0154 (0.0112)  0.0042*** (0.0009)  No 
            
PANEL B: Time dynamics  SICt=a(CSRt-1)  Revt+1=b(SICt)+c'(CSRt-1)   
Pooled No 0.0171*** (0.0026)  -536.0375 (640.8732)  44.3036 (33.4309)  No 
Pooled  Yes 0.0085*** (0.0012)  -789.3677 (490.8322)  27.9137 (26.2548)  No 
            
Pooled IHS No 0.0171*** (0.0026)  0.0106 (0.0713)  -0.0694 (0.0435)  No 
Pooled IHS Yes 0.0085*** (0.0012)  -0.0035 (0.0042)  -0.0094** (0.0029)  No 
            
Fixed effects No 0.0035 (0.0026)  151.2192 (477.4810)  0.0885 (21.1451)  No 
Fixed effects Yes 0.0019 (0.0013)  227.0754 (219.4250)  -16.6682 (12.8627)  No 
            
Fixed effects IHS No 0.0035 (0.0026)  -0.0030 (0.0118)  0.0052*** (0.0011)  No 
Fixed effects IHS Yes 0.0019 (0.0013)  -0.0124 (0.0182)  0.0024*** (0.0006)  No 
            
Note: IHS models use inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed revenue to control for the influence of outlier firms on revenue. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
 136 
 
Hypothesis 4: Employee stakeholders 
Table 36 summarizes the results of hypothesis 4 tests. Panel A reports the results of same-year 
tests. Panel B reports models with 1-year lag time dynamics. 
 Panel A tests for mediation in models where all variables are measured in the same 
year. All pooled models show a positive, statistically significant relationship between 
employee SIC and employee CSR, satisfying the first condition of mediation. Pooled models 
with untransformed revenue as the dependent variable reject the hypothesis of mediation. 
Pooled models using inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed revenue to control for outliers on 
revenue support the hypothesis. Mediation is full without assuming missing observations of 
R&D and advertising are 0 and partial assuming missing observations are equal to 0. Models 
assuming missing observations are zero have higher statistical power because they have more 
observations. 
 Pooled models using the transformed revenue variable report mediation while models 
without the transformed variable do not. The skewed distribution of revenue suggests outliers 
have a large influence on estimation, and models using the untransformed variable might lead 
to inference errors. The fixed effects models are less affected by transforming the dependent 
variable. Fixed effects models only estimate within-firm relationships and excludes all 
between-firm information. Pooled regression retains some between-firm information. Revenue 
differences are larger across firms than within firms because firms tend to have similar 
revenues year over year. Pooled regression's use of between-firm information might make it 
more vulnerable to the skewed revenue distribution. 
 Fixed effects models in Panel A estimate within-firm mediation and control for 
unmeasured time-invariant firm characteristics. Models that do not assume missing 
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observations of R&D and advertising are 0 show no association between employee SIC and 
employee CSR within a firm, rejecting the first condition for mediation. However, models 
assuming missing observations are zero show positive association between employee SIC and 
employee CSR within firms. In the second stage of mediation testing, these models reject 
mediation. 
 Taking all models in Panel A together, the evidence is against the hypothesis that SIC 
for employees mediates the effect of employee CSR on revenue. Only the pooled regression 
models with inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed revenue show evidence for mediation. 
Untransformed pooled models reject mediation. Untransformed and transformed fixed effects 
models reject mediation. 
 Panel B estimates time dynamics models assuming employee CSR takes 1 year to 
directly affect employee SIC and 2 years to directly affect revenue. The model also assumes 
employee SIC takes 1 year to directly affect revenue. Pooled regressions show a strong, 
positive relationship between employee CSR and next-year employee SIC, satisfying the first 
condition of mediation. Pooled models without a transformed dependent variable reject the 
mediation hypothesis. Both pooled models with transformed revenue to control for outliers 
show employee SIC partially mediates the effect of employee CSR on revenue. Partial 
mediation in a model specified with 1-year lags suggests employee SIC positively affects next-
year revenue and, independent of the effect of employee SIC on next-year revenue, employee 
CSR retains an independent positive effect on revenue two years after the change in employee 
CSR. Fixed effects models specified with 1-year lags reject the hypothesis of mediation and 
show no relationships between employee SIC, employee CSR, or revenue.  
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 Taken together, the results in Panel B suggest employee SIC does not mediate the effect 




Table 36: Mediation test results for employee SIC and employee-focused CSR. 
            
Model 
Assume missing R&D 
& advertising = 0 a Std. error 
 
b Std. error 
 
c' Std. error 
 
Mediation 
PANEL A: Same year  SIC = a(CSR)  Rev = b(SIC) + c'(CSR)   
Pooled No 0.0198*** (0.0034)  195.6673 (394.4084)  -52.6325* (24.0797)  No 
Pooled  Yes 0.0160*** (0.0015)  -209.7548 (284.2636)  26.0522 (19.6504)  No 
            
Pooled IHS No 0.0198*** (0.0034)  0.1612*** (0.0315)  0.0064 (0.0038)  Full 
Pooled IHS Yes 0.0160*** (0.0015)  0.2096*** (0.0193)  0.0059* (0.0024)  Partial 
            
Fixed effects No 0.0035 (0.0026)  358.5702* (175.7152)  -26.5995* (12.6472)  No 
Fixed effects Yes 0.0064*** (0.0013)  115.9044 (80.2161)  -2.6704 (7.7438)  No 
            
Fixed effects IHS No 0.0035 (0.0026)  -0.0004 (0.0072)  0.0009 (0.0009)  No 
Fixed effects IHS Yes 0.0064*** (0.0013)  -0.0045 (0.0046)  0.0017* (0.0007)  No 
            
PANEL B: Time dynamics  SICt=a(CSRt-1)  Revt+1=b(SICt)+c'(CSRt-1)   
Pooled No 0.0174*** (0.0035)  482.7647 (405.9814)  -54.8042* (27.3921)  No 
Pooled  Yes 0.0120*** (0.0015)  -131.3381 (350.1463)  44.1672* (21.2244)  No 
            
Pooled IHS No 0.0174*** (0.0035)  0.1588*** (0.0322)  0.0112** (0.0038)  Partial 
Pooled IHS Yes 0.0120*** (0.0015)  0.1952*** (0.0200)  0.0095*** (0.0024)  Partial 
            
Fixed effects No 0.0004 (0.0027)  130.4599 (289.3392)  -33.5505 (18.2356)  No 
Fixed effects Yes 0.0020 (0.0014)  157.7259 (80.7981)  -0.1407 (10.1725)  No 
            
Fixed effects IHS No 0.0004 (0.0027)  -0.0050 (0.0056)  -0.0002 (0.0008)  No 
Fixed effects IHS Yes 0.0020 (0.0014)  -0.0010 (0.0034)  0.0003 (0.0005)  No 
            
Note: SIC = employee SIC. CSR = employee-focused CSR. IHS models use inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed revenue to control for the influence of large 
outlier firms on revenue. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Hypothesis 5: Environment stakeholders 
Table 37 summarizes the results of hypothesis 5 tests. Panel A reports the results of same-year 
tests. Panel B reports models with 1-year lag time dynamics. 
 All models in Panel A show a positive relationship between environment SIC and 
environment CSR, satisfying the first condition for mediation. Pooled models with 
untransformed revenue as the dependent variable show no mediation when not assuming 
missing R&D and advertising observations are 0 and full mediation when assuming missing 
observations equal 0. The full mediation result suggests the direct effect of SIC on revenue is 
negative. This contradicts stakeholder influence capacity theory that predicts the higher a firm's 
SIC the better the firm is at translating CSR into increased performance. Additional research 
will be needed to determine whether and how increasing environmental SIC decreases revenue. 
 Fixed effects models with untransformed revenue as the dependent variable show no 
evidence for mediation. Fixed effects models with transformed revenue to control for outliers 
show evidence of full mediation. Again, mediation is negative with SIC having a strong 
negative association with revenue. This result contradicts stakeholder influence capacity 
theory. 
 Taken together, the results in Panel A suggest environment SIC mediates the effect of 
environment CSR on performance, but the mediation effect occurs in opposite directions 
depending on the model. Pooled models with a transformed dependent variable show a positive 
mediation effect of environment SIC. Fixed effects models with a transformed dependent 
variable show a negative mediation effect of environment SIC. Differences in these models 
could be driven by the firm-specific, time-invariant characteristics controlled for in fixed-
effects models but uncontrolled for in pooled regression models. Confounding bias from time-
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invariant firm-specific characteristics could cause the estimates in pooled regression to differ 
from those in fixed effects regression. However, the fixed effects models report negative 
mediation, which cannot be explained using stakeholder influence capacity theory. 
 Fixed effects models estimate the relationship within a firm. Negative within-firm 
mediation suggests that a firm that increases its stakeholder influence capacity will experience 
a decrease in revenue. This result could be explained due to time dynamics. Negative mediation 
is reported in same-year models in which all variables are measured in the same year. 
Increasing environment CSR might be very expensive, involving changing production 
processes, supply chain configurations, and other core components of a firm's business model. 
Changing such components might require diverting spending from other functions to 
increasing stakeholder influence capacity, such as from marketing or R&D. This could reduce 
revenues by altering product and service offerings, producing a negative within-firm estimate 
of SIC mediation for environment stakeholders. 
 Pooled IHS models instead show positive mediation. These models, in addition to not 
controlling for time-invariant firm-specific characteristics, combine within-firm and across-
firm information. A positive mediation effect in these models could be due to bias from the 
omitted firm characteristics, but it could also result from a true positive mediation relationship 
across firms that dominates the negative within-firm relationship found in the fixed effects 
models. More research is needed to understand whether the performance effects of 





Table 37: Mediation test results for environment SIC and environment-focused CSR.  
            
Model 
Assume missing R&D 
& advertising = 0 a Std. error 
 
b Std. error 
 
c' Std. error 
 
Mediation 
PANEL A: Same year  SIC = a(CSR)  Rev = b(SIC) + c'(CSR)   
Pooled No 0.0247*** (0.0028)  -728.6945 (725.7241)  7.8462 (27.9340)  No 
Pooled  Yes 0.0192*** (0.0014)  -1,954.2959* (987.4302)  53.6664 (35.5883)  Full 
            
Pooled IHS No 0.0247*** (0.0028)  0.3220*** (0.0384)  -0.0054 (0.0033)  Full 
Pooled IHS Yes 0.0192*** (0.0014)  0.2827*** (0.0338)  -0.0049* (0.0021)  Partial 
            
Fixed effects No 0.0081*** (0.0020)  247.4962 (254.8147)  -7.2906 (11.5509)  No 
Fixed effects Yes 0.0068*** (0.0009)  -561.8177 (325.3208)  4.4612 (7.0534)  No 
            
Fixed effects IHS No 0.0081*** (0.0020)  -0.0325*** (0.0088)  -0.0008 (0.0007)  Full 
Fixed effects IHS Yes 0.0068*** (0.0009)  -0.0362*** (0.0075)  -0.0011 (0.0006)  Full 
            
PANEL B: Time dynamics  SICt=a(CSRt-1)  Revt+1=b(SICt)+c'(CSRt-1)   
Pooled No 0.0155*** (0.0027)  -502.1050 (720.7886)  26.8901 (29.0845)  No 
Pooled  Yes 0.0138*** (0.0014)  -2,235.3079 (1,141.2048)  48.8680 (38.1585)  No 
            
Pooled IHS No 0.0155*** (0.0027)  0.2982*** (0.0393)  -0.0068 (0.0035)  Full 
Pooled IHS Yes 0.0138*** (0.0014)  0.2353*** (0.0350)  -0.0074*** (0.0022)  Partial 
            
Fixed effects No -0.0017 (0.0019)  -48.5614 (428.0955)  13.6475 (15.9518)  No 
Fixed effects Yes 0.0002 (0.0010)  -499.3873 (283.9163)  25.4013 (13.3725)  No 
            
Fixed effects IHS No -0.0017 (0.0019)  -0.0212* (0.0084)  0.0015 (0.0008)  No 
Fixed effects IHS Yes 0.0002 (0.0010)  -0.0124* (0.0063)  0.0021*** (0.0004)  No 
            
Note: SIC = environment SIC. CSR = environment-focused CSR. IHS models use inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed revenue to control for the influence of 
large outlier firms on revenue. Robust, firm-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Discussion and Future Research 
This chapter developed and tested three hypotheses that incorporate stakeholder heterogeneity 
into social influence capacity theory. Each hypothesis predicted how customer-, employee-, 
and environment-stakeholder SIC mediates the effect of CSR for each of those stakeholder 
groups on firm performance, measured as revenue. The tests support the proposition that SIC 
is stakeholder-specific rather than a single firm capability that operates the same way 
regardless of which stakeholder group's welfare is targeted by the CSR actions.  
The tests suggest SIC translates CSR into performance effects when the CSR targets 
the social welfare of employees or the environment, but not when it targets the social welfare 
of customer stakeholders. Existing theory claims customer-focused CSR actions can influence 
consumer behavior (Schuler & Cording, 2006). The tests in this chapter do not contradict that 
theory, but they do suggest important boundary condition on the theory. That customer-focused 
CSR does not mediate the CSR-performance relationship does not mean such CSR has no 
influence on consumer behavior. It is possible that consumer behavior is influenced by 
customer-focused CSR actions. But the test results in these data suggest a boundary condition 
that customer-focused CSR does not change consumer behavior in ways that alter firm revenue 
performance. That does not mean customer-focused CSR has no effect on performance, only 
that the effect does not operate through changing customer behavior. Fixed effects mediation 
tests using a transformed dependent variable found that customer-focused CSR has a strong 
positive effect on performance independent of customer-focused SIC. This suggests customer-
focused CSR increases firm performance through some other channel than by altering 
customer behavior. Future research could examine channels by which customer-focused CSR 
affects revenue performance other than by influencing the behavior of existing customers. For 
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example, developing customer-focused CSR might require analyzing the firm's current 
customer base, which might reveal unserved markets. Beginning to serve such markets could 
increase revenue, but not by influencing existing customer-behavior. Future research could 
examine whether customer-focused CSR affects existing customers or leads to the firm 
identifying new customers and markets. 
Several tests suggest the direct effect of SIC on revenue is negative, independent of the 
direct effect of CSR on revenue. One explanation for a negative mediation effect comes from 
stakeholder influence capacity theory's basis in organizational learning. Firms begin with zero 
SIC and must learn how to influence stakeholder behavior with CSR. SIC is a capability that 
is built over time from experience and learning, and in the initial learning phase, increases in 
SIC are predicted to decrease performance because firms are building an SIC capability. At 
some point, the SIC capability develops enough to begin returning more in performance than 
it costs in resources, and the relationship between SIC and performance becomes positive 
(Barnett & Salomon, 2012). Negative mediation could result for stakeholder groups for which 
firms generally have a weakly-developed SIC capability. The regression coefficient is an 
average value across all firms. If the average firm in the data has low SIC and is in the 
capability learning phase where increased SIC relates to decreased performance, a negative 
mediation result is possible and expected. Future research could examine the SIC learning 
process to understand the inflection point in different industries and CSR issue areas at which 
enough learning has occurred to change the negative effect of CSR on performance to a 
positive effect.  




The hypothesis tests in this chapter have several limitations. First, testing mediation requires 
measures of both CSR and SIC, raising concerns about measurement quality. Second, 
mediation implies a temporal sequence between three constructs, raising concerns about 
whether the temporal sequence is correctly specified. Third, the data are observational in 
nature, rather than experimentally controlled, raising the problem of biased estimation. 
 Testing mediation requires measures of three constructs: the cause, the mediator, and 
the outcome. In this chapter, the cause is CSR, the mediator is SIC, and the outcome is 
performance. CSR is measured using the CSRHub dataset, SIC is measured using the KLD 
dataset, and performance is measured using revenue from the Compustat Fundamentals Annual 
dataset. Measurement quality becomes a potential limitation of the study, especially given 
recent criticism of common CSR measures (Chatterji et al., 2016, 2009). This limitation is 
most concerning with using KLD to measure SIC. To date, there is no accepted measure of 
SIC, and this chapter is the first empirical study I am aware of that attempts to measure SIC. 
The only other empirical test of SIC theory uses the same measure for CSR as for SIC and tests 
moderation, not mediation (Barnett & Salomon, 2012). If KLD is not a good measure of SIC, 
the mediation tests are less useful for testing the hypotheses developed in this chapter. 
 The second limitation arises from the temporal sequence implied by a mediation model. 
In mediation, the cause must affect the mediator, which must then affect the outcome, implying 
at least a two-step temporal model. I attempt to capture this two-step model by using 1-year 
lags between the cause and mediator and the mediator and the outcome, which forces a 2-year 
lag between the cause and the outcome. If this temporal sequence does not match the 
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underlying, true temporal sequence between CSR, SIC, and firm performance, the models will 
not provide accurate tests of the theory. 
 Third, the data used in this chapter are observational rather than experimentally 
controlled, raising the potential for bias caused by various problems that arise when using 
observational data. Omitted variable bias might exist if the regression model used in the 
hypothesis tests does not include all potential confounds between the independent and 
dependent variables. Reverse causality in which changes in a firm's SIC causes subsequent 
changes in a firm's CSR could bias the estimates. I attempt to control for various biases arising 
from endogeneity by using control variables and fixed effects regressions, but it is impossible 
to entirely discount the possibility of endogeneity biases when using observational rather than 




CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
The chapters of this dissertation test and extend theory about the mechanisms by which CSR 
affects firm performance, specifically whether stakeholder influence capacity links CSR to 
performance.  
Chapter 2 tests whether CSR affects revenue performance using three empirical 
strategies: propensity score matching, difference-in-differences estimation, and fixed effects 
regression. Together, the tests provide no consensus on whether CSR affects revenue 
performance, matching the lack of consensus in the overall CSR performance literature that 
now contains more than three decades of empirical research on a direct effect of CSR on 
performance. 
For increased CSR, propensity score models suggest the most extreme increases in CSR 
cause higher revenue. This result is robust across models using from 1-10 nearest neighbors 
for matching. However, moderate increases in CSR have either no effect on revenue or, when 
the number of neighbors used for matching exceeds 4, a negative effect on revenue. As the 
number of neighbors increases, bias becomes a greater concern, but estimates become more 
precise. The negative result could be driven by bias, but, even if that is true, estimation with 
few neighbors (and the least bias) show no effect of moderate CSR on revenue performance. 
Finally, smaller changes in CSR also have a positive effect on revenue across models using 
from 1-10 nearest neighbors for propensity score matching. 
This pattern of results suggests large and small increases in CSR can increase revenues, 
but moderate increases in CSR cannot or can even reduce revenues. The pattern suggests a 
non-linear relationship between CSR and performance in which the effect is positive over the 
range from small to moderate increase, negative from moderate to extreme increase, and 
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positive for extreme increases in CSR. Barnett (2007) theorizes and Barnett and Salomon 
(2012) finds evidence of a non-linear, U-shaped relationship between stakeholder influence 
capacity and performance. Though their theory is not about the direct effect of CSR on 
performance, evidence for non-linearity in both my empirical results and their tests of 
stakeholder influence capacity together suggest there might not be a linear, constant effect of 
CSR on performance but that the effect might instead vary across the range of CSR. For 
decreases in CSR, I find no effect of decreased CSR on revenue performance when using all 
years of data, regardless of the size of CSR decrease. 
The results of difference-in-differences models show a different pattern than the 
propensity score matching models. The difference-in-differences models estimate effects for 
individual years rather than all years in the propensity score models described above. The 
models are thus somewhat incomparable.  
Difference-in-differences models struggle to estimate effects for the extreme changes 
in CSR due to a small number of events in some years. For moderate changes in CSR, 
difference-in-differences models show a positive effect on revenue for both increased and 
decreased CSR in the majority of years. This result suggests firms that experience moderate 
changes in CSR also have higher revenues than firms that do not experience moderate changes 
in CSR. A similar pattern holds for small changes in CSR. The pattern of results is robust to 
using transformed revenue to control for the influence of outlier firms. 
Fixed effects regression models estimate the within-firm change in revenue associated 
with within-firm changes in CSR. These models use the raw CSR measure rather than the 
threshold measures used in the propensity score matching and difference-in-differences 
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models. Fixed effects models find no relationship between within-firm changes in CSR and 
within-firm changes in revenue. 
Chapter 3 conducts mediation analyses to test whether firm stakeholder influence 
capacity mediates the effect of CSR on performance. I use two different estimation strategies. 
The first is pooled regression, and the second is fixed effects regression. I use two 
specifications of time effects. The first assumes mediation happens quickly and uses variables 
measured in the same year. The second assumes mediation occurs with a time lag of one year. 
In that specification, variables are measured one year apart. For each estimation strategy and 
model, I make two assumptions about missing data on research and development and 
advertising capabilities. The first assumption is that missing data should be left missing. The 
second assumption is that missing observations are equal to zero (Barnett & Salomon, 2012 
makes this assumption). Assuming missing observations are zero increases the number of 
observations and, consequently, the statistical power of the tests, but if missing observations 
are not truly zero, then assuming they are zero might bias estimates. 
The results of mediation analysis show a mixed picture. Pooled same-year models show 
partial mediation when controlling for outlier firms on revenue. This model shows stakeholder 
influence capacity has a positive effect on revenue performance. The model also shows that 
CSR has a negative direct effect on revenue after controlling for its influence on stakeholder 
influence capacity. 
Fixed effects models differ from pooled regression models in that fixed effects models 
only estimate within-firm associations, while pooled models use both within- and between-
firm information. Pooled models do not control for time-invariant firm characteristics 
controlled for in fixed effects models. Fixed effects same-year models show no mediation 
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except in models using a transformed revenue variable to control for outliers and not assuming 
missing values equal 0. That model shows full mediation by SIC. The results for one-year 
lagged models are similar to those for same-year models. 
Together, the mediation analysis results in Chapter 3 show limited evidence that SIC 
mediates CSR's effect on performance as predicted by stakeholder influence capacity theory. 
However, stakeholder influence capacity theory assumes firms have a single SIC that applies 
to all stakeholders. The tests in Chapter 3 follow that assumption and do not differentiate 
between types of CSR targeted at different stakeholders or stakeholder groups.  
Chapter 4 relaxes the stakeholder-blind assumption of stakeholder influence capacity 
theory and examines whether SIC mediation differs by stakeholder group. I examine three 
stakeholder groups: customers, employees, and the environment. I conduct the same mediation 
tests as Chapter 3 except I use measures of stakeholder-specific CSR and stakeholder-specific 
SIC, rather than the overall measures used in Chapter 3. 
The results of Chapter 4 suggest SIC mediates the CSR-performance relationship for 
some stakeholders but not others. There is little evidence that SIC mediates customer-focused 
CSR, some evidence it mediates employee-focused CSR, and moderate evidence it mediates 
environment-focused CSR.  
The results of Chapter 4 contribute a new emphasis on stakeholder heterogeneity to 
theory about the performance impacts of CSR. CSR theory increasingly considers CSR as 
targeted toward the social welfare of specific stakeholder groups, rather than a generic society-
level conceptualization of responsibility. Developments in stakeholder theory are recognizing 
the possibility that not all stakeholder groups want to be treated the same way by a firm. 
Instead, the response of stakeholders to firm actions might depend on how the stakeholder 
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wants to be treated by the firm and on how firms are perceived to be treating other stakeholders. 
These developments complicate the stakeholder-management approach by implying that firms 
cannot treat stakeholders as the same or even as unique groups whose social welfare can be 
managed through compartmentalized or generic CSR actions.  
Instead, ongoing integration of CSR and stakeholder theories point toward firms 
customizing CSR strategies for the social welfare of specific stakeholder groups, while 
addressing how CSR strategies for one stakeholder group will be perceived by and will 
influence the behavior of other stakeholder groups. These theoretical developments imply that 
stakeholder influence capacity—the ability of a firm to recognize how to influence 
stakeholders with CSR actions—will become increasingly important in the future. Such 
development also implies possible future research directions in this research area. 
Future Research Directions 
The most promising future research direction implied by the results of this dissertation is that 
CSR does affect performance through stakeholder influence capacity, supporting stakeholder 
influence capacity theory, but stakeholder influence capacity is not a single firm capability 
transcending stakeholders and CSR issues. Instead, firms appear to have different SIC for 
specific stakeholders, and SIC does not appear to mediate the CSR-performance relationship 
for some stakeholders, especially customers. 
Future research could build on this work to further explore how CSR affects 
performance through specific stakeholder groups. Research is already turning in this direction 
as CSR scholars seek to identify mechanisms by which CSR plausibly affects performance. 
For example, studies have shown some types of CSR appear to influence performance through 
increasing sales, implying a customer mechanism (Flammer, 2015), and by decreasing 
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shirking, implying an employee mechanism (Flammer, 2015; Flammer & Luo, 2017). The 
results of this dissertation do not fully support the customer mechanism and partially support 
the employee mechanism. Strongest support is for the environment mechanism, which has not 
to my knowledge yet been examined in empirical CSR research. 
Stakeholder influence capacity theory suggests CSR research should start focusing on 
specific stakeholder groups rather than continuing to examine relationships between firm-level 
CSR and firm-level performance measures. This direction meshes well with recent 
developments in instrumental stakeholder theory that stakeholder groups require 
heterogeneous management from firms if firms are going to benefit from managing their 
relationships with those groups. Integration of stakeholder influence capacity with 
instrumental stakeholder theory in this area is an exciting new direction for both CSR research 
and stakeholder theory research. 
CSR research increasingly views CSR as a means of relationship management with key 
actors external and internal to the firm. Instrumental stakeholder theory holds that firm 
performance depends on the quality of relationships firms build with various stakeholder 
groups, some of which are more important to the firm than others. Stakeholder influence 
capacity has the potential to become the bridge between these two areas of inquiry around firm 
performance, a bridge that could lead to increased understanding of when, why, where, and 
how firms engaging on social issues rather than focusing only on traditional business issues 
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Appendix 1: Chapter 2 
Table 38: Empirical tests of CSR performance since 2010. 
 
Study Year Outcome Predictor Data 
Time 
period Method Relationship  Mechanism  
Counterfactual 
design 
           


























2 Lev et al. 
(2010) 
2010 Revenue growth Philanthropy growth 
(lag) 
Compustat: Revenue; 




Granger causality +   
3 “” 2010 Philanthropy 
growth 
Revenue growth (lag) “” “” “” +/-   
4 Mishina et 
al. (2010) 









Logistic regression +  N 
5 "" "" "" Abnormal market 
returns 
"" "" "" +/-  N 
6 "" "" "" Firm prominence "" "" "" +/-  N 
7 Jiao (2010) 2010 Tobin's q Aggregate CSR Compustat: Tobin's q; 
KLD net scores 
1992-
2003 
IV Regression +  N 
8 "" 2010 "" CSR Community "" "" "" +/-  N 
9 "" 2010 "" CSR Diversity "" "" "" +/-  N 
10 "" 2010 "" CSR Environment "" "" "" +  N 
11 "" 2010 "" CSR Employee "" "" "" +  N 
12 "" 2010 "" CSR Product "" "" "" +/-  N 
13 Flammer 
(2013) 
2013 Share price Announcement of 
eco-friendly news 
Share price: CRSP; 




Event study + becoming +/- 
 
Shareholders Y 
14 "" "" "" Announcement of 
eco-harmful news 













Experiment + Employees (4 
channels) 
Y 
16 "" 2014 "" Environmental 
responsibility 
"" "" "" + "" Y 
17 "" 2014 "" Community 
responsibility 
Field experiment with 
171 job fair attendees 
"" Observational + "" N 
   
162 
 
18 "" 2014 "" Environmental 
responsibility 
"" "" "" +/- "" N 







of meaningful work 
827 employees, 18 North 
American food & ag 
firms 
 Survey and SEM + Employee N 
20 ""  "" Employee perception 
of firm support 
""  "" +/- "" N 




of meaningful work 
""  "" + "" N 
22 ""  "" Employee perception 
of firm support 
""  "" + "" N 
23 Flammer 
(2015) 
2015 Share price CSR shareholder 
proposals 






+  Y 
24 "" 2015 Labor productivity "" "" "" "" + Employees  
25 "" 2015 Sales growth "" "" "" "" + Customers  
26 "" 2015 Capital 
expenditures 
"" "" "" "" +/- Efficiency  






Prior internal and 
current external CSR 
Compustat: Tobin's q; 







+  N 
28 "" 2016 "" Gap between prior 






-  N 
29 Shea and 
Hawn 
(2019) 
2019 Firm reputation CSR, moderated by 
corporate warmth 
Amazon MTurk  Experiment +  Y 
30 "" 2019 Purchase intention "" ""  "" +  Y 
31 "" 2019 Perceived quality "" ""  "" +/-  Y 
32 "" 2019 Purchase price "" ""  "" +/-  Y 
33           
34           
           




Appendix 2: Chapter 3 Full Estimation Results 






Table 39: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of CSR on performance. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
          
CSR 385.1838*** 470.1205*** 368.0587*** 361.6000*** 149.6154*** 116.3507*** 42.3940 -57.8872 2.4142 
 (62.0919) (73.3217) (62.2724) (58.1559) (39.1271) (34.8411) (40.6377) (47.1300) (28.9505) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0009 0.2970 0.2197 0.9335 
Long-term debt   0.5731*** 0.3656* 0.1581 0.1462 0.8424*** -0.5162 0.0901 
   (0.1026) (0.1623) (0.1038) (0.1034) (0.1661) (0.4645) (0.0950) 
   0.0000 0.0243 0.1277 0.1575 0.0000 0.2668 0.3429 
Assets    0.0389 0.0322 0.0321 -0.0589*** 0.6202** 0.0341 
    (0.0252) (0.0204) (0.0201) (0.0150) (0.2161) (0.0195) 
    0.1217 0.1139 0.1101 0.0001 0.0042 0.0810 
Employees     198.6517*** 194.6057*** 167.9365*** 155.4914*** 183.0731*** 
     (9.4815) (9.6460) (17.0386) (13.9539) (12.8770) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Age      114.6509*** 32.1589 37.4678 89.9270** 
      (28.4093) (28.6945) (31.1417) (27.8902) 
      0.0001 0.2626 0.2293 0.0013 
Advertising       7.9132*** -0.8780 3.9814* 
       (1.8196) (2.2617) (1.6689) 
       0.0000 0.6980 0.0171 
R&D        -1.0928 4.6223*** 
        (1.8271) (0.9579) 
        0.5499 0.0000 
          
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,824 12,824 12,770 12,699 5,626 3,358 12,699 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Table 40: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of CSR on the mediator variable SIC. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC 
          
CSR 0.1148*** 0.1298*** 0.1265*** 0.1260*** 0.1247*** 0.1190*** 0.1379*** 0.1613*** 0.1029*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0087) (0.0138) (0.0169) (0.0073) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Long-term debt   0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0009 0.6844 0.8155 0.9757 0.1805 0.9326 0.3494 
Assets    0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* -0.0000 0.0000* 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.0337 0.0356 0.0335 0.0417 0.4794 0.0154 
Employees     0.0013 0.0006 -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0010 
     (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0015) 
     0.6203 0.8003 0.1743 0.3645 0.5118 
Age      0.0197*** 0.0293*** 0.0273*** 0.0163*** 
      (0.0028) (0.0046) (0.0061) (0.0026) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0009*** 0.0006* 0.0005** 
       (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
       0.0000 0.0111 0.0057 
R&D        0.0007** 0.0007*** 
        (0.0002) (0.0001) 
        0.0012 0.0000 
          
Observations 12,880 12,880 12,826 12,826 12,772 12,701 5,626 3,358 12,701 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Table 41: Pooled regression estimates from the mediation test. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
          
SIC 820.8253* 967.7847** 495.1650 415.7281 188.9766 65.5717 114.1903 -190.7880 -425.3357 
 (355.0205) (358.5466) (370.4083) (386.3527) (208.6889) (233.1605) (143.0524) (184.6827) (246.4481) 
 0.0208 0.0070 0.1814 0.2820 0.3653 0.7786 0.4249 0.3019 0.0845 
CSR 290.9722*** 344.4893*** 305.4394*** 309.2309*** 126.0434** 108.5472* 26.6481 -27.1075 46.1960 
 (77.4610) (90.8520) (82.7135) (80.9390) (48.5743) (44.3376) (36.3211) (34.4387) (39.2335) 
 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0095 0.0144 0.4633 0.4314 0.2391 
Long-term debt   0.5638*** 0.3643* 0.1578 0.1462 0.8447*** -0.5155 0.0866 
   (0.1048) (0.1631) (0.1040) (0.1036) (0.1663) (0.4598) (0.0948) 
   0.0000 0.0255 0.1293 0.1584 0.0000 0.2626 0.3611 
Assets    0.0377 0.0316 0.0319 -0.0592*** 0.6181** 0.0354 
    (0.0253) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0150) (0.2148) (0.0202) 
    0.1370 0.1272 0.1210 0.0001 0.0041 0.0800 
Employees     198.4102*** 194.5690*** 168.1522*** 155.2605*** 182.6561*** 
     (9.5294) (9.6900) (17.1471) (13.8268) (12.4168) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Age      113.3579*** 28.8117 42.6701 96.8467** 
      (31.7869) (29.6445) (32.0643) (30.8829) 
      0.0004 0.3313 0.1837 0.0017 
Advertising       7.8083*** -0.7619 4.1931** 
       (1.8179) (2.2700) (1.5993) 
       0.0000 0.7373 0.0088 
R&D        -0.9672 4.9085*** 
        (1.8482) (1.0511) 
        0.6009 0.0000 
          
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,824 12,824 12,770 12,699 5,626 3,358 12,699 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Pooled regression: transformed DV to reduce outlier influence 
 168 
 
Table 42: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of CSR on performance. The performance measure is transformed to control for the 
influence of outliers, using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue 
          
CSR 0.0216*** 0.0330*** 0.0274*** 0.0271*** 0.0191*** 0.0091* 0.0101* 0.0039 0.0020 
 (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0048) (0.0057) (0.0036) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0276 0.0354 0.4956 0.5722 
Long-term debt   0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0000 0.0105 0.0350 0.0599 0.0007 0.3162 0.1283 
Assets    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.2085 0.2047 0.1796 0.0085 0.5312 0.1297 
Employees     0.0072* 0.0060* 0.0030* 0.0025 0.0052* 
     (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0025) 
     0.0325 0.0276 0.0487 0.0504 0.0341 
Age      0.0345*** 0.0302*** 0.0327*** 0.0329*** 
      (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0018) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0006*** 0.0002 0.0003** 
       (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       0.0004 0.1033 0.0023 
R&D        0.0002** 0.0003*** 
        (0.0001) (0.0000) 
        0.0020 0.0000 
          
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,824 12,824 12,770 12,699 5,626 3,358 12,699 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 43: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of CSR on the mediator SIC. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC 
          
CSR 0.1148*** 0.1298*** 0.1265*** 0.1260*** 0.1247*** 0.1190*** 0.1379*** 0.1613*** 0.1029*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0087) (0.0138) (0.0169) (0.0073) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Long-term debt   0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0009 0.6844 0.8155 0.9757 0.1805 0.9326 0.3494 
Assets    0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* -0.0000 0.0000* 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.0337 0.0356 0.0335 0.0417 0.4794 0.0154 
Employees     0.0013 0.0006 -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0010 
     (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0015) 
     0.6203 0.8003 0.1743 0.3645 0.5118 
Age      0.0197*** 0.0293*** 0.0273*** 0.0163*** 
      (0.0028) (0.0046) (0.0061) (0.0026) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0009*** 0.0006* 0.0005** 
       (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
       0.0000 0.0111 0.0057 
R&D        0.0007** 0.0007*** 
        (0.0002) (0.0001) 
        0.0012 0.0000 
          
Observations 12,880 12,880 12,826 12,826 12,772 12,701 5,626 3,358 12,701 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 44: Pooled regression estimates of the mediator test. The performance measure is transformed to control for the influence of 
outliers, using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue 
          
SIC 0.1687*** 0.2024*** 0.1781*** 0.1755*** 0.1675*** 0.1334*** 0.1113*** 0.1056*** 0.1117*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0110) (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0138) (0.0116) (0.0107) (0.0121) (0.0100) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CSR 0.0022 0.0067 0.0049 0.0050 -0.0018 -0.0068 -0.0052 -0.0131* -0.0095** 
 (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0034) 
 0.5782 0.1098 0.2494 0.2278 0.6592 0.0577 0.2141 0.0154 0.0055 
Long-term debt   0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0000 0.0088 0.0254 0.0430 0.0002 0.2732 0.0756 
Assets    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.3161 0.3159 0.2587 0.0024 0.4208 0.1997 
Employees     0.0070* 0.0060* 0.0032* 0.0027* 0.0053* 
     (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0023) 
     0.0184 0.0153 0.0193 0.0251 0.0207 
Age      0.0319*** 0.0270*** 0.0298*** 0.0311*** 
      (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0017) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0005** 0.0001 0.0003** 
       (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       0.0013 0.2688 0.0079 
R&D        0.0001 0.0002*** 
        (0.0001) (0.0000) 
        0.1036 0.0000 
          
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,824 12,824 12,770 12,699 5,626 3,358 12,699 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 45: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of CSR on performance. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
          
CSR 4.9701 -27.4119 -29.0303* -27.0146 -11.6903 -11.7654 -26.9959 -37.3349 -11.8232 
 (9.2532) (14.3148) (14.1007) (14.2233) (11.9344) (11.9712) (18.2223) (25.7553) (11.9353) 
 0.5912 0.0556 0.0396 0.0576 0.3274 0.3258 0.1387 0.1476 0.3220 
Long-term debt   0.2006** 0.0887 0.0668 0.0668 0.1494 -0.1855 0.0532 
   (0.0673) (0.0607) (0.0706) (0.0706) (0.1264) (0.1763) (0.0777) 
   0.0029 0.1440 0.3441 0.3442 0.2374 0.2931 0.4939 
Assets    0.0590* 0.0478* 0.0478* 0.0024 0.2989*** 0.0453* 
    (0.0269) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0181) (0.0903) (0.0228) 
    0.0287 0.0392 0.0392 0.8937 0.0010 0.0475 
Employees     183.2033*** 183.1970*** 132.1620** 108.5976* 169.4444*** 
     (46.5318) (46.5341) (47.2045) (48.8953) (46.0200) 
     0.0001 0.0001 0.0052 0.0266 0.0002 
Age      -56.2629 236.5772** 15.4378 -79.8959 
      (122.2837) (85.5222) (86.2327) (122.3479) 
      0.6455 0.0058 0.8580 0.5138 
Advertising       5.7358** 4.6638** 2.7530*** 
       (1.8289) (1.6550) (0.6390) 
       0.0018 0.0050 0.0000 
R&D        0.9977 2.6653*** 
        (0.8294) (0.6769) 
        0.2294 0.0001 
          
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,824 12,824 12,770 12,699 5,626 3,358 12,699 
Number of firms 2,940 2,940 2,933 2,933 2,922 2,893 1,289 780 2,893 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 46: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of CSR on SIC. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC 
          
CSR 0.0403*** 0.0429*** 0.0426*** 0.0425*** 0.0422*** 0.0421*** 0.0393*** 0.0590*** 0.0420*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0078) (0.0101) (0.0047) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Long-term debt   -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
   0.5230 0.6821 0.6976 0.6978 0.2901 0.8661 0.6929 
Assets    -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.9244 0.9493 0.9494 0.5418 0.4907 0.9558 
Employees     -0.0022 -0.0022 0.0015 0.0051 -0.0021 
     (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0034) (0.0043) 
     0.6018 0.6017 0.7293 0.1314 0.6334 
Age      0.4475*** 0.3738*** 0.3949*** 0.4468*** 
      (0.0216) (0.0329) (0.0437) (0.0217) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0008 0.0016* -0.0003 
       (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0004) 
       0.1081 0.0149 0.4176 
R&D        -0.0001 0.0001 
        (0.0003) (0.0003) 
        0.6057 0.6353 
          
Observations 12,880 12,880 12,826 12,826 12,772 12,701 5,626 3,358 12,701 
Number of firms 2,940 2,940 2,933 2,933 2,922 2,893 1,289 780 2,893 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 174 
 
Table 47: Fixed effects regression estimates of the mediation test. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
          
SIC 40.3744 -104.4231 -97.7358 -96.7296 -86.0744 -86.1930 38.5719 84.6574 -86.1643 
 (73.7781) (68.2816) (66.1185) (65.5498) (62.3694) (62.4421) (40.3921) (43.9918) (61.4216) 
 0.5843 0.1263 0.1395 0.1401 0.1677 0.1676 0.3398 0.0547 0.1608 
CSR 3.3432 -22.9404 -24.8713 -22.8998 -8.0570 -8.1361 -28.5118 -42.3308 -8.2062 
 (9.8155) (14.8432) (14.5979) (14.8532) (12.5080) (12.5417) (17.8354) (25.4235) (12.5040) 
 0.7334 0.1223 0.0885 0.1232 0.5195 0.5166 0.1102 0.0963 0.5117 
Long-term debt   0.1999** 0.0881 0.0664 0.0663 0.1503 -0.1863 0.0527 
   (0.0671) (0.0606) (0.0706) (0.0706) (0.1274) (0.1756) (0.0779) 
   0.0029 0.1458 0.3474 0.3476 0.2381 0.2889 0.4986 
Assets    0.0589* 0.0478* 0.0478* 0.0025 0.3003*** 0.0453* 
    (0.0271) (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0182) (0.0902) (0.0229) 
    0.0297 0.0403 0.0403 0.8902 0.0009 0.0486 
Employees     183.0148*** 183.0082*** 132.1032** 108.1638* 169.2669*** 
     (46.3552) (46.3573) (47.2378) (48.8783) (45.8347) 
     0.0001 0.0001 0.0052 0.0272 0.0002 
Age      -17.6912 222.1587* -17.9913 -41.3949 
      (109.9408) (93.2154) (91.1260) (110.0504) 
      0.8722 0.0173 0.8435 0.7068 
Advertising       5.7063** 4.5276** 2.7251*** 
       (1.8350) (1.6694) (0.6459) 
       0.0019 0.0068 0.0000 
R&D        1.0095 2.6773*** 
        (0.8235) (0.6820) 
        0.2206 0.0001 
          
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,824 12,824 12,770 12,699 5,626 3,358 12,699 
Number of firms 2,940 2,940 2,933 2,933 2,922 2,893 1,289 780 2,893 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Longitudinal regression: transformed DV to reduce outlier influence 
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Table 48: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of CSR on performance. The performance measure is transformed to control 
for the influence of outliers, using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue 
          
CSR 0.0031*** -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0006 -0.0011 
 (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0011) 
 0.0007 0.1341 0.1544 0.1633 0.3158 0.3363 0.1415 0.6446 0.3309 
Long-term debt   0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0114 0.0756 0.2864 0.2958 0.7094 0.0068 0.6076 
Assets    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.1187 0.2091 0.2101 0.7642 0.0442 0.2620 
Employees     0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0036*** 0.0029** 0.0055*** 
     (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0012) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0047 0.0000 
Age      0.0288*** 0.0334*** 0.0372*** 0.0280*** 
      (0.0069) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0069) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
Advertising       0.0003*** 0.0002* 0.0001 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
       0.0000 0.0113 0.1084 
R&D        0.0000 0.0001* 
        (0.0000) (0.0000) 
        0.3462 0.0310 
          
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,824 12,824 12,770 12,699 5,626 3,358 12,699 
Number of firms 2,940 2,940 2,933 2,933 2,922 2,893 1,289 780 2,893 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 49: Fixed effects regression estimates of effect of CSR on SIC. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC SIC 
          
CSR 0.0403*** 0.0429*** 0.0426*** 0.0425*** 0.0422*** 0.0421*** 0.0393*** 0.0590*** 0.0420*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0078) (0.0101) (0.0047) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Long-term debt   -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
   0.5230 0.6821 0.6976 0.6978 0.2901 0.8661 0.6929 
Assets    -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.9244 0.9493 0.9494 0.5418 0.4907 0.9558 
Employees     -0.0022 -0.0022 0.0015 0.0051 -0.0021 
     (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0034) (0.0043) 
     0.6018 0.6017 0.7293 0.1314 0.6334 
Age      0.4475*** 0.3738*** 0.3949*** 0.4468*** 
      (0.0216) (0.0329) (0.0437) (0.0217) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0008 0.0016* -0.0003 
       (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0004) 
       0.1081 0.0149 0.4176 
R&D        -0.0001 0.0001 
        (0.0003) (0.0003) 
        0.6057 0.6353 
          
Observations 12,880 12,880 12,826 12,826 12,772 12,701 5,626 3,358 12,701 
Number of firms 2,940 2,940 2,933 2,933 2,922 2,893 1,289 780 2,893 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 50: Fixed effects regression estimates of the mediation test.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue 
          
SIC 0.0201*** 0.0028 0.0029 0.0030 0.0033 0.0033 0.0105*** 0.0112*** 0.0033 
 (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0029) 
 0.0000 0.3554 0.3262 0.3238 0.2611 0.2525 0.0000 0.0000 0.2548 
CSR 0.0023* -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0013 -0.0012 
 (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0011) 
 0.0108 0.1139 0.1301 0.1378 0.2660 0.2832 0.0558 0.3413 0.2789 
Long-term debt   0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0118 0.0769 0.2817 0.2907 0.8516 0.0066 0.5965 
Assets    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.1148 0.2039 0.2048 0.8250 0.0389 0.2570 
Employees     0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0036*** 0.0028** 0.0055*** 
     (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0061 0.0000 
Age      0.0273*** 0.0294*** 0.0327*** 0.0265*** 
      (0.0077) (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0077) 
      0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 
Advertising       0.0003*** 0.0002* 0.0001 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
       0.0000 0.0198 0.0971 
R&D        0.0000 0.0001* 
        (0.0000) (0.0000) 
        0.3125 0.0309 
          
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,824 12,824 12,770 12,699 5,626 3,358 12,699 
Number of firms 2,940 2,940 2,933 2,933 2,922 2,893 1,289 780 2,893 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The performance measure is transformed to control for the influence of outliers, using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Robust standard errors 





The Baron and Kenny mediation approach assumes correctly specified causal relationships. 
This section presents the results of an exploration of whether analysis results change based on 
assumptions about the temporal relationships between independent, outcome, and mediator 
variables. Mediation relationships imply the passage of time. If M mediates the relationship 
between X and Y, M must occur after X but before Y. However, the exact timing of occurrence 
and lag between variables is uncertain. Examining temporal dynamics assesses the possibility 






Table 51: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of CSR on performance using a time-delayed specification. Subscript t indicates 
year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
CSRt-1 385.7899*** 508.8450*** 389.6923*** 395.2628*** 180.8716*** 150.6861*** 59.1093 -19.4273 37.2439 
 (68.5240) (83.3477) (65.4185) (66.4447) (49.3399) (42.8810) (48.2051) (43.4141) (35.5474) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0005 0.2205 0.6547 0.2949 
Long-term debtt-1   0.6168*** 0.4359* 0.1399 0.1259 0.9655*** -0.3766 0.0649 
   (0.1242) (0.1988) (0.1348) (0.1361) (0.2248) (0.5560) (0.1345) 
   0.0000 0.0284 0.2994 0.3550 0.0000 0.4986 0.6297 
Assetst-1    0.0323 0.0342 0.0346 -0.0726*** 0.6127** 0.0370 
    (0.0316) (0.0266) (0.0265) (0.0216) (0.2184) (0.0264) 
    0.3079 0.1995 0.1925 0.0008 0.0052 0.1618 
Employeest-1     202.4073*** 199.0800*** 174.7611*** 161.3231*** 189.2236*** 
     (10.7971) (11.4953) (18.6668) (14.8177) (15.2528) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Aget-1      115.2883** 33.9283 43.3583 86.1923* 
      (35.7941) (36.6134) (36.4794) (35.0873) 
      0.0013 0.3544 0.2351 0.0141 
Advertisingt-1       7.5555*** -1.5951 3.9559* 
       (2.0847) (2.0541) (1.9115) 
       0.0003 0.4378 0.0386 
R&Dt-1        -1.4092 4.4606*** 
        (1.8596) (1.0288) 
        0.4489 0.0000 
          
Observations 7,320 7,320 7,290 7,290 7,269 7,247 3,247 1,949 7,247 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 52: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of CSR on SIC using a time-delayed specification. Subscript t indicates year. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt 
          
CSRt-1 0.0920*** 0.1105*** 0.1072*** 0.1073*** 0.1061*** 0.1013*** 0.1222*** 0.1365*** 0.0835*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0093) (0.0141) (0.0166) (0.0074) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0073 0.9526 0.7861 0.5813 0.3796 0.8832 0.0709 
Assetst-1    0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000** 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.0380 0.0345 0.0298 0.1476 0.5700 0.0069 
Employeest-1     0.0014 0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0008 
     (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0016) 
     0.5898 0.7312 0.1726 0.4066 0.6182 
Aget-1      0.0194*** 0.0281*** 0.0250*** 0.0150*** 
      (0.0031) (0.0051) (0.0066) (0.0028) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0009*** 0.0006** 0.0006** 
       (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
       0.0001 0.0058 0.0012 
R&Dt-1        0.0007*** 0.0008*** 
        (0.0002) (0.0001) 
        0.0000 0.0000 
          
Observations 9,723 9,723 9,681 9,681 9,649 9,608 4,306 2,579 9,608 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 53: Pooled regression estimates of the mediation test using a time-delayed specification. Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
SICt 956.6806* 978.6008* 617.6357 552.2029 279.1175 176.7458 155.0976 -59.1698 -347.9597 
 (428.1352) (436.9712) (445.1071) (459.1515) (240.4898) (264.8225) (170.3775) (203.4813) (283.7297) 
 0.0256 0.0252 0.1654 0.2293 0.2459 0.5046 0.3629 0.7713 0.2202 
CSRt-1 299.9565*** 399.4085*** 322.6277*** 334.9339*** 150.6745* 132.4190* 39.6636 -11.0430 66.1406 
 (84.3325) (106.1413) (90.0113) (93.2696) (62.1488) (56.5630) (40.5394) (37.6858) (49.7025) 
 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0154 0.0193 0.3281 0.7696 0.1834 
Long-term debtt-1   0.6072*** 0.4393* 0.1422 0.1278 0.9683*** -0.3770 0.0574 
   (0.1249) (0.1972) (0.1363) (0.1384) (0.2256) (0.5541) (0.1390) 
   0.0000 0.0260 0.2971 0.3562 0.0000 0.4966 0.6800 
Assetst-1    0.0301 0.0331 0.0339 -0.0730*** 0.6118** 0.0385 
    (0.0316) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0216) (0.2183) (0.0276) 
    0.3402 0.2230 0.2134 0.0008 0.0053 0.1628 
Employeest-1     202.0041*** 198.9256*** 175.1087*** 161.2567*** 188.9126*** 
     (11.1319) (11.7484) (18.8332) (14.7915) (14.7567) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Aget-1      111.8226** 29.1705 44.9425 91.2024* 
      (39.4186) (37.0208) (36.8664) (37.9586) 
      0.0046 0.4309 0.2234 0.0164 
Advertisingt-1       7.3904*** -1.5506 4.2031* 
       (2.0897) (2.1013) (1.8163) 
       0.0004 0.4609 0.0208 
R&Dt-1        -1.3614 4.7381*** 
        (1.9149) (1.1841) 
        0.4774 0.0001 
          
Observations 7,320 7,320 7,290 7,290 7,269 7,247 3,247 1,949 7,247 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 54: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of CSR on performance using a time-delayed specification and an inverse hyperbolic 
sine transformed performance variable to control for the influence of outliers. Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
CSRt-1 0.0144** 0.0278*** 0.0218*** 0.0221*** 0.0155** 0.0084* 0.0087 0.0049 0.0011 
 (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0052) (0.0060) (0.0036) 
 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0392 0.0973 0.4116 0.7691 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0000 0.0536 0.1486 0.2243 0.0039 0.5351 0.3963 
Assetst-1    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.3749 0.2729 0.2269 0.0303 0.2708 0.1622 
Employeest-1     0.0061* 0.0053* 0.0028* 0.0022* 0.0046* 
     (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0021) 
     0.0293 0.0241 0.0386 0.0499 0.0284 
Aget-1      0.0269*** 0.0258*** 0.0268*** 0.0250*** 
      (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0018) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0006** 0.0001 0.0003** 
       (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       0.0017 0.2050 0.0032 
R&Dt-1        0.0001* 0.0003*** 
        (0.0001) (0.0000) 
        0.0223 0.0000 
          
Observations 7,320 7,320 7,290 7,290 7,269 7,247 3,247 1,949 7,247 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 55: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of CSR on SIC using a time-delayed specification. Subscript t indicates year. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt 
          
CSRt-1 0.0920*** 0.1105*** 0.1072*** 0.1073*** 0.1061*** 0.1013*** 0.1222*** 0.1365*** 0.0835*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0093) (0.0141) (0.0166) (0.0074) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0073 0.9526 0.7861 0.5813 0.3796 0.8832 0.0709 
Assetst-1    0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000** 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.0380 0.0345 0.0298 0.1476 0.5700 0.0069 
Employeest-1     0.0014 0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0008 
     (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0016) 
     0.5898 0.7312 0.1726 0.4066 0.6182 
Aget-1      0.0194*** 0.0281*** 0.0250*** 0.0150*** 
      (0.0031) (0.0051) (0.0066) (0.0028) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0009*** 0.0006** 0.0006** 
       (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
       0.0001 0.0058 0.0012 
R&Dt-1        0.0007*** 0.0008*** 
        (0.0002) (0.0001) 
        0.0000 0.0000 
          
Observations 9,723 9,723 9,681 9,681 9,649 9,608 4,306 2,579 9,608 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 56: Pooled regression estimates of the mediation test using a time-delayed specification and an inverse hyperbolic sine transformed 
performance variable to control for the influence of outliers. Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
SICt 0.1631*** 0.1691*** 0.1523*** 0.1504*** 0.1428*** 0.1210*** 0.1045*** 0.0954*** 0.0972*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0129) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0100) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CSRt-1 -0.0002 0.0089* 0.0053 0.0057 0.0000 -0.0041 -0.0045 -0.0086 -0.0070* 
 (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0057) (0.0034) 
 0.9619 0.0383 0.1880 0.1559 0.9992 0.2496 0.3272 0.1308 0.0417 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0000 0.0280 0.0801 0.1322 0.0018 0.4620 0.2260 
Assetst-1    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.5374 0.4147 0.3311 0.0134 0.1703 0.2503 
Employeest-1     0.0059* 0.0052* 0.0030* 0.0023* 0.0047* 
     (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0019) 
     0.0142 0.0112 0.0115 0.0234 0.0150 
Aget-1      0.0245*** 0.0226*** 0.0243*** 0.0236*** 
      (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0017) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0004** 0.0001 0.0002* 
       (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       0.0048 0.5186 0.0112 
R&Dt-1        0.0001 0.0002*** 
        (0.0001) (0.0000) 
        0.3025 0.0000 
          
Observations 7,320 7,320 7,290 7,290 7,269 7,247 3,247 1,949 7,247 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 57: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of CSR on performance using a time-delayed specification. Subscript t indicates 
year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
CSRt-1 4.9151 19.9044 23.1240 21.3430 30.4634 30.4805 -20.8196 -21.1910 31.2096 
 (13.6325) (30.1996) (29.9987) (27.9464) (27.1188) (27.1435) (18.7604) (28.2196) (27.4001) 
 0.7185 0.5099 0.4409 0.4451 0.2614 0.2616 0.2674 0.4530 0.2548 
Long-term debtt-1   0.1746* 0.2026** 0.1672* 0.1672* 0.1315 0.2261 0.1664* 
   (0.0769) (0.0773) (0.0763) (0.0763) (0.0766) (0.5832) (0.0770) 
   0.0233 0.0089 0.0286 0.0286 0.0861 0.6984 0.0307 
Assetst-1    -0.0193 -0.0271 -0.0271 -0.0096 0.0229 -0.0278 
    (0.0268) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0162) (0.2506) (0.0280) 
    0.4719 0.3280 0.3280 0.5538 0.9273 0.3201 
Employeest-1     159.2795*** 159.2757*** 93.8398* 89.1854 156.6610** 
     (47.9981) (47.9997) (42.3526) (46.5805) (48.4682) 
     0.0009 0.0009 0.0270 0.0561 0.0012 
Aget-1      214.8303 322.8802* 194.6438 207.2838 
      (124.6605) (127.9655) (166.5748) (125.5402) 
      0.0850 0.0118 0.2431 0.0989 
Advertisingt-1       0.8445 0.7119 0.3548 
       (1.8566) (2.4460) (1.2723) 
       0.6493 0.7711 0.7804 
R&Dt-1        0.8543 0.9171 
        (1.6850) (0.6543) 
        0.6123 0.1612 
          
Observations 7,320 7,320 7,290 7,290 7,269 7,247 3,247 1,949 7,247 
Number of firms 1,933 1,933 1,928 1,928 1,922 1,912 879 527 1,912 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 189 
 
Table 58: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of CSR on SIC using a time-delayed specification. Subscript t indicates year. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt 
          
CSRt-1 0.0196*** 0.0250*** 0.0248*** 0.0245*** 0.0245*** 0.0246*** 0.0294*** 0.0363** 0.0243*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0084) (0.0120) (0.0053) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0025 0.0000 
Long-term debtt-1   -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
   0.9644 0.6738 0.6532 0.6546 0.7533 0.6214 0.5966 
Assetst-1    -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.3103 0.3353 0.3360 0.2011 0.9877 0.3882 
Employeest-1     -0.0033 -0.0033 0.0032 0.0100 -0.0021 
     (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0051) 
     0.5284 0.5297 0.5996 0.0596 0.6739 
Aget-1      0.5221*** 0.4218*** 0.4327*** 0.5243*** 
      (0.0265) (0.0407) (0.0541) (0.0266) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006 
       (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0004) 
       0.8871 0.9526 0.0878 
R&Dt-1        0.0000 -0.0002 
        (0.0005) (0.0004) 
        0.9852 0.6847 
          
Observations 9,723 9,723 9,681 9,681 9,649 9,608 4,306 2,579 9,608 
Number of firms 2,383 2,383 2,375 2,375 2,368 2,349 1,088 658 2,349 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 59: Fixed effects regression estimates of the mediation test using a time-delayed specification. Subscript t indicates year. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
SICt 13.1645 -73.8804 -76.5966 -79.8045 -73.9424 -73.8467 -60.2399 -72.6073 -71.8517 
 (69.2248) (65.7721) (65.1653) (64.6863) (63.1660) (63.2199) (116.4551) (160.1584) (63.0057) 
 0.8492 0.2615 0.2400 0.2175 0.2419 0.2429 0.6051 0.6505 0.2543 
CSRt-1 4.7022 21.8616 25.1484 23.4212 32.3942 32.4151 -18.8304 -18.3234 33.0616 
 (13.9493) (30.1154) (29.9792) (28.0223) (27.2374) (27.2641) (19.1956) (29.1385) (27.4861) 
 0.7361 0.4680 0.4017 0.4034 0.2345 0.2346 0.3269 0.5297 0.2292 
Long-term debtt-1   0.1751* 0.2036** 0.1682* 0.1682* 0.1312 0.2227 0.1674* 
   (0.0770) (0.0774) (0.0763) (0.0763) (0.0752) (0.5758) (0.0770) 
   0.0231 0.0086 0.0276 0.0276 0.0814 0.6991 0.0297 
Assetst-1    -0.0196 -0.0274 -0.0274 -0.0099 0.0226 -0.0281 
    (0.0267) (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0161) (0.2504) (0.0279) 
    0.4621 0.3205 0.3205 0.5395 0.9281 0.3138 
Employeest-1     159.0910*** 159.0894*** 94.0349* 89.7274 156.5809** 
     (47.7602) (47.7626) (42.1173) (46.5073) (48.2573) 
     0.0009 0.0009 0.0258 0.0542 0.0012 
Aget-1      255.6230* 350.2906** 230.2913 247.2390* 
      (113.8104) (108.5510) (134.1280) (114.8052) 
      0.0248 0.0013 0.0866 0.0314 
Advertisingt-1       0.8095 0.6580 0.2873 
       (1.8437) (2.3837) (1.2680) 
       0.6607 0.7826 0.8208 
R&Dt-1        0.8666 0.9034 
        (1.7023) (0.6543) 
        0.6109 0.1675 
          
Observations 7,320 7,320 7,290 7,290 7,269 7,247 3,247 1,949 7,247 
Number of firms 1,933 1,933 1,928 1,928 1,922 1,912 879 527 1,912 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 60: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of CSR on performance using a time-delayed specification and an inverse 
hyperbolic sine transformed performance variable to control for the influence of outliers. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
CSRt-1 0.0038*** 0.0023** 0.0023** 0.0023** 0.0026*** 0.0025*** 0.0016 0.0024 0.0026*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0008) 
 0.0000 0.0033 0.0023 0.0027 0.0009 0.0010 0.0843 0.0682 0.0008 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0159 0.0127 0.0597 0.0588 0.3581 0.8957 0.0655 
Assetst-1    -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.6011 0.2309 0.2263 0.0591 0.5907 0.1622 
Employeest-1     0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0021 0.0021 0.0037** 
     (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0012) 
     0.0013 0.0013 0.1138 0.1831 0.0019 
Aget-1      0.0241*** 0.0328*** 0.0308*** 0.0238*** 
      (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0053) (0.0037) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
       0.0975 0.2799 0.3176 
R&Dt-1        0.0001 0.0000 
        (0.0000) (0.0000) 
        0.2248 0.1710 
          
Observations 7,320 7,320 7,290 7,290 7,269 7,247 3,247 1,949 7,247 
Number of firms 1,933 1,933 1,928 1,928 1,922 1,912 879 527 1,912 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 61: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of CSR on SIC using a time-delayed specification.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt SICt 
          
CSRt-1 0.0196*** 0.0250*** 0.0248*** 0.0245*** 0.0245*** 0.0246*** 0.0294*** 0.0363** 0.0243*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0084) (0.0120) (0.0053) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0025 0.0000 
Long-term debtt-1   -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
   0.9644 0.6738 0.6532 0.6546 0.7533 0.6214 0.5966 
Assetst-1    -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.3103 0.3353 0.3360 0.2011 0.9877 0.3882 
Employeest-1     -0.0033 -0.0033 0.0032 0.0100 -0.0021 
     (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0051) 
     0.5284 0.5297 0.5996 0.0596 0.6739 
Aget-1      0.5221*** 0.4218*** 0.4327*** 0.5243*** 
      (0.0265) (0.0407) (0.0541) (0.0266) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006 
       (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0004) 
       0.8871 0.9526 0.0878 
R&Dt-1        0.0000 -0.0002 
        (0.0005) (0.0004) 
        0.9852 0.6847 
          
Observations 9,723 9,723 9,681 9,681 9,649 9,608 4,306 2,579 9,608 
Number of firms 2,383 2,383 2,375 2,375 2,368 2,349 1,088 658 2,349 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 62: Fixed effects regression estimates of the mediation test using a time-delayed specification and an inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformed performance variable to control for outliers. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
SICt 0.0083*** 0.0021 0.0020 0.0020 0.0022 0.0023 0.0089** 0.0078* 0.0025 
 (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0020) 
 0.0003 0.3209 0.3361 0.3393 0.2837 0.2513 0.0013 0.0150 0.2175 
CSRt-1 0.0036*** 0.0022** 0.0023** 0.0023** 0.0025** 0.0025** 0.0013 0.0020 0.0025** 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0008) 
 0.0000 0.0047 0.0034 0.0038 0.0014 0.0015 0.1518 0.1061 0.0013 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0166 0.0134 0.0632 0.0626 0.3566 0.9430 0.0695 
Assetst-1    -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.6182 0.2413 0.2375 0.1227 0.6067 0.1711 
Employeest-1     0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0021 0.0021 0.0037** 
     (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0012) 
     0.0013 0.0013 0.1236 0.1999 0.0019 
Aget-1      0.0229*** 0.0287*** 0.0270*** 0.0224*** 
      (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0055) (0.0035) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
       0.0651 0.2201 0.2857 
R&Dt-1        0.0001 0.0000 
        (0.0000) (0.0000) 
        0.2119 0.1625 
          
Observations 7,320 7,320 7,290 7,290 7,269 7,247 3,247 1,949 7,247 
Number of firms 1,933 1,933 1,928 1,928 1,922 1,912 879 527 1,912 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 63: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of CUSTOMER CSR on performance. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
          
Environment CSR 212.0612*** 311.2126*** 238.9628*** 240.8738*** 91.9095*** 75.7165** 36.7900 -10.1374 16.0868 
 (42.6284) (59.4714) (49.8616) (49.1630) (27.5061) (24.5083) (23.0442) (25.0988) (20.8567) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0020 0.1106 0.6864 0.4406 
Long-term debt   0.5723*** 0.3602* 0.1562 0.1445 0.8400*** -0.5133 0.0898 
   (0.1023) (0.1627) (0.1046) (0.1040) (0.1654) (0.4661) (0.0951) 
   0.0000 0.0269 0.1352 0.1648 0.0000 0.2711 0.3452 
Assets    0.0397 0.0325 0.0324 -0.0586*** 0.6196** 0.0341 
    (0.0253) (0.0205) (0.0202) (0.0149) (0.2165) (0.0195) 
    0.1164 0.1119 0.1083 0.0001 0.0043 0.0811 
Employees     198.6383*** 194.5018*** 167.8433*** 155.4647*** 182.9505*** 
     (9.4715) (9.6185) (17.0296) (13.9915) (12.8950) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Age      115.6802*** 32.0545 35.8263 89.4775** 
      (28.2473) (28.7492) (31.0617) (27.7298) 
      0.0000 0.2651 0.2491 0.0013 
Advertising       7.9105*** -0.9167 3.9676* 
       (1.8118) (2.2580) (1.6749) 
       0.0000 0.6849 0.0179 
R&D        -1.1372 4.6034*** 
        (1.8245) (0.9493) 
        0.5333 0.0000 
          
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,824 12,824 12,770 12,699 5,626 3,358 12,699 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 64: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of CUSTOMER CSR on the mediator CUSTOMER SIC. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm. 



















          
Environment CSR 0.0205*** 0.0263*** 0.0254*** 0.0254*** 0.0238*** 0.0225*** 0.0240*** 0.0247*** 0.0192*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0014) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Long-term debt   0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0003 0.1968 0.4676 0.6317 0.1192 0.1672 0.5977 
Assets    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.1244 0.1300 0.1232 0.2416 0.1985 0.0684 
Employees     0.0021 0.0018 0.0003 0.0005 0.0011 
     (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
     0.0874 0.0942 0.5599 0.2963 0.1621 
Age      0.0086*** 0.0124*** 0.0135*** 0.0071*** 
      (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0011) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0004*** 0.0003* 0.0003*** 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       0.0000 0.0108 0.0000 
R&D        0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
        (0.0001) (0.0000) 
        0.0005 0.0000 
          
Observations 12,857 12,857 12,804 12,804 12,751 12,680 5,617 3,355 12,680 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 65: Pooled regression estimates of the mediation test. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
          
Environment SIC 3,951.8247*** 4,143.4019*** 2,716.9014** 2,578.7537** -52.7567 -472.3451 192.3444 -728.6945 -1,954.2959* 
 (973.2270) (991.6274) (925.8248) (956.9400) (874.7915) (961.7665) (779.4313) (725.7241) (987.4302) 
 0.0001 0.0000 0.0034 0.0071 0.9519 0.6234 0.8051 0.3156 0.0479 
Environment CSR 132.2953** 202.7014*** 170.4140** 175.7517** 93.2472* 86.4666* 32.1800 7.8462 53.6664 
 (42.4821) (60.1000) (54.3962) (54.7895) (41.5022) (39.1266) (31.5518) (27.9340) (35.5883) 
 0.0019 0.0008 0.0017 0.0014 0.0247 0.0272 0.3080 0.7789 0.1317 
Long-term debt   0.5497*** 0.3486* 0.1563 0.1452 0.8378*** -0.4874 0.0869 
   (0.0998) (0.1591) (0.1033) (0.1028) (0.1694) (0.4519) (0.0935) 
   0.0000 0.0285 0.1303 0.1579 0.0000 0.2812 0.3531 
Assets    0.0379 0.0326 0.0327 -0.0585*** 0.6124** 0.0355 
    (0.0252) (0.0208) (0.0206) (0.0152) (0.2123) (0.0200) 
    0.1333 0.1181 0.1125 0.0001 0.0040 0.0762 
Employees     198.7411*** 195.3344*** 167.7830*** 155.8090*** 185.0385*** 
     (9.7336) (9.6362) (17.1086) (13.6794) (12.0892) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Age      119.7719*** 29.6299 45.6323 103.4487** 
      (34.8706) (32.8709) (33.2479) (33.4478) 
      0.0006 0.3675 0.1703 0.0020 
Advertising       7.8379*** -0.7206 4.4973** 
       (1.7631) (2.2072) (1.5250) 
       0.0000 0.7442 0.0032 
R&D        -0.9643 5.0606*** 
        (1.7944) (1.0801) 
        0.5912 0.0000 
          
Observations 12,854 12,854 12,802 12,802 12,749 12,678 5,617 3,355 12,678 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Pooled regression: transformed DV to reduce outlier influence
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Table 66: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of CUSTOMER CSR on performance. The performance measure is transformed to 
control for the influence of outliers, using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue 
          
Environment CSR 0.0081*** 0.0186*** 0.0147*** 0.0148*** 0.0091** 0.0042 0.0086** 0.0025 0.0004 
 (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0021) 
 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0806 0.0019 0.4605 0.8349 
Long-term debt   0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0000 0.0112 0.0359 0.0606 0.0008 0.3208 0.1286 
Assets    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.1975 0.1966 0.1757 0.0091 0.5294 0.1289 
Employees     0.0073* 0.0060* 0.0030 0.0025 0.0052* 
     (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0025) 
     0.0334 0.0280 0.0509 0.0511 0.0342 
Age      0.0347*** 0.0302*** 0.0327*** 0.0330*** 
      (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0018) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0006*** 0.0002 0.0003** 
       (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       0.0003 0.0998 0.0023 
R&D        0.0002** 0.0003*** 
        (0.0001) (0.0000) 
        0.0017 0.0000 
          
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,824 12,824 12,770 12,699 5,626 3,358 12,699 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 67: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of CUSTOMER CSR on the mediator Environment SIC. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm. 



















          
Environment CSR 0.0205*** 0.0263*** 0.0254*** 0.0254*** 0.0238*** 0.0225*** 0.0240*** 0.0247*** 0.0192*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0014) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Long-term debt   0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0003 0.1968 0.4676 0.6317 0.1192 0.1672 0.5977 
Assets    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.1244 0.1300 0.1232 0.2416 0.1985 0.0684 
Employees     0.0021 0.0018 0.0003 0.0005 0.0011 
     (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
     0.0874 0.0942 0.5599 0.2963 0.1621 
Age      0.0086*** 0.0124*** 0.0135*** 0.0071*** 
      (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0011) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0004*** 0.0003* 0.0003*** 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       0.0000 0.0108 0.0000 
R&D        0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
        (0.0001) (0.0000) 
        0.0005 0.0000 
          
Observations 12,857 12,857 12,804 12,804 12,751 12,680 5,617 3,355 12,680 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 68: Pooled regression estimates of the mediator test. The performance measure is transformed to control for the influence of 
outliers, using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue 
          
Environment SIC 0.5853*** 0.6186*** 0.5463*** 0.5410*** 0.4579*** 0.3473*** 0.3700*** 0.3220*** 0.2827*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0368) (0.0362) (0.0358) (0.0478) (0.0389) (0.0356) (0.0384) (0.0338) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Environment CSR -0.0037 0.0024 0.0009 0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0036 -0.0002 -0.0054 -0.0049* 
 (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0021) 
 0.0896 0.3552 0.7234 0.6614 0.4627 0.1040 0.9480 0.0957 0.0199 
Long-term debt   0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0000 0.0070 0.0211 0.0396 0.0004 0.4341 0.0788 
Assets    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.2408 0.2360 0.2035 0.0057 0.2400 0.1576 
Employees     0.0063* 0.0054* 0.0029* 0.0024* 0.0049* 
     (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0023) 
     0.0316 0.0257 0.0321 0.0467 0.0306 
Age      0.0317*** 0.0256*** 0.0284*** 0.0309*** 
      (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0017) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0005** 0.0001 0.0003** 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       0.0017 0.3326 0.0093 
R&D        0.0001 0.0002*** 
        (0.0001) (0.0000) 
        0.1023 0.0000 
          
Observations 12,854 12,854 12,802 12,802 12,749 12,678 5,617 3,355 12,678 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 69: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of Environment CSR on performance. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
          
Environment CSR 13.3095** -2.1817 -4.2262 -4.3766 0.1986 0.2063 -2.4498 -5.2992 0.6097 
 (4.0915) (6.7388) (6.4358) (6.2802) (5.6012) (5.6193) (7.9744) (10.9362) (5.6025) 
 0.0012 0.7461 0.5114 0.4859 0.9717 0.9707 0.7587 0.6281 0.9133 
Long-term debt   0.2004** 0.0883 0.0665 0.0665 0.1495 -0.1840 0.0529 
   (0.0674) (0.0607) (0.0706) (0.0706) (0.1269) (0.1748) (0.0777) 
   0.0030 0.1457 0.3458 0.3460 0.2392 0.2926 0.4960 
Assets    0.0591* 0.0479* 0.0479* 0.0024 0.2987** 0.0453* 
    (0.0269) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0181) (0.0906) (0.0228) 
    0.0283 0.0389 0.0389 0.8939 0.0010 0.0471 
Employees     183.4533*** 183.4484*** 132.7524** 109.3161* 169.7025*** 
     (46.5604) (46.5633) (47.3907) (49.1887) (46.0593) 
     0.0001 0.0001 0.0052 0.0265 0.0002 
Age      -56.1309 232.9438** 14.6331 -79.9129 
      (123.5124) (84.7112) (87.0887) (123.5769) 
      0.6495 0.0060 0.8666 0.5179 
Advertising       5.7573** 4.6140** 2.7589*** 
       (1.8238) (1.6696) (0.6407) 
       0.0016 0.0059 0.0000 
R&D        1.0008 2.6628*** 
        (0.8289) (0.6759) 
        0.2276 0.0001 
          
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,824 12,824 12,770 12,699 5,626 3,358 12,699 
Number of firms 2,940 2,940 2,933 2,933 2,922 2,893 1,289 780 2,893 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 70: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of Environment CSR on Environment SIC. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm. 



















          
Environment CSR 0.0079*** 0.0070*** 0.0069*** 0.0069*** 0.0068*** 0.0068*** 0.0070*** 0.0081*** 0.0068*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0009) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Long-term debt   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.3236 0.4287 0.4236 0.4234 0.1446 0.0375 0.4430 
Assets    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.7058 0.6728 0.6730 0.8981 0.8600 0.8054 
Employees     -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 -0.0019 
     (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0020) 
     0.6136 0.6103 0.6271 0.7211 0.3369 
Age      0.1622*** 0.1387*** 0.1583*** 0.1602*** 
      (0.0093) (0.0137) (0.0188) (0.0092) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 
       (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
       0.0872 0.2744 0.5142 
R&D        0.0001 0.0002** 
        (0.0001) (0.0001) 
        0.5122 0.0091 
          
Observations 12,857 12,857 12,804 12,804 12,751 12,680 5,617 3,355 12,680 
Number of firms 2,939 2,939 2,932 2,932 2,921 2,892 1,289 780 2,892 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 71: Fixed effects regression estimates of the mediation test. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue 
          
Environment SIC -133.1155 -471.7757 -517.8374 -525.3315 -494.1820 -494.9587 477.2310* 247.4962 -561.8177 
 (333.0057) (347.2342) (344.3741) (344.0970) (325.5643) (325.9644) (227.1487) (254.8147) (325.3208) 
 0.6894 0.1744 0.1328 0.1269 0.1291 0.1290 0.0358 0.3317 0.0843 
Environment CSR 14.3945** 1.1098 -0.6478 -0.7528 3.6035 3.5992 -5.7596 -7.2906 4.4612 
 (4.9282) (8.1661) (7.9405) (7.8439) (7.0589) (7.0692) (8.2494) (11.5509) (7.0534) 
 0.0035 0.8919 0.9350 0.9235 0.6097 0.6107 0.4852 0.5281 0.5271 
Long-term debt   0.2037** 0.0912 0.0694 0.0694 0.1420 -0.1964 0.0555 
   (0.0673) (0.0594) (0.0685) (0.0686) (0.1247) (0.1788) (0.0754) 
   0.0025 0.1246 0.3115 0.3117 0.2549 0.2723 0.4617 
Assets    0.0593* 0.0481* 0.0481* 0.0025 0.2992** 0.0455* 
    (0.0268) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0176) (0.0907) (0.0227) 
    0.0270 0.0376 0.0376 0.8863 0.0010 0.0454 
Employees     183.0272*** 183.0173*** 132.3531** 109.1403* 168.6591*** 
     (46.3751) (46.3770) (47.1367) (49.0786) (45.7801) 
     0.0001 0.0001 0.0051 0.0264 0.0002 
Age      24.0567 166.7230* -24.5562 10.0121 
      (86.6364) (73.7941) (78.1111) (86.3667) 
      0.7813 0.0240 0.7533 0.9077 
Advertising       5.5949** 4.5433** 2.8214*** 
       (1.8010) (1.7044) (0.6913) 
       0.0019 0.0078 0.0000 
R&D        0.9828 2.7965*** 
        (0.8349) (0.6894) 
        0.2395 0.0001 
          
Observations 12,854 12,854 12,802 12,802 12,749 12,678 5,617 3,355 12,678 
Number of firms 2,939 2,939 2,932 2,932 2,921 2,892 1,289 780 2,892 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 72: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of Environment CSR on performance. The performance measure is transformed 
to control for the influence of outliers, using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue 
          
Environment CSR 0.0010* -0.0015* -0.0015* -0.0015* -0.0014* -0.0014* -0.0015** -0.0011 -0.0014* 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
 0.0446 0.0126 0.0125 0.0124 0.0207 0.0215 0.0040 0.1404 0.0220 
Long-term debt   0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0113 0.0740 0.2739 0.2827 0.7264 0.0081 0.5869 
Assets    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.1121 0.2002 0.2013 0.8085 0.0467 0.2518 
Employees     0.0060*** 0.0059*** 0.0036*** 0.0029** 0.0055*** 
     (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0012) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0046 0.0000 
Age      0.0293*** 0.0341*** 0.0376*** 0.0285*** 
      (0.0069) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0069) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0003*** 0.0002* 0.0001 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
       0.0000 0.0120 0.1093 
R&D        0.0000 0.0001* 
        (0.0000) (0.0000) 
        0.3484 0.0317 
          
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,824 12,824 12,770 12,699 5,626 3,358 12,699 
Number of firms 2,940 2,940 2,933 2,933 2,922 2,893 1,289 780 2,893 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 73: Fixed effects regression estimates of effect of Environment CSR on Environment SIC. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 



















          
Environment CSR 0.0079*** 0.0070*** 0.0069*** 0.0069*** 0.0068*** 0.0068*** 0.0070*** 0.0081*** 0.0068*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0009) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Long-term debt   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.3236 0.4287 0.4236 0.4234 0.1446 0.0375 0.4430 
Assets    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.7058 0.6728 0.6730 0.8981 0.8600 0.8054 
Employees     -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 -0.0019 
     (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0020) 
     0.6136 0.6103 0.6271 0.7211 0.3369 
Age      0.1622*** 0.1387*** 0.1583*** 0.1602*** 
      (0.0093) (0.0137) (0.0188) (0.0092) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 
       (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
       0.0872 0.2744 0.5142 
R&D        0.0001 0.0002** 
        (0.0001) (0.0001) 
        0.5122 0.0091 
          
Observations 12,857 12,857 12,804 12,804 12,751 12,680 5,617 3,355 12,680 
Number of firms 2,939 2,939 2,932 2,932 2,921 2,892 1,289 780 2,892 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 74: Fixed effects regression estimates of the mediation test. The performance measure is transformed to control for the influence 
of outliers, using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue IHS Revenue 
          
Environment SIC 0.0077 -0.0337*** -0.0345*** -0.0346*** -0.0338*** -0.0338*** -0.0212** -0.0325*** -0.0362*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0072) (0.0088) (0.0075) 
 0.2338 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0031 0.0002 0.0000 
Environment CSR 0.0010 -0.0012* -0.0012* -0.0013* -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0014* -0.0008 -0.0011 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
 0.0592 0.0433 0.0436 0.0433 0.0630 0.0647 0.0107 0.2645 0.0701 
Long-term debt   0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0112 0.0644 0.1768 0.1828 0.9075 0.0146 0.4595 
Assets    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.0978 0.1790 0.1799 0.8016 0.0417 0.2301 
Employees     0.0059*** 0.0059*** 0.0036*** 0.0029** 0.0054*** 
     (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0031 0.0000 
Age      0.0348*** 0.0370*** 0.0427*** 0.0343*** 
      (0.0072) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0072) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertising       0.0003*** 0.0002** 0.0001 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       0.0000 0.0084 0.1198 
R&D        0.0000 0.0001* 
        (0.0000) (0.0000) 
        0.3321 0.0198 
          
Observations 12,854 12,854 12,802 12,802 12,749 12,678 5,617 3,355 12,678 
Number of firms 2,939 2,939 2,932 2,932 2,921 2,892 1,289 780 2,892 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




The Baron and Kenny mediation approach assumes correctly specified causal relationships. 
This section presents the results of an exploration of whether analysis results change based on 
assumptions about the temporal relationships between independent, outcome, and mediator 
variables. Mediation relationships imply the passage of time. If M mediates the relationship 
between X and Y, M must occur after X but before Y. However, the exact timing of occurrence 
and lag between variables is uncertain. Examining temporal dynamics assesses the possibility 





Table 75: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of Environment CSR on performance using a time-delayed specification. Subscript 
t indicates year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
Environment CSRt-1 150.1236*** 285.1870*** 221.0993*** 227.3666*** 92.1642** 83.3023* 50.5617 21.7899 27.9691 
 (44.5464) (68.2936) (56.8451) (57.8654) (35.3703) (33.0149) (28.3330) (26.4229) (29.5929) 
 0.0008 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0092 0.0117 0.0747 0.4099 0.3447 
Long-term debtt-1   0.6204*** 0.4372* 0.1408 0.1258 0.9632*** -0.3748 0.0644 
   (0.1241) (0.1980) (0.1354) (0.1367) (0.2232) (0.5568) (0.1350) 
   0.0000 0.0273 0.2983 0.3574 0.0000 0.5012 0.6336 
Assetst-1    0.0327 0.0343 0.0347 -0.0723*** 0.6126** 0.0371 
    (0.0319) (0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0215) (0.2185) (0.0265) 
    0.3052 0.2005 0.1928 0.0008 0.0052 0.1621 
Employeest-1     202.7354*** 199.1762*** 174.6541*** 161.1820*** 189.1609*** 
     (10.6806) (11.3794) (18.6187) (14.8128) (15.2219) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Aget-1      118.7658** 34.8981 41.9473 86.8251* 
      (36.1192) (36.6713) (36.2313) (35.3731) 
      0.0010 0.3415 0.2475 0.0142 
Advertisingt-1       7.5604*** -1.6267 3.9592* 
       (2.0738) (2.0420) (1.9124) 
       0.0003 0.4260 0.0386 
R&Dt-1        -1.4673 4.4671*** 
        (1.8496) (1.0214) 
        0.4280 0.0000 
          
Observations 7,320 7,320 7,290 7,290 7,269 7,247 3,247 1,949 7,247 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 76: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of Environment CSR on Environment SIC using a time-delayed specification. 
Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 



















          
Environment CSRt-1 0.0152*** 0.0210*** 0.0200*** 0.0201*** 0.0185*** 0.0175*** 0.0179*** 0.0155*** 0.0138*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0014) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0012 0.2268 0.4891 0.6472 0.1315 0.2629 0.5754 
Assetst-1    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.3156 0.2663 0.2393 0.2722 0.2035 0.1128 
Employeest-1     0.0022 0.0019 0.0004 0.0006 0.0011 
     (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
     0.0819 0.0858 0.5199 0.1484 0.1466 
Aget-1      0.0100*** 0.0137*** 0.0142*** 0.0080*** 
      (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0012) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0004*** 0.0003** 0.0003*** 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 
R&Dt-1        0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
        (0.0001) (0.0000) 
        0.0000 0.0000 
          
Observations 9,716 9,716 9,675 9,675 9,643 9,602 4,306 2,579 9,602 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 214 
 
Table 77: Pooled regression estimates of the mediation test using a time-delayed specification. Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
Environment SICt 4,115.8657*** 4,048.0562*** 2,683.5803* 2,599.8638* -214.5390 -587.4801 146.1473 -502.1050 -2,235.3079 
 (1,071.1663) (1,119.6909) (1,046.6056) (1,078.3240) (993.3397) (1,083.8055) (770.7797) (720.7886) (1,141.2048) 
 0.0001 0.0003 0.0104 0.0160 0.8290 0.5878 0.8497 0.4864 0.0503 
Environment CSRt-1 102.9893* 221.2391** 180.9891** 188.1807** 95.1757* 91.2408* 48.6059 26.8901 48.8680 
 (43.4301) (69.3472) (61.2218) (63.2483) (45.3545) (43.6357) (32.2597) (29.0845) (38.1585) 
 0.0178 0.0014 0.0032 0.0030 0.0360 0.0367 0.1322 0.3556 0.2005 
Long-term debtt-1   0.5978*** 0.4251* 0.1412 0.1261 0.9615*** -0.3592 0.0566 
   (0.1193) (0.1902) (0.1341) (0.1359) (0.2271) (0.5498) (0.1351) 
   0.0000 0.0255 0.2926 0.3534 0.0000 0.5139 0.6753 
Assetst-1    0.0309 0.0345 0.0351 -0.0722*** 0.6064** 0.0389 
    (0.0316) (0.0273) (0.0272) (0.0218) (0.2179) (0.0272) 
    0.3276 0.2070 0.1972 0.0010 0.0056 0.1521 
Employeest-1     203.1812*** 200.2417*** 174.6181*** 161.5257*** 191.4557*** 
     (10.9442) (11.2836) (18.6898) (14.5963) (14.1353) 
     0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Aget-1      123.9504** 32.9146 48.6714 101.3378* 
      (43.4582) (39.0392) (35.4650) (40.9852) 
      0.0044 0.3994 0.1705 0.0135 
Advertisingt-1       7.4942*** -1.4479 4.7346** 
       (2.0325) (2.1107) (1.7084) 
       0.0002 0.4930 0.0056 
R&Dt-1        -1.2981 5.0886*** 
        (1.9164) (1.2409) 
        0.4985 0.0000 
          
Observations 7,314 7,314 7,284 7,284 7,263 7,241 3,247 1,949 7,241 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Pooled regression: transformed DV to reduce outlier influence 
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Table 78: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of Environment CSR on performance using a time-delayed specification and an 
inverse hyperbolic sine transformed performance variable to control for the influence of outliers. Subscript t indicates year. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
Environment CSRt-1 -0.0041 0.0080** 0.0048 0.0051 0.0008 -0.0013 0.0010 -0.0037 -0.0050* 
 (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0022) 
 0.0966 0.0070 0.0798 0.0630 0.7696 0.5845 0.7410 0.3070 0.0240 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0000 0.0474 0.1341 0.2090 0.0043 0.5467 0.3818 
Assetst-1    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.3849 0.2837 0.2344 0.0321 0.2719 0.1663 
Employeest-1     0.0062* 0.0054* 0.0028* 0.0022* 0.0046* 
     (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0021) 
     0.0296 0.0242 0.0395 0.0469 0.0279 
Aget-1      0.0273*** 0.0260*** 0.0271*** 0.0251*** 
      (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0018) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0006** 0.0001 0.0003** 
       (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       0.0015 0.1888 0.0031 
R&Dt-1        0.0002* 0.0003*** 
        (0.0001) (0.0000) 
        0.0122 0.0000 
          
Observations 7,320 7,320 7,290 7,290 7,269 7,247 3,247 1,949 7,247 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 79: Pooled regression estimates of the effect of Environment CSR on Environment SIC using a time-delayed specification. 
Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 



















          
Environment CSRt-1 0.0152*** 0.0210*** 0.0200*** 0.0201*** 0.0185*** 0.0175*** 0.0179*** 0.0155*** 0.0138*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0014) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0012 0.2268 0.4891 0.6472 0.1315 0.2629 0.5754 
Assetst-1    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.3156 0.2663 0.2393 0.2722 0.2035 0.1128 
Employeest-1     0.0022 0.0019 0.0004 0.0006 0.0011 
     (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
     0.0819 0.0858 0.5199 0.1484 0.1466 
Aget-1      0.0100*** 0.0137*** 0.0142*** 0.0080*** 
      (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0012) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0004*** 0.0003** 0.0003*** 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 
R&Dt-1        0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
        (0.0001) (0.0000) 
        0.0000 0.0000 
          
Observations 9,716 9,716 9,675 9,675 9,643 9,602 4,306 2,579 9,602 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 80: Pooled regression estimates of the mediation test using a time-delayed specification and an inverse hyperbolic sine transformed 
performance variable to control for the influence of outliers. Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
Environment SICt 0.5306*** 0.5209*** 0.4600*** 0.4569*** 0.3819*** 0.3085*** 0.3499*** 0.2982*** 0.2353*** 
 (0.0400) (0.0383) (0.0375) (0.0369) (0.0455) (0.0391) (0.0393) (0.0393) (0.0350) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Environment CSRt-1 -0.0103*** -0.0005 -0.0023 -0.0021 -0.0047 -0.0056* -0.0037 -0.0068 -0.0074*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0022) 
 0.0000 0.8580 0.3601 0.4162 0.0528 0.0142 0.1828 0.0554 0.0008 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0000 0.0278 0.0872 0.1511 0.0017 0.6602 0.2777 
Assetst-1    0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.4216 0.3169 0.2584 0.0186 0.0606 0.1934 
Employeest-1     0.0054* 0.0048* 0.0027* 0.0020* 0.0044* 
     (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0019) 
     0.0259 0.0204 0.0200 0.0482 0.0233 
Aget-1      0.0246*** 0.0213*** 0.0231*** 0.0235*** 
      (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0018) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0004** 0.0000 0.0002* 
       (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       0.0069 0.7179 0.0122 
R&Dt-1        0.0001 0.0002*** 
        (0.0001) (0.0000) 
        0.3910 0.0000 
          
Observations 7,314 7,314 7,284 7,284 7,263 7,241 3,247 1,949 7,241 
Firm FEs No No No No No No No No No 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 81: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of Environment CSR on performance using a time-delayed specification. 
Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
Environment CSRt-1 9.8769 20.6893 22.3818 22.0282 26.0386 26.0782 3.1753 13.8815 26.5680 
 (5.0911) (13.9178) (13.9937) (13.6515) (13.7818) (13.8362) (11.0449) (17.1052) (13.9571) 
 0.0525 0.1373 0.1099 0.1068 0.0590 0.0596 0.7738 0.4174 0.0571 
Long-term debtt-1   0.1751* 0.2033** 0.1680* 0.1680* 0.1334 0.2318 0.1672* 
   (0.0771) (0.0773) (0.0761) (0.0761) (0.0780) (0.5840) (0.0768) 
   0.0233 0.0086 0.0275 0.0275 0.0873 0.6917 0.0295 
Assetst-1    -0.0194 -0.0273 -0.0273 -0.0093 0.0261 -0.0281 
    (0.0270) (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0163) (0.2502) (0.0281) 
    0.4723 0.3269 0.3268 0.5667 0.9170 0.3186 
Employeest-1     159.3771*** 159.3732*** 94.7293* 89.5819 156.7021** 
     (48.1127) (48.1149) (42.8246) (47.0472) (48.5755) 
     0.0009 0.0009 0.0272 0.0574 0.0013 
Aget-1      189.5337 297.6152* 147.9667 181.4599 
      (131.5520) (135.9342) (179.4578) (132.4839) 
      0.1498 0.0288 0.4100 0.1709 
Advertisingt-1       0.8588 0.6000 0.3815 
       (1.8659) (2.4577) (1.2769) 
       0.6454 0.8072 0.7652 
R&Dt-1        0.8709 0.9282 
        (1.6908) (0.6498) 
        0.6067 0.1533 
          
Observations 7,320 7,320 7,290 7,290 7,269 7,247 3,247 1,949 7,247 
Number of firms 1,933 1,933 1,928 1,928 1,922 1,912 879 527 1,912 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 82: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of Environment CSR on Environment SIC using a time-delayed specification. 
Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 



















          
Environment CSRt-1 0.0036*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0017 0.0002 
 (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0010) 
 0.0000 0.9463 0.9531 0.9551 0.9552 0.9609 0.9649 0.3930 0.8584 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.2445 0.2409 0.2434 0.2444 0.1115 0.3617 0.2313 
Assetst-1    -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.8189 0.8207 0.8210 0.5559 0.9245 0.6587 
Employeest-1     -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0030 0.0036 -0.0009 
     (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0027) 
     0.9953 0.9959 0.2901 0.2396 0.7305 
Aget-1      0.1965*** 0.1707*** 0.1975*** 0.1942*** 
      (0.0113) (0.0171) (0.0238) (0.0113) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0007** 0.0008** 0.0003 
       (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
       0.0079 0.0055 0.1505 
R&Dt-1        0.0001 0.0002* 
        (0.0001) (0.0001) 
        0.2253 0.0419 
          
Observations 9,716 9,716 9,675 9,675 9,643 9,602 4,306 2,579 9,602 
Number of firms 2,383 2,383 2,375 2,375 2,368 2,349 1,088 658 2,349 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 83: Fixed effects regression estimates of the mediation test using a time-delayed specification. Subscript t indicates year. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
Environment SICt -176.4512 -422.1780 -452.5099 -454.0624 -471.8139 -472.2557 114.4310 -48.5614 -499.3873 
 (262.6364) (276.3178) (278.4971) (278.7929) (274.2804) (274.4423) (318.5632) (428.0955) (283.9163) 
 0.5018 0.1267 0.1044 0.1035 0.0856 0.0855 0.7195 0.9097 0.0788 
Environment CSRt-1 10.4198 19.5542 21.1951 20.8349 24.7989 24.8355 3.4384 13.6475 25.4013 
 (5.5223) (13.2913) (13.3661) (13.0303) (13.1691) (13.2219) (10.6053) (15.9518) (13.3725) 
 0.0593 0.1414 0.1130 0.1100 0.0598 0.0605 0.7459 0.3926 0.0576 
Long-term debtt-1   0.1792* 0.2075** 0.1722* 0.1723* 0.1318 0.2326 0.1716* 
   (0.0778) (0.0789) (0.0775) (0.0775) (0.0795) (0.5898) (0.0781) 
   0.0214 0.0086 0.0263 0.0263 0.0978 0.6935 0.0282 
Assetst-1    -0.0195 -0.0274 -0.0274 -0.0090 0.0265 -0.0285 
    (0.0270) (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0163) (0.2483) (0.0283) 
    0.4699 0.3249 0.3248 0.5803 0.9151 0.3133 
Employeest-1     159.8263*** 159.8282*** 94.3372* 89.7213 156.4744** 
     (48.0045) (48.0082) (42.6765) (47.0682) (48.3043) 
     0.0009 0.0009 0.0273 0.0572 0.0012 
Aget-1      293.9786* 273.5565** 159.7281 289.8846* 
      (115.4215) (94.5756) (118.6242) (115.1916) 
      0.0109 0.0039 0.1787 0.0119 
Advertisingt-1       0.7537 0.6510 0.7700 
       (1.9462) (2.7101) (1.3789) 
       0.6986 0.8103 0.5766 
R&Dt-1        0.8772 1.0580 
        (1.7212) (0.6626) 
        0.6105 0.1104 
          
Observations 7,314 7,314 7,284 7,284 7,263 7,241 3,247 1,949 7,241 
Number of firms 1,930 1,930 1,925 1,925 1,919 1,909 879 527 1,909 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 84: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of Environment CSR on performance using a time-delayed specification and 
an inverse hyperbolic sine transformed performance variable to control for the influence of outliers. Subscript t indicates year. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
Environment CSRt-1 0.0026*** 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0010 0.0016 0.0021*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0004) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0660 0.0501 0.0000 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0151 0.0110 0.0523 0.0517 0.3423 0.8622 0.0581 
Assetst-1    -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.5598 0.1992 0.1949 0.0427 0.6036 0.1352 
Employeest-1     0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0021 0.0021 0.0037** 
     (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0012) 
     0.0015 0.0015 0.1201 0.1955 0.0022 
Aget-1      0.0222*** 0.0322*** 0.0298*** 0.0218*** 
      (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0054) (0.0037) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
       0.0907 0.2591 0.2991 
R&Dt-1        0.0001 0.0000 
        (0.0000) (0.0000) 
        0.2189 0.1583 
          
Observations 7,320 7,320 7,290 7,290 7,269 7,247 3,247 1,949 7,247 
Number of firms 1,933 1,933 1,928 1,928 1,922 1,912 879 527 1,912 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 85: Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of Environment CSR on Environment SIC using a time-delayed specification. 
Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 



















          
Environment CSRt-1 0.0036*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0017 0.0002 
 (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0010) 
 0.0000 0.9463 0.9531 0.9551 0.9552 0.9609 0.9649 0.3930 0.8584 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.2445 0.2409 0.2434 0.2444 0.1115 0.3617 0.2313 
Assetst-1    -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.8189 0.8207 0.8210 0.5559 0.9245 0.6587 
Employeest-1     -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0030 0.0036 -0.0009 
     (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0027) 
     0.9953 0.9959 0.2901 0.2396 0.7305 
Aget-1      0.1965*** 0.1707*** 0.1975*** 0.1942*** 
      (0.0113) (0.0171) (0.0238) (0.0113) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0007** 0.0008** 0.0003 
       (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
       0.0079 0.0055 0.1505 
R&Dt-1        0.0001 0.0002* 
        (0.0001) (0.0001) 
        0.2253 0.0419 
          
Observations 9,716 9,716 9,675 9,675 9,643 9,602 4,306 2,579 9,602 
Number of firms 2,383 2,383 2,375 2,375 2,368 2,349 1,088 658 2,349 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 86: Fixed effects regression estimates of the mediation test using a time-delayed specification and an inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformed performance variable to control for the influence of outliers. Subscript t indicates year. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 Revenuet+1 
          
Environment SICt 0.0020 -0.0099 -0.0105 -0.0105 -0.0109 -0.0109 -0.0121 -0.0212* -0.0124* 
 (0.0054) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0084) (0.0063) 
 0.7095 0.1078 0.0900 0.0894 0.0738 0.0719 0.0744 0.0122 0.0479 
Environment CSRt-1 0.0026*** 0.0019*** 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0021*** 0.0020*** 0.0009 0.0015 0.0021*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0004) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0717 0.0614 0.0000 
Long-term debtt-1   0.0000* 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000* 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   0.0136 0.0095 0.0442 0.0437 0.2690 0.9052 0.0477 
Assetst-1    -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    0.5558 0.1983 0.1940 0.0384 0.6398 0.1284 
Employeest-1     0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0022 0.0021 0.0037** 
     (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0012) 
     0.0014 0.0014 0.1080 0.1739 0.0020 
Aget-1      0.0246*** 0.0347*** 0.0349*** 0.0245*** 
      (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0056) (0.0038) 
      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Advertisingt-1       0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
       (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
       0.0574 0.1388 0.2179 
R&Dt-1        0.0001 0.0000 
        (0.0000) (0.0000) 
        0.1974 0.1279 
          
Observations 7,314 7,314 7,284 7,284 7,263 7,241 3,247 1,949 7,241 
Number of firms 1,930 1,930 1,925 1,925 1,919 1,909 879 527 1,909 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
